

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute for International Studies

Master thesis

2015

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**“The last Bridge“ – The United German
Olympic Teams in the East and West
German Press 1956-1964**

Master thesis

Prague 2015

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Academic Year: 2014/2015

Bibliographic note

Pust-Petters, Anna. *“The Last Bridge” – The United German Olympic Team in the East and West German Press 1956-1964*. Master thesis. Charles University in Prague, 2015.

Abstract

The purpose of the thesis is to explore how the negotiations about the United German Olympic Teams (1956-1964) were represented in the West and East German press, specifically in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FRG) and Neues Deutschland (GDR). The United German Olympic Teams were the last bridge connecting the two Germanys, continuing to exist even after the construction of the Berlin wall. The thesis is based on the assumption that sport played an important role in the construction of post-war German identities. Moreover, it will be argued that the two German states relied heavily on ideological demarcation from the respective “other” for legitimization. Thus, the thesis will argue that the discourses about the constitution of the team reflect on questions of identity, unity, and division. In order achieve this, Fairclough’s method of Critical Discourse Analysis will be used to examine ideological and symbolic content in the discourses on the negotiations between the two National Olympic Committees.

Abstrakt

Cílem této diplomové práce je prozkoumat způsob, jímž byla vyjednávání o společném německém olympijském týmu (1956-1964) zobrazována ve východoněmeckém a západoněmeckém tisku; konkrétně v Neues Deutschland (NDR) a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (SRN). Společný německý olympijský tým byl posledním mostem spojujícím obě Německa, existujícím dokonce i po vztyčení Berlínské zdi. Diplomová práce je založená na předpokladu, že sport hrál důležitou úlohu při utváření poválečných německých identit. Co více, snaží se dokázat, že se oba německé státy legitimizovaly na základě ideologického vymezení k "tomu druhému". Bude proto dokazovat, že diskurz o ustavení společného týmu odráží otázky identity, jednoty a rozdělení. Užitou metodou je Faircloughova metoda kritické diskurzivní analýzy; zkoumán je ideologický a symbolický obsah diskurzů o vyjednávání obou národních olympijských výborů.

Klíčová slova

Sport, Olympia, Německo, NDR, SRN

Keywords

Sport, Olympic Games, Germany, GDR, FRG

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 10 July 2015

Anna Pust-Petters

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my inspiring and ever helpful supervisors Tomáš Nigrin, Petr Roubal and Petr Šafařík as well as my patient proof-readers Fredric Petters, Filip Svitek, and especially Brianna Tichy. I would also like to thank Tomáš Brolík and Gerbrand van den Eekhout for Czech translation and moral support.

Institute of International Studies Master thesis proposal
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The Master's thesis should examine how the United German Olympic Teams were reflected in the Media from 1956-1964. The main research question of this thesis will be: "How were tensions concerning unity and identity projected through the media of a divided country?"

Related sub-questions can include: "How was the "other" Germany referred to in the context of the United Teams?"; "How does this reflect on the image of the national "self"?"; "Was there a noticeable change in the discourse throughout the eight year time period in which the United German Teams existed?"

Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	3
LITERATURE REVIEW	6
HISTORICAL CONTEXT	9
FRG	10
GDR	13
INNER-GERMAN COMPETITION	16
THE UNITED GERMAN OLYMPIC TEAMS.....	18
RECONSTRUCTING SPORT	20
POLITICAL SPORT.....	23
QUERELLES D'ALLEMAGNE	29
<i>The First Team</i>	34
<i>The Second Team</i>	38
<i>The Third Team – After the Wall</i>	39
<i>The first independent Olympic Teams 1968</i>	41
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA	42
FRG	43
GDR	45
METHODOLOGY: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS.....	49
RESEARCH QUESTION	52
RESEARCH DESIGN	52
FRAMING.....	54
ANALYSIS	57
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG	57
<i>German Unity</i>	57
<i>The “other” Germany</i>	62
<i>Style and Language</i>	69
NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.....	71
<i>German Unity</i>	71
<i>The “other” Germany</i>	75
<i>Style and Language</i>	80
CONCLUSION	82
PRIMARY SOURCES	85
BIBLIOGRAPHY	88
LIST OF APPENDICES	94
APPENDICES	95

Introduction

The topic of this thesis concerns itself with the United German Olympic Teams that existed for a eight-year time span from 1956 to 1964. Even though the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had already been constituted in 1949, this is especially paradox considering that the Berlin wall was built in 1961. The fact that the team existed even after the division of the country had become cemented was due to the instance of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which saw it as a victory of sport over politics.¹ Thus, the common Olympic team was the last area in which the two German states were connected, something that was not lost on contemporary observers. For instance, one *Der Spiegel* article from 1964 about the United German Teams is titled “*Die letzte Brücke.*”² – the last bridge.

Moreover, the time period in which it existed was one of the reconstruction of post-war German identity, or rather identities, which was necessary after the ideological vacuum the legacy of the Third Reich had left in Germany. The importance of sport for national identity and legitimization of the state has been thoroughly examined in the case of the GDR, however it has also been claimed that victories of national teams in the FRG, such as the football World Cup of 1954, did more for national identity in the FRG than the Economic Miracle was ever able to achieve. Sport, seen as ideologically free space, was the first realm in which Germans were able to feel something akin to national pride after the end of World War II. Another factor that figured heavily into the construction of post-War German identities was that of demarcation from the other state. In the FRG this manifested itself in a strident-anti-communism, while the GDR based its legitimization largely on its role in the struggle between future-oriented socialism and imperialist capitalism represented by the FRG.³ Thus, it can be assumed that “the last Bridge” of the United German Teams were an instrument over which

¹ Brick, Eike, “Die gesamtdeutschen Olympiamannschaften – Eine paradoxie der deutschen Sportgeschichte?” PhD. diss. University of Bielefeld 2013, p. 1.

² “Die letzte Brücke.” *Der Spiegel*, 6 October 1965, accessed 20 March, 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46274484.html>.

³ Sywottek, Arnold, “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als gesellschaftspolitische Herausforderung der DDR.” In *Die DDR und der Westen : transnationale Beziehungen 1949-1989*, edited by Ulrich Pfeil. Berlin: Links, 2001, p. 151.

conflicts of national identity, ideology, legitimization, and most importantly unity versus division were carried out.

The mass media, as Walter Lippmann adequately stated, creates a bridge between “the world outside and the pictures in our head.”⁴ The media disseminated not only information, but symbolic content to a large and heterogeneous audience.⁵ As McQuail has illustrated, media spreads knowledge – in a very broad sense of the word – including identity, history and meaning, to society: “...the media to a large extent serve to constitute our perceptions and definitions of social reality and normality for the purposes of a public, shared social life, and are key source of standards, models, and norms.”⁶

The main research question will be: How were tensions concerning unity and identity projected through the media of a divided country? Related sub-questions include: How was the “other” Germany referred to in the context of the United Teams? How does this reflect on the image of the national “self”? Was there a makeable change in the discourse throughout the eight year time period in which the United German teams existed?

I will attempt to shed light on these questions by examining how the united German Teams were represented in the West and East German media, more specifically the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) and *Neues Deutschland* (ND). In order to do this, I will use Fairclough’s concept of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). As Fairclough states, understanding the socio-cultural and historical context in which a certain communicative event takes place is tantamount to analysing discourse. This is why a large part of this thesis is dedicated to situating the United German Teams in the context in which they were established.⁷ I will begin by broadly outlining political and societal developments in both German states, followed by a brief contextualization of the role of the media in East and West Germany. Next I will give a narrative description of how and why the United German team was constituted for the Olympics of 1956, 1960 and 1964, which is tantamount to understanding the discourse on the United German Teams. Finally I will describe the used methodology and research design,

⁴ Lipwell quoted by McCombs, in McCombs, Maxwell E. *Setting the agenda : the mass media and public opinion*. Cambridge Malden, MA: Polity, 2014, p. 21.

⁵ Rowe, David. *Sport, culture and the media the unruly trinity*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2004, p. 25.

⁶ McQuail, Denis. *McQuail's mass communication theory*. Los Angeles, Calif. London: SAGE, 2005, p. 81.

⁷ Fairclough, Norman. *Media discourse*. London New York: E. Arnold, 1995, p. 184.

followed by the actual analysis. In the analysis I will attempt to show that the discourse about the United German Olympic Teams reflect the heightening tensions about the division of Germany. As the division became more apparent, so did the discourse become more aggressive. In conclusion I will summarize the discourse on the United German team.

Even though in some points the similarities and differences between the East and West German discourse will be pointed out, it must be clarified that this thesis does not tempt to compare the two. As will be illustrated below, the media in East Germany had, by the early 1950s, developed along the lines of a pluralistic, democratic society, while it was completely controlled by the state in East Germany, which would make a direct comparison arbitrary. The units of analysis will, however, be the same for both ND and FAZ, as it can be assumed that even the party-controlled East German media reacted to its population. Moreover, this will demonstrate that the points of conflict were very similar in both German states.

It must also be pointed out that this thesis uses an inter-disciplinary approach, drawing from fields such as historiography, sociology and communication studies. Hence, due to time constraints, many broader theoretical concepts will only be hinted at, as theoretical detail has been sacrificed in service of broader context.

The thesis adds value to the field since, as Boyle and Haynes have illustrated, “Mediated versions of sport are one of the key areas of culture which give us a sense of a lived history.”⁸ More specifically, the topic of United Teams has not been paid a great deal of attention by academia. Moreover, its medial representation has not been examined at all. In a broader context, the research on the connection between sport and international relations has only been started to be of interest in the last 10 years.

⁸ Boyle, Raymond, and Haynes, Richard. *Power play sport, the media and popular culture*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p.19.

1. Literature Review

Surprisingly, the United German Olympic Teams has not been a major topic of research in sport historiography. Eike Brick, in the form of a doctoral dissertation titled “*Die gesamtdeutschen Olympiamannschaften – eine Paradoxie der Sportgeschichte?*”⁹ has undertaken the most recent and comprehensive study on the United German Olympic Teams. Brick’s dissertation concerns itself with the question of how it was possible that a United German team existed in a time when the FRG denounced any contact to the GDR, who was in turn trying struggling for international recognition. She points out the paradoxical situation, that only at the time of Willy Brandt’s *Neue Ostpolitik*, and thus for the Olympics of 1972, did the two German states participate in the Olympics with their respective national flags, anthem and emblem.¹⁰ Brick situates the United Teams in the broader context of competitive sport and the Cold War for the time frame 1949-1972, while at the same time emphasizing inner-German sport relations. Theoretically, her work is based on the concept of “*Re-Kulturalisierung*,”¹¹ a stream of thought in sport historiography, which emphasizes the cultural, as opposed to the societal and political, importance of sport. Hence, she argues, that the influence of politics on the United German Teams was not as strong as previously assumed. Instead of working with primary sources, Brick attempts to widen the conceptualization of the United German Teams by excluding “*Primatdenken*.”¹²

Isabell Kappler has examined the united German Teams exclusively from the side of the GDR. She shows that sport, and especially high-level competitive sport, was fully integrated into the GDR’s foreign policy and used as a means to demonstrate East German legitimacy and sovereignty. As opposed to Brick, Kappler uses primary sources from the SED, thus clearly emphasizing the influence of politics in sport, at least for the East German side.¹³

⁹ Brick.

¹⁰ Brick, p. 1-2.

¹¹ Brick, p. 25-26.

¹² Brick, p. 38.

¹³ Kappler, Isabell, “Die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft 1964 im Spiegel der Sportpolitik der DDR. Eine Neubewertung auf der Grundlage des Archivs für Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der DDR (Berlin).“ In *Blickpunkt Olympia : Entdeckungen, Erkenntnisse, Impulse = Focus on Olympism*, edited by Manfred Messing, 254-262. Kassel Petersham, NSW: Agon-Sportverl. Walla Walla Press, 2000.

Gerald R. Hughes and Rachel J. Owen have examined the United Teams from the view of the British foreign office. While mainly concentrating on the British perspective, they offer valuable insights into the symbolic nature of national representation at the Olympics.¹⁴

Apart from these works, the United German Teams have mainly been included in broader considerations on inter-German sport relations. For the pre-1989 period, it must be noted that GDR historiography did not concern itself with the United German Teams at all. As Brick has pointed out, FRG historians started to pay attention to the United German teams by the 1970s, most likely due to the success of the GDR in the 1972 Olympics. Most of these works are however, influenced largely by anti-communist tendencies.¹⁵

Ulrich Pabst¹⁶ has also devoted a great deal of attention to the United German Teams in the context of inner-German sport relations in the period of 1945 to 1961. He emphasizes the instrumentalization of sport by politics not only in the GDR, but also for the FRG. Due to the fact that Pabst's work was published in 1980, certain aspects concerning the GDR were not included in the book. Despite this fact, he does give a very detailed account on the United German Teams, without being openly motivated by anti-communist or anti-GDR resentments. Unfortunately, his examination ends with 1961, thus does not integrate the last Olympics for which a United German Team was constituted. Gunter Holzweißig examines the United German Teams in the framework of sport as an instrument of the GDR's foreign policy, however it is only briefly mentioned under the broader topic of inter-German sport relations and mainly draws on Pabst.¹⁷

After the opening of the GDR archives in 1989, several collections on primary sources concerning sport in the GDR were published throughout the course of the 1990s, however none of them is exclusively about the United Teams.¹⁸

The volume "*Rückkehr nach Olympia. Vorgeschichte – Gründung – Erste*

¹⁴ Hughes, R. Gerald and Owen, Rachel J., "'The Continuation of Politics by Other Means': Britain, the Two Germanys and the Olympic Games, 1949-1972." *Contemporary European History* 18 (2009): 443-474.

¹⁵ Brick, p. 7.

¹⁶ Pabst, Ulrich. *Sport, Medium der Politik?: Der Neuaufbau des Sports in Deutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und die innerdeutschen Sportbeziehungen bis 1961*. Berlin: Bartels und Wernitz, 1980, p. 21.

¹⁷ Holzweißig, Gunter, Manfred Messing, and Voigt, Dieter. *Diplomatie im Trainingsanzug: Sport als politisches Instrument der DDR in den innerdeutschen und internationalen Beziehungen*. München Wien: Oldenbourg, 1981.

Jahre,” published by the West German NOC in 1989 offers a detailed examination of the inner workings of the NOC as well as the DSB in its constitutive years. However, due to the time in which it was published and the publisher itself, interpretations offered on the United German Teams, the East German NOC as well as the FRG’s NOC itself, must be taken with a grain of salt.¹⁹

Günter Buchstab’s article “*Sport und Politik im geteilten Deutschland*”²⁰ examines the connection between sport and politics in divided Germany, however mainly focuses on each German perspective rather than inter-German sport relations. Concerning the United German Olympic Teams, he does not offer any new, valuable insights.

Andreas Michaelis mentions the United Teams briefly in the context of sport in the GDR as part of the systemic conflict with the FRG. He is one of the few authors who explicitly claims that, while the GDR decidedly tried to use sport as a means to international political recognition, its role in achieving this should not be overvalued. He supports this hypothesis by stating that at the time the East German NOC was officially recognized, the GDR had established diplomatic relations merely with 13 countries. Furthermore, he states that it was the political and economic hegemony of the FRG that isolated the GDR, and it was also a shift in West German policy, and the abandonment of the Hallstein-Doctrine, which ended the isolation.²¹

Michael Geyer in turn has shown how the Hallstein-Doctrine was reflected in inner-German sport relations and in this context, also devotes a considerable amount of attention to the United Teams. Geyer claims that the GDR represented itself as a state entity towards the West primarily through sport, which was of great importance for inter-German relations. Owing to the offensive strategy of the GDR in utilizing sport as a means to official recognition, the question of the national representation of Germany was intensified. The connected questions of symbolic representation of national identity touched on the self-conception of the FRG to represent all of Germany, and therefore,

¹⁸ See Brick for a brief discussion of available sources, Brick, p.11.

¹⁹ Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland (Ed.). *Rückkehr nach Olympia : Vorgeschichte, Gründung, erste Jahre; eine Dokumentation herausgegeben vom Nationalen Olympischen Komitee für Deutschland aus Anlass der 40. Wiederkehr seines Gründungstages am 24. September 1949*. München: Copress-Verl, 1989.

²⁰ Buchstab, Günter, “Sport und Politik im geteilten Deutschland.” *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 8 (2001): 113-130.

²¹ Michaelis, Andreas, “Der Leistungssport der DDR im Spannungsfeld der Systemaußenbeziehung in den 50er und 60er Jahren.” In *Parteiauftrag, ein neues Deutschland : Bilder, Rituale und Symbole der frühen DDR*, edited by Dieter Vorsteher. München: Koehler & Amelang, 1997, p. 431-433.

based on the GDR's offensive strategy, sport was integrated into the fundamental principals of West German foreign policy throughout the second half of the 1950s.²²

Although some of the above mentioned publications occasionally rely on quoting press from both East and West Germany in connection with the United German Olympic Teams, mainly to demonstrate public opinion, none of them offers an examination of the role of the media for the United Teams, nor for inter-German sport relations in general.

David Rowe as well as Richard Haynes and Raymond Boyle²³ have examined the relationship between Sport, Media and (Popular-) Culture. Although they focus on the Anglo-Saxon sphere, as well as professional sport journalism, they convincingly show why sport history is important, and furthermore, why media and sport are inherently connected. As Haynes and Boyle state: "Mediated versions of sport are one of the key areas of culture which give us a sense of a lived history."²⁴ Moreover, they all offer comprehensive overview of theories of sport in sociology.

2. Historical Context

Even though the main topic of this thesis revolves around sport and its medial representation, it is important to look at the social and historical context of the era, which is under examination. Certainly the division of the world into a bipolar bloc system culminating in the Cold War was the most important international political development after the end of World War II. It pertains to the topic of the thesis insofar that Germany itself, geographically and otherwise, lay at the heart of the conflict.²⁵ The next chapter will outline political and societal developments in both German states that are important for the topic of the thesis, however, due to space constraints and the fact that it has been examined thoroughly by historiography, the general international context can not be outlined in detail. Mainly the focus will lie on the

²²Geyer, Martin H., "Der Kampf um nationale Repräsentation. Deutsch-deutsche Sportbeziehungen und die 'Hallstein-Doktrin.'" *Vierteljahresschrift für Zeitgeschichte* 44 (1996), p. 58.

²³ Rowe; Haynes and Boyle.

²⁴ Boyle and Haynes, p. 19.

legitimization, or lack thereof, in both German states. I will attempt to show that in both cases, distancing from the “other“ German state as well as inner-German competition was one of the main strategies of legitimization as well as formation of national identity.

FRG

By the mid-1950s, the FRG had become a member of the West European Coal and Steel Union, joined NATO and reestablished an army and armament industry. At the same time, it had gained partial independence from the western allies and established diplomatic relations through a foreign ministry, which was followed by formal independence in 1955. Even though the Allies never officially abandoned their commitment to a future reunification of Germany as stipulated in the Potsdam agreement, the western Allies' rejection of the Stalin Note of March 10, 1952, implied that German unity was not on the top of political priorities. Although the GDR had been constituted in 1949, the FRG was committed to denying the division of the country. This was articulated in the sole claim to representation, or *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* of the German nation, and solidified in the Basic Law: “Until Germany was restored as a unified state, the government of the Federal Republic - which alone had been elected in a free democratic matter - would act as the sole legitimate representative of the German people.”²⁶ In terms of *Realpolitik* this was translated into the Hallstein-Doctrine, which was a cornerstone of FRG-foreign policy and was aimed at isolating the GDR by internationally by not establishing diplomatic relations with any countries that recognized the, derivatively titled, “so-called GDR.”²⁷

Politically, the time of Adenauer's fourteen-year chancellorship is generally believed to be a time of stability due to its sheer length, however, political and societal consensus was not nearly as secure as is often assumed.²⁸ One of the biggest issues of time was naturally that of reunification. American surveys of West

²⁵ Lemke, Michael, “Die Außenbeziehungen der DDR (1949-1966).“ In *Die DDR und der Westen : transnationale Beziehungen 1949-1989*, edited by Ulrich Pfeil. Berlin: Links, 2001, p. 65.

²⁶ Schaefer, Sagi “Hidden Behind the Wall: West German State Building and the emergence of the Iron Curtain.“ *Central European History* 44 (2011), p. 512.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 513.

²⁸ Weiner, Andrew S., “Memory under Reconstruction: Politics and Event in ‘Wirtschaftswunder’ West Germany.“ *Grey Room* 37 (2009), p. 101.

German opinions show that in 1955 as much as 40% of the population would have accepted neutrality, as proposed by the Soviet Union, as the price for reunification and, moreover, they blamed the division of the country on both sides - a nightmare for Adenauer's western-oriented policy.²⁹ In fact, other surveys show that from 1950s until the 1980s, 70-80% of the participants regularly were for reunification.³⁰

Weiner states that "... the Adenauer period is typically characterized as a time of near-total, state-sanctioned amnesia regarding the crimes of National Socialist repression."³¹ Structural and personal continuities with the Third Reich, contemporary critics argued, had led to the failure of constructing a new, more humane world after the collapse of the old one.³² And indeed, despite the rhetoric of denazification, it has been estimated that approximately 80% of FRG civil servants were formerly members of the NSDAP.³³ The often-minuscule reparation of resistance fighters and concentration camp prisoners stood in stark contrast to ex-Nazis occupying high public offices. As indispensable as moral critique may have been, the policy of looking the other way did have a stabilizing effect on the new state,³⁴ which it needed desperately. Apart from general reconstruction efforts after the war, until 1961 the FRG and its society had to deal with the integration of up to 12 million refugees, émigrés and displaced persons.³⁵ Therefore, superficial identification was facilitated, while a politically and economically strong republic was formed - albeit built on a morally weak foundation.³⁶

At the same time, the question of personal continuity caused problems for legitimacy of Adenauer's chancellorship as well as social friction. Throughout the 1950s and 60s a new generation was entering adulthood, which was itself entirely unconnected to the crimes of their parents' generation. The term "don't trust anyone older than 30" was coined during this period and illustrates the generational conflict adequately. Detlef Siegfried identifies up to five incongruous generations, ranging

²⁹ Schumacher, Frank, "Democratization and Hegemonic Control: American Propaganda and the West German Public's Foreign Policy Orientation, 1949-1955." In *The American Nation – National Identity – Nationalism*, edited by Knud Krakau. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 1997, p. 290, 293.

³⁰ Friedrich, Wolfgang-Uwe, "'Wir sind ein Volk' Die Deutschen und die Deutsche Einheit, 1945-1990." *German Studies Review* 15 (1992), p. 147.

³¹ Weiner, Andrew S., "Memory under Reconstruction: Politics and Event in 'Wirtschaftswunder' West Germany." *Grey Room* 37 (2009), p. 96.

³² Klessmann, Christoph. *Die doppelte Staatsgründung : deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991, p. 296.

³³ Weiner, p. 96.

³⁴ Klessmann, "doppelte Staatsgründung." p. 297.

³⁵ Friedrich, p. 138.

from the people who were born during the *Kaiserreich*, who had experienced a third change of political systems during their lifetime, including Konrad Adenauer and his successor Ludwig Erhard, to the people born around 1950 and were adolescents during the quite turbulent 1960s.³⁷ Furthermore he states: “Undoubtedly, the ‘long 1960s’ between roughly 1958 and 1973 in West Germany were also ‘Golden years’ of economic prosperity, increased leisure time, deformatization of societal relations and political liberalization.”³⁸ All of these undoubtedly positive societal shifts were substantially advanced by the younger generation, but at the same time faced fierce confrontation, sometimes even in the form of terrorism, from those who profited most from them.³⁹

After the turbulent times following World War II, West Germany found itself in a greatly improved position compared to its Eastern Counterpart. Due to Marshall Plan economic aid and the full integration into the western system of alliances, the *Wirtschaftswunder* had taken hold in the FRG. Kleßmann underlines the importance of the myth of the market economy as an important factor in the stabilization and integration of the state, as it enabled the suppression of political and moral problems.⁴⁰ The strident anti-communism that developed during this time must also be seen in the context of forgetting uncomfortable truths of the past. Even though its roots in Germany go back to the Weimar Republic, the events in the Soviet Occupational Zone, as well as the radical transformation towards Stalinism in the GDR, solidified and legitimized this attitude, creating a societal consensus that encompassed all relevant political and social groups.⁴¹

Although the topic of Inter-German competition is more relevant for the GDR and will be further outlined at a later point, it can be assumed that it did have its part to play in West Germany. The influx well-educated workers did its part in supporting the economic miracle. Also the construction of the social market economy did not happen without competitive pressure from East Germany. The anti-communist integration theory lived from the demarcation towards the GDR, and Adenauer’s

³⁶ Klessmann, “doppelte Staatsgründung,” p. 297.

³⁷ Siegfried, Detlef, “‘Don’t Trust Anyone Older Than 30?’ Voices of Conflict and Consensus between Generations in 1960s West Germany.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40/4 (2005), p. 729.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 728.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 727 - 728.

⁴⁰ Klessmann, “doppelte Staatsgründung,” p. 297.

⁴¹ Klessmann, “doppelte Staatsgründung,” p. 298.

election victories of 1949 and 1953 can only be understood in the context of East German developments.⁴²

GDR

Generally, the 1950s can be characterized as years of crisis in the relationship between regime and society in the GDR - they were a decade of social transformation following far-reaching policies of expropriation, redistribution and nationalization within the framework of denazification and demilitarization. The weakness of the political and economic structure was publicly illustrated and strengthened by the mass exodus of irreplaceable groups of people. The construction of the Wall in 1961 was the *ultima ratio* of the regime to enforce the integration of the population.⁴³

Similarly to West Germany, the GDR initially declared its own claim to sole representation in its constitution. However, at the latest from 1961 onwards, its policy shifted towards demarcation and the preservation of the state. In the “Peace Plan“ of 1961 and the “National Document“ of 1962,⁴⁴ national sovereignty, as opposed to unity, were highlighted. Furthermore, the so-called “two-state-theory“ underlined the GDR’s insistence on two German states.⁴⁵ Moreover, the “three-state-theory” stipulated that West-Berlin was its own state, in contrast to being part of the FRG.⁴⁶

Generally there was a shift in policy towards West Germany from the late 1950s. Until then, both states had been connected not only through sports,

⁴² Sabrow, Martin, “Die DDR in der deutschen Geschichte.“ In *Die DDR und der Westen : transnationale Beziehungen 1949-1989*, edited by Ulrich Pfeil. Berlin: Links, 2001, p. 28.

⁴³ Skyba, Peter, “Massenorganisationen ohne Massen. Jugendpolitik, Militarisierung und das Scheitern der FDJ.“ In *Vor dem Mauerbau : Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 235. ; Scherstjanoi, Elke and Schwart, Ralph “Vergleichende Betrachtungen zu Krisenverlauf, Krisenwahrnehmung und Krisenmanagement 1952/52 und 1960/61.“ In *Vor dem Mauerbau: Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 266.

⁴⁴ Friedrich, p. 145.

⁴⁵ Wentker, Hermann, “Die gesamtdeutsche Systemkonkurrenz und die durchlässige innerdeutsche Grenze. Herausforderungen und Aktionsrahmen für die DDR in den fünfziger Jahren.“ In *Vor dem Mauerbau : Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 60-65.

⁴⁶ Pabst, p. 256.

churches and personal relationships, but also through trade - something that the East German economy had been relying heavily.⁴⁷ However, from this point onwards, there was a quantitative increase in demarcation efforts by the GDR, including restriction of passenger transport and mail, as well as telephone lines.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the GDR launched a massive propaganda campaign against Adenauer and his government, which accused the FRG of having National Socialist functionaries in all leading positions. This campaign was clearly intended to decrease the legitimization of the West German state, while having the opposite effect in the GDR.⁴⁹

The planned economy was one of the first steps towards socialism that the SED implemented. However, the lack in economic experience, the increase of production without technological or qualitative improvement, led to the East German economy performing dismally throughout the 1950s and⁵⁰ the dissatisfaction with standards of living increased accordingly to the improvement of those in West Germany.⁵¹ Moreover, the Sovietization of the GDR was cemented and increased by the 2nd Party Conference. Most of its resolutions, like the administrative reform that was supposed to expand and widen the control of the SED; the alteration of class relationship and ownership in favor of socialism, the militarization of life in general and the socialist restructuring of culture, education and upbringing (*“Bildung und Erziehung”*⁵²) had very tangible impacts on every day life. For instance, the forced collectivization of farms affected not only agricultural workers, as the drop in production was felt by everyone.⁵³ Moreover, the attempt to dogmatically indoctrinate the youth failed repeatedly in the policy of the FDJ. Small freedoms given in response to this failure were revoked as soon as the younger generations attempted to test their limitations. The young generation showed its dissatisfaction with the regime, like many others, by emigrating: alone in the two weeks leading up to the construction of the wall, 15 000 adolescents fled to West Germany.⁵⁴

⁴⁷ Wentker, p. 63.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 71.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 73-74.

⁵¹ Heydemann, Günther and Roth, Heidi “Systembedingte Konfliktpotentiale in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre. Die Leipziger Universität in den Jahren 1953, 1956 und 1961.“ In *Vor dem Mauerbau : Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 206-208.

⁵² Ibid., p. 206-208.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 206-208.

⁵⁴ Skyba, p. 262-263.

The massive abscondence of East Germans, mainly of young, well-educated specialists, only increased economic problems of the GDR.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the problem of *Republikflucht* was nothing less than a public relations disaster for the regime.⁵⁶ What could easily be declared the biggest challenge the GDR had to face, at least until the construction of the Berlin Wall, has been called “*Abstimmung mit den Füßen*.”⁵⁷ Albert O. Hirschmann, however, has claimed that the open border also had a stabilizing effect on the regime. Firstly, the emigration of specialists made room for persons loyal to the regime to occupy leading positions in politics and the economy. Secondly, the mass exodus was the consequence of societal resignation of resistance to the regime, both of which had a stabilizing effect.⁵⁸ In any case, until 1961 more than 3.5 million East Germans emigrated to the GDR, amounting to approximately 15% of the population.⁵⁹

Continuities from the Third Reich were indeed much less common than in the FRG - as outlined before, denazification was pursued with far more vigor in the Soviet Zone. Even though some professions such as doctors and Protestant priests, whose party membership in the NSDAP had been high in numbers, were spared out of necessity or concession to the Church, the complete exchange in civil servants caused a break with old traditions of the bureaucracy. Something similar could be observed with the intelligence, where the exchange of elites was also very high, although formally it was strikingly similar to the old one in terms of closeness to the regime.⁶⁰ That the proclaimed equalization of society did not take place, namely that the regime had to make room, at least to a certain extent and based economic and political considerations for a bourgeois class, led to social conflict in the GDR. Even though the workers were ideologically privileged, they never were able to truly establish political control. Kleßmann states that even though traditional social stratification was nonexistent, it was merely replaced with one that was different and harder to measure

⁵⁵ Ritter, Gerhard A., “Traditionen und Brüche: die DDR in den fünfziger Jahren.” In *Vor dem Mauerbau : Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann, 21-38. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 23.

⁵⁶ For more information on the topic of *Republikflucht* see Bispinck, Henrik, “‘Republikflucht’: Flucht und AÜreise als Problem für die SED-Führung.” In *Vor dem Mauerbau : Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann, 286-309. München: Oldenbourg, 2003.

⁵⁷ Wentker, p. 74.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 73-74.

⁵⁹ Friedrich, p. 138.

⁶⁰ Ritter, p. 31-32.

by old standards, something that can easily be seen in the existence of a *nomenclatura*.⁶¹

Throughout the course of the 1950s it became clear that the GDR was not able to compete with the FRG economically or politically, be it through singular action or longer campaigns. With its economic and political stabilization, the FRG was enormously attractive for East Germans, where the initial post-war vigor of the *Aufbaugesellschaft* had already started to wear off.⁶² Moreover, a large challenge emanated from West Germany especially in the field of traditional *Hochkultur* such as journalism, fiction, essay writing but mainly historiography. The intense censorship of academics in the GDR never allowed them to reach the same standards as in the West. Thus, as Sywottek has pointed out, the FRG posed a societal and political challenge for the legitimization of the GDR, increasing inter-German competition.⁶³

Inner-German Competition

With the constitution of the GDR, inner-German competition for the right to national existence and sovereignty was created as well. Its importance cannot be over-stressed for the topic of this thesis. Even though the GDR has to be viewed as part of the history of the Soviet Bloc, and only then as part of German history, every decision by the Polit-Bureau and government was made in regards to Bonn, and had to be sanctioned by Moscow which decreased the possibility for independent action significantly. Furthermore *“Während das ‘Dritte Reich’ ein nationaler Einheitsstaat mit hoher Identifikation der Bevölkerung war, bildete die DDR lediglich einen Teilstaat in steter Fixierung auf und in beständiger Konkurrenz zum anderen Teil der Nation.”*⁶⁴ Consequently, sport was perhaps one of, if not the only area in which the GDR was able to outshine the FRG.

After looking at each country individually, it is important to note the common denominators between the GDR and the FRG. First and foremost, both states were German - meaning that they shared the same history, language and culture as

⁶¹ Klessmann, Chritoph, “‘Führende Klasse’, Sozialpolitik und Egalisierung in der DDR.“ In *Vor dem Mauerbau : Politik und Gesellschaft in der DDR der fünfziger Jahre*, edited by Dierk Hoffmann. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, p. 82-85.

⁶² Wentker, p. 69.

⁶³ Sywottek, p. 151-162.

well as experience of the war, including the questions of fault and guilt, and the consequent occupation through the Allies. Moreover, the populations of the GDR and FRG were inherently connected through personal relationships, which permeated the demarcation line. Initially, both German states laid claim to be successor states of the Reich and their by a respective *Alleinvertretungsanspruch*, manifested in the constitution of the GDR and the FRG's Basic Law with the pan-German terminology "*Volk*."⁶⁵

Yet another similarity between the states was the method of politically and legally persecuting proponents of the other as a matter of astonishing implicitness. While in the FRG the partially excessive anti-communism was regulated through legislation, in the GDR the declaimed fear of spies, agents and *saboteurs* turned into a political tool typical of Stalinist argumentation.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, East German politicians nearly outdid their West German counterparts, whom they (in part, rightly so) accused of being National Socialists, in regards to using national rhetoric. For instance, in 1956, the first east German minister of defense, Willy Stoph, declared: "*Im Gegensatz zu den Westdeutschen Söldnerformationen, die amerikanische Uniformen tragen, wird unsere nationale Volksarmee deutsche Uniformen tragen, die den nationalen Traditionen unseres Volkes entsprechen.*"⁶⁷ Furthermore, the deliverance of the nation from the "*Bonner Protektoratsverwaltung*," "*nationale Wiedergeburt*," "*nationale Würde*"⁶⁸ and "national rights" as well as the protection of advanced German culture from "*volksfremden und volkfeindlichen Strömungen.*"⁶⁹ were declared as main goals of the SED.⁷⁰ The argument that a deepening of the division must be avoided at all costs, which had still been persistent in the 1940s, completely disappeared throughout the 1950s.

However, the construction of the "other Germany" as the enemy did not only have negative domestic consequences. On the contrary, the competing systems turned into a challenge for both sides. In all relevant statements of the SED, the reference to unity was clearly articulated. No matter how dismal the consequences of

⁶⁴ Pfeil, Ulrich, "Eine Einleitung." In *Die DDR und der Westen : transnationale Beziehungen 1949-1989*, edited by Ulrich Pfeil. Berlin: Links, 2001, p.14.

⁶⁵ Asmus, Ronald, "The GDR and the German Nation: Sole Heir or Socialist Sibling?" *International Affairs* 60 (1948), p. 405.

⁶⁶ Klessmann, "doppelte Staatsgründung." p. 300.

⁶⁷ Friedrich, p. 145.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 145.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 145.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 145.

any given policy of increasing production norms was, it was all done in service of reunification. Similarly, the FRG could use the nationalization and collectivization of private property in the GDR as an argument to torpedo reforms that went in similar directions and discredit excessively socially radical claims.⁷¹

As unavoidable as the division of Germany seems retrospectively, the complex causation of internal and external influences cannot be ignored. Even though it was certainly consequential of international developments, domestic factors in Germany played an important role. While the East German politicians were unwilling, or perhaps rather unable, to envision any other plan for Germany than that of a socialist state, the West German politicians and public were mostly not willing to consider reunification as a neutral country. The German question therefore turned into nothing more than political rhetoric. In the GDR the evocation of a “peace-loving and democratic Germany,” lost its initial credibility due to the fact that no one wanted to have a unified, yet Stalinist Germany. Additionally, the SED lacked any democratic legitimization, illustrated by the demonstrations of June 17, 1953. In the FRG the utilization of potential unification was similarly ritualized, however, since the government had public backing, alternative forms could not be enforced democratically.⁷²

The United German Olympic Teams

The father of the modern day Olympics, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, was an ardent advocate of the “healthy body, healthy mind” idea. While he realized that physical fitness of the younger generations would make the population more effective in waging war – it must be added that France had just been defeated in the Franco-Prussian war – he assumed that meeting and interacting with other young people from all over the world who shared a common interest, namely sport, would support international understanding and decrease the likelihood of actual war.⁷³ The idea that international sporting events were, and are, in fact productive for improved relations between countries, whether they might be engaged in a conflict or not, has not always been shared by everyone. In 1945 George Orwell wrote:

⁷¹ Klessmann, “doppelte Staatsgründung,” p. 300-301.

⁷² Ibid., p. 299-300.

“I am always amazed when I hear people saying that sport creates goodwill between the nations, and that if only the common peoples of the world could meet one another at football or cricket, they would have no inclination to meet on the battlefield. Even if one didn’t know from concrete examples (the 1936 Olympic Games, for instance) that international sporting contests lead to orgies of hatred, one could deduce it from general principles.”⁷⁴

What Orwell implied in the article, which was written after the Soviet Dynamo’s visited Britain for a football match, is the theory of sport as “symbolic representation,” the “continuation of politics by other means”⁷⁵ and even a functional substitute for war. There certainly are enough historical examples which support this theory. One must only think of the Water-Polo match at the Olympic Games of 1956 between the Hungarian and Soviet teams that took place amidst the bloody suppression of the revolution in Budapest by Soviet troops, or when Czechoslovakia beat the Soviet Union in the 1969 World Ice Hockey championships, merely one year after the Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Regardless of which stance one chooses to take (as the two diverging opinions seem to be exactly that – opinions depending on personal interpretation and the individual context of each match), it is well established that national governments have invested strongly in sports, “... because of the highly effective way in which sport can contribute to nation building.”⁷⁷ If we assume that after World War II the legacy of National Socialism necessitated the reconstruction of German identity, or rather identities in East and West Germany, it seems necessary to examine how sport figured into the process of nation building in postwar Germany. The following chapter will outline the reorganization of sport after World War II, sport as a factor in the inter-German struggle for national legitimization and finally, the *Querelle d’Allemand* or the conflict surrounding the constitution of a United German Olympic team.

⁷³ Rowe, p. 17.

⁷⁴ Orwell quoted in Rowe, p. 23.

⁷⁵ *Die Zeit* from 1966 quoted by Hughes and Owen, p. 443.

⁷⁷ Rowe, p. 21.

Reconstructing Sport

The term *Stunde Null* is commonly used to describe the time in Germany immediately after the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. Its use is not uncontroversial, as it implies a radical and complete break within German society with the War, the Holocaust and National Socialism. The question whether and in how far the alleged *Stunde Null* did indeed take place in postwar Germany, can be asked of all spheres of society - including sport. As Freudenreich and Maurer have pointed out: “... *Sport ist eben keine freischwebende Größe, er ist abhängig von den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen. So paßte er sich der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur an, und so war auch im Nachkriegsdeutschland ein Spiegelbild der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklung.*“⁷⁸

That the reconstruction and organization of sports was not at the top of the list of Allied priorities immediately after the war, can be explained by the extremely dire situation concerning all basic supplies. Food, housing and infrastructure were insufficient or destroyed. Reconstruction, not leisure, and certainly not competitive sport, was the most important immediate task. Nonetheless, the Allies were well aware of the role that sport had played in politics and education in the Third Reich.⁷⁹ Thus, sport was quickly included in the threefold conception of demilitarization, denazification and democratization and was to be implemented according to Allied visions for Germany.

The *Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen* (NSRL) was terminated, along with all other sport-organizations, by Directive Nr. 23 of 17 December 1945 of the Allied Control Council. Henceforth, every new organization had to be approved by the local occupational Force.⁸⁰ Moreover, it was subject to the policy of reeducation. However, no clear conception for reeducation in sports as such existed amongst the western Allies, let alone between all Four Forces.⁸¹ It must also be mentioned that, at least in the Western Zones, the reconstruction of sport organizations

⁷⁸ Freudenreich, Josef-Otto and Maurer, Michael, “Sport.“ In *Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Wolfgang Benz. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989, p. 274.

⁷⁹ Brick, p. 52.

⁸⁰ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 274.

⁸¹ Gissel, Norbert and Bernsdorf, Walter, “Reeducation durch Sport in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone.“ In *Der geteilte deutsche Sport : Tagung der DVS-Sektion Sportgeschichte vom 24.-26. März 1995 in Potsdam*, edited by Giselher Spitzer and Harald Braun. Köln: Sport und Buch Strauss, 1997, p. 49-50.

was even more inconsistent due to the fact that Directive Nr. 23 was merely a Directive, not a law, and therefore open to the interpretation of the respective Commander.⁸²

In the American and British zones, Sport were seen as a way to playfully practice democracy in a controllable environment.⁸³ Moreover, “The sudden release from leadership and discipline furnished by the Nazi youth leaders, the chaos caused by war damage and occupation, the lack of school and sport facilities, and the shortage of food, fuel, housing and of employment will combine to produce a highly un-desirable (steht so im text!) effect among the German youth of both sexes.”⁸⁴ Thus, sport was viewed as an un-exchangeable necessity in the construction of a democratic, humane society and its absence seen as a concrete danger for achieving this goal. With the shift from “Containment“ towards *Realpolitik* and “Roll-back,“ reeducation took on a new importance in the attempt to bind Germany to the West and deflect Communism.⁸⁵ In the year following the constitution of the FRG in 1949, the *Deutscher Sportbund* (DSB) was founded as the umbrella association for all sport and gymnastic organizations. In line with West German policy of the claim to sole representation, “the DSB effectively had a dual role: to speak for *all* Germans and to deny the legitimacy of any equivalent body in the GDR.”⁸⁶

As opposed to the West, the view that sport formed an integral part of culture had been well established in the Soviet Union for some time.⁸⁷ Already during the war, exiled German communists, including Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, were integrating sport into their theoretical concepts for the reconstruction of Germany.⁸⁸ Accordingly, the conditions of Directive Nr. 23 were followed far more precisely in the Soviet Occupational Zone than in the Western Zones.⁸⁹ After the dissolution of the NSRL, reorganization of Sport in the SBZ was initially implemented on the communal level. The concrete plans for the construction of a “unitarian, antifascist-democratic sport movement“ (*einheitliche, antifaschistisch-demokratische Sportbewegung*) were however only realized from 1948 onwards. With the participation of the unions (FDGB)

⁸² Brick, p. 53.

⁸³ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 274.

⁸⁴ Gissel, Bernsdorf, p. 53.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 53-56.

⁸⁶ Hughes, Owen, 448.

⁸⁷ For a discussion on the role of Sport in Communism see: Riordan, James, “The influence of Communism on Sport.“ *Historical Social Research* 32 (2007), p. 110-115.

⁸⁸ Brick, p. 52,54.

⁸⁹ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 274; Krüger, Michael, et al. *Doping und Anti-Doping in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950 bis 2007 Genese - Strukturen - Politik*. Hildesheim: Arete Verlag, 2014, p. 31.

and the socialist youth organization (FDJ) the umbrella-organization *Deutscher Sportausschuss* (DA) was founded on 1 October 1948. Through its founding and organizational structure guaranteed that sport was completely integrated into the broader societal development in East Germany.⁹⁰

De-nazification as well as personal continuity in sport must be seen from the aspect of the sport elites, as they were the ones negotiating with the international sport associations as well as the IOC. As with most policies, De-nazification in sport was handled very differently according in each respective occupational Zone.⁹¹ Technically, after 1945 only persons exonerated from any connection with the NSDAP were supposed be in any high-ranking sport positions and all types of offenders and followers to be removed from the clubs and organizations, regardless of the respective Zone. In the Western Zones however, de-nazification was given up on soon after the war ended, resulting in the leading personnel of the sport organizations differing only very little from before the war. As in politics and civil service, persons who had been active during National Socialism were soon reinstated as functionaries. Next to the well know Carl Diem, who had been general secretary of the so-called “Nazi-Olympics“ in 1936, Karl Ritter von Halt probably the most prominent amongst them. During National Socialism he was head of the track and field association and in 1945 made *Reichssportführer*, thus clearly part of high-ranking National Socialist elite. After having been imprisoned in the ex-concentration camp Buchenwald as a convicted war criminal until 1950, he became chairperson of the West German NOC in 1951, as well as honorary president of the track and field association.⁹² Von Halt’s career illustrates the value of personal connections in the realm of sport – his release from Buchenwald was made a condition to the Soviet Union being recognized by the IOC by none other than Avery Brundage himself. Von Halt’s past was an excellent opportunity for GDR propagandists to slander West German sport officials as “*Faschisten*,” “*Militaristen*,” and “*Revachinsten*.”⁹³

In the Soviet Occupational Zone, none of the National Socialist functionaries were allowed to stay in leading positions, causing a general exchange of the sport elite. This was at least one of the contributing factors that later impeded negotiations about recognition of East German teams and associations by international sport organizations.

⁹⁰ Michaelis, p. 425.

⁹¹ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 276.

⁹² Ibid., p. 276-7.

Not only were most of the international organizations dominated by western representatives, who had pervasive prejudices against the East German clubs as well as being strongly anti-communism, but communication skills and expertise in the field were something that East German officials were lacking in comparison to their western counterparts. Personal contacts established over long periods of time were yet another factor that put the official recognition of West German teams at an advantage.⁹⁴

Political Sport

The struggle for the constitution of a United German Olympic team sheds light on several inner-German as well as international conflicts of the 1950s and 60s. Firstly, it shows the connection between sport and international relations in general and, more specifically, for the Cold War, during which it became increasingly important as a site for direct competition between the two blocs. Both sides incorporated sport into a broader propaganda campaign to underline the superiority of the respective system without risking real, or “hot“, war.⁹⁵ As Andrew L. Johns has pointed out: “Sport can also transcend the playing-field and influence society, culture, politics and diplomacy. It can be a peaceful tool of goodwill or used as leverage to coerce behavior. It can exacerbate existing nationalistic tensions or be used to promote development and strengthen alliances.”⁹⁷ Germany, or rather the FRG and GDR, lying at the heart of the conflict played an important role in this. Moreover, it illustrates how important sport is for national identity and symbolism. This was especially the case in postwar Germany, where the legacy of National Socialism had left national self-confidence in ruins, resulting in the necessity of both German states to reinvent and underscore their legitimization:

“Of course, in terms of the *Symbolpolitik* represented by the interplay between sport and nation historically, Germany is not unusual. But the division of Germany after 1949 – and the refusal of one entity to accept that

⁹³ Brick, p. 75.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 64-65.

⁹⁵ Johns, Andrew L., “Introduction. Competing in the Global Arena: Sport and Foreign Relations since 1945.” In *Diplomatic games : sport, statecraft, and international relations since 1945*, edited by Heather Dichter and Andrew L. Johns. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2014, p. 5.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

the other even existed – added a special significance to this case. By the late 1960s, citizens of the FRG strongly identified with ‘their’ Germany and viewed that state (and its athletes) as being the torchbearer for the whole German nation. At the same time, while many in the East were not communists, a whole generation had grown up identifying with the GDR. Thus, with the burden of history weighing heavily in spheres more normally associated with national pride, full and separate FRG and GDR participation in the Olympics was to become an integral part of the process of ‘normalization’ of the two German states.”⁹⁹

Furthermore, the constitution of the common German team shows how two seemingly contradicting conceptions of sport that had developed in the FRG and GDR along the lines of their respective political system, added yet another field of tension to the struggle for legitimization as well as reunification. These points of contention will become more apparent in the following chapter that it will be dedicated to the actual process of forming the United German team, however, it seems necessary to first describe broader dimensions of the above mentioned conflicts, which the following paragraphs will attempt to do.

In both East and West Germany, sport was used to strengthen national self-confidence. In the FRG, this is slightly harder to trace than in the GDR, since sport operated under the banner of being allegedly un-political. Ironically, the development of sport as an important aspect for politics in West Germany only manifested itself through the fact that the GDR represented itself as a state entity towards the West primarily through sport. Owing to the offensive strategy of the GDR to utilize sport as a means to official recognition, the question of the national representation of Germany was intensified. The connected questions of symbolic representation of national identity touched on the self-conception of the FRG to represent *all* of Germany, namely the claim to sole representation, and thus also fundamental principals of West German foreign policy.¹⁰⁰

As mentioned above, initially sport was intended to be un-political in the Federal Republic. This had two implications: First, that sport was to be autonomous and independent from political influence and second, that sport was to be un-political itself.

⁹⁹ Hughes, Owen, p. 448.

¹⁰⁰ Geyer, p. 58.

Although both concepts are interrelated, one is substantiated in practicalities and legislation, whereas the notion of un-political sport is based in liberal sport theory of the twentieth century, in which subjectivism and individualism as well as sport being a free space in society (*gesellschaftlicher Freiraum*) played a large roll. Pabst characterizes this view of sport as being the “most important incidental in the world.”¹⁰¹ The Autonomy of West German sport from politics was articulated from its beginning by its protagonists and postulated in the statutes of the DSB, which stated political, religious and racial neutrality as well as the unconditional right to self-determination and self-management.¹⁰² This autonomy was nominally based on its *Eigenweltcharacter*, meaning that sport should be purpose free.¹⁰³

In West Germany, post war sport was intentionally organized in opposition to the state and party sport of National Socialism. After 1945, sport was meant to be separated from the state, organized in politically independent associations and clubs. It was intended as an individual, voluntary and private activity devoid of politics.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, sport was governed along the lines of parliamentary democratic principles and developed according to a pluralistic, democratic society with diverging interest groups.¹⁰⁵ Apart from physical education in schools, sport was, and is until this day, not mentioned in the Basic Law. This legislative vacuum, as opposed to the GDR where it was mentioned in the constitution, left political involvement free of any clearly defined framework. Krüger et. al state that this development was, contrary to what is often stated in academic literature, based less on the decision of the Allies and more on the consensus between the bourgeois and worker sport functionaries, as conflicts between the two groups during the Weimar Republic as well the *Gleichschaltung* of sport during National Socialism had proven to be hindering to democracy.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, autonomy of sport was officially recognized by the state. Yet it soon became apparent that especially competitive sport would be able to finance itself through membership fees of the clubs. Therefore, in addition to autonomy and self-management, the principle of subsidiaries entered the sport-state dynamics. From its offset it became clear, that the principles of

¹⁰¹ Translated from German by Author: „Sport als ‚die wichtigste Nebensache der Welt‘“ see Pabst, p. 33.

¹⁰² Krüger et al., p. 32.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 31-33.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁰⁵ Pabst, p. 36.

¹⁰⁶ Krüger et al., p. 31.

subsidiaries and autonomy were contradictory, as financial dependency of the state would limit the autonomy of sport.¹⁰⁷

To a certain degree, sport in West Germany was caught up far more in political power struggles than that of West Germany (do you mean East Germany? If not, the statement is confusing), due to the fact that the lines between sport and politics were not clearly drawn. In addition to struggling for compromise with East German sport organizations and officials, it had to assert its independence towards its own government – even more so as it was allegedly un-political. On the other hand, sport had to constantly lobby its own cause to gain financial support from the government. Moreover, it can be presumed that sport was the first realm in which Germans were able to feel something similar to national pride after World War II. The most prominent example of this is “Das Wunder von Bern“ when the FRG’s team won the Football World Championship in 1954. Wenzel Jaksch, a member of parliament for the Social Democrats, went so far as to say that the regained confidence of all Germans through the 1954 victory would be helpful for the reconstruction of Europe’s freedom and unity. Accordingly, after the unsatisfactory performance of the West German Olympic team in Mexico City 1968, there was talk of athletic rearmament. Some historians go so far as to claim that competitive sport did more for national confidence than the economic miracle ever did.¹⁰⁸

In East Germany, initially the DA as well as the FDGB categorically disapproved competitive sport (*Leistungssport*) as opposed to mass sport. This disapproving stance towards the cultivation of competitive Sport changed radically in 1950, when Walter Ulbricht forced the creation of a University for Sport, the *Deutsche Hochschule für Körperkultur* (DHfK).¹⁰⁹ In fact, as Hartmann illustrates, Walter Ulbricht is considered to be the father of GDR-sport. He was amongst one of the first personalities in postwar Germany to realize that success in competitive sport would bring East Germany, later to be known mainly thanks to him as “Wonderland of Sport“ (*Wunderland des Sports*), not only athletic, but political recognition as well as have a stabilizing effect on the system as well as improve Identification of the population with the regime – which was desperately needed when one considers the number of people fleeing to West Germany. No other contemporary politician held as many sport-

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 31-33.

¹⁰⁸ Pabst, p. 39-40.

¹⁰⁹ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 281-283.

political speeches as Walter Ulbricht, or showed such a strong personal interest in the topic – mostly likely due to the fact that he himself had been an athlete in his youth.¹¹⁰ He fully supported the view that “Es muß demokratisch aussehen, aber wir müssen alles in der Hand haben.”¹¹¹ and that athletes were to be receive a “uniform, anti-fascist-democratic education.”¹¹² Slogans such as “Every sportsman is an activist“ (“*Jeder Sportler ein Aktivist!*“) or “Diplomacy in a Training-suit“ (“*Diplomatie im Trainingsanzug*“) exemplify this view. It is also illustrated by the fact that, for the first time in German history, sport and physical culture were manifested in the constitution of the GDR.

In East Germany sport quickly evolved from something that was to be uniform and representative of socialist egalitarian society, to a symbol of sovereignty as well as a demonstration of superiority towards the West.¹¹³ Moreover, goals to outperform West Germany at least athletically, if not politically or economically, were clearly articulated by the SED. Sport was viewed as an important part of the struggle between socialism and capitalism.¹¹⁴ And indeed, sport was turned into an integral part of socialist society: When reading the internal plans for mass as well as competitive sport, one could get the impression that, at least from the side of Ulbricht, the socialist society of the future was identical with a large sport-collective. The athlete was stylized as a model socialist citizen, whose success was due to the system – not personal success.¹¹⁵

Especially the Western claim to un-political sport was attacked by East German politicians: “Jeder Versuch, die Sportbewegung außerhalb des gesellschaftlichen Geschehens zu stellen, ist von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Wir grenzen uns also ganz bewußt von den Theoretikern einer sogenannten unpolitischen Sportbewegung ab.”¹¹⁶ And the GDR did indeed integrate sport fully into its domestic and foreign policy. Until 1960 East Germany managed, through its close ties to the Soviet Union, to gain recognition from other socialist countries, however it did not

¹¹⁰ This is anecdotally manifested in the following: Merely a few hours after the constitution of the GDR, the East German Football team played against the Hungarians, who were at the time considered to be some of the best in the world, and only lost 1:2. Walter Ulbricht, having attended as a guest star, awarded each player with 300 Mark, a considerable amount of money. Ironically, six months later half of the fled the country via West Berlin. Hartmann, 9.

¹¹¹ Hartmann, Grit and Berendonk, Brigitte. *Goldkinder : die DDR im Spiegel ihres Spitzensports*. Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 1997, p. 10.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹³ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 281-283.

¹¹⁴ Michaelis, p. 427.

¹¹⁵ Geyer, p. 64.

¹¹⁶ Honecker quoted by Hartmann, p. 12.

succeed in establishing diplomatic relations with non-socialist countries as well as achieving international recognition of its sovereignty. Additionally, it was unable to convince its own population of the benefits of socialism, especially in opposition to the *Wirtschaftswunder* of West Germany. Therefore competitive sport was used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the state, with the hope that its victories would make the denial of its sovereign existence impossible and furthermore stabilize the regime internally: “high-level sport is cheaper than an economic miracle.”¹¹⁸

For the GDR, West German sport was as a part of bourgeois-capitalist society and thus, in inner-German sport relations, the “un-political” sport of the FRG and the political sport of GDR stood in opposition to each other as representatives of the respective political systems. That West German sport declared itself as un-political was already seen as a political act, with which it was trying to force East German sport to give up its ideological and political objectives in regards to inner-German sport relations. West German demand for apolitical sport relations was therefore an ideological weapon in dealing with its Eastern component. To this extent, East German criticism of this paradox was completely on point.¹¹⁹

Inner-German sport travel (*deutsch-deutscher Sportverkehr*) and relations were one of the largest challenges for international sport over decades. Not only did the interests of two different concepts of society collide, but also of two diverging views on sport. At the same time, they reflected the will of both sides for unity, albeit according to each political and ideological belief. For the West German sport this meant that on one hand it had to be assertive in its perceptions towards East Germany. On the other hand it had to, consistent with its own self-understanding as a per se un-political movement, stand up to the constant meddling of politics. Konrad Adenauer completely refused the prospect of reunification along the lines of what Ulbricht had articulated in the 1950s. According to the sole claim of representation (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*) of the FRG as well as the Hallstein-Doctrine, no contacts were to be had with East Germany. This mandate also pertained to sport.¹²⁰ For East Germany it meant that they utilized inner-german sport contacts for recognition as well as differentiation.¹²¹ Inner-German sport relations are related to the topic of the thesis insofar as they were completely terminated by the DSB as a reaction to the construction of the Berlin wall.

¹¹⁸ Kappler, p. 254.

¹¹⁹ Pabst, p. 41-43.

¹²⁰ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 283.

That a United German team was constituted anyway three years later, created a paradoxical situation not lost on East or West German observers.

Querelles d'Allemagne

In connection with modern mass media international sport competitions, held under the ideological banner of athletic internationalism, are undoubtedly one of the most effective means for demonstrating popular nationalism in the 20th century. The Olympic Games demonstrate more than any other competition how much this non-state internationalism thrives off of the connection between sport and national symbolism. Since their re-foundation through Pierre de Coubertin at the end of the 19th century, they have seen a steady increase of ceremony and ritual. The cult that has been created around them is meticulously formalized in the Olympic protocol and references the nation at every turn. This is true of the invitations that are extended towards the NOCs, who's foundation equal that of a state; the representation through a *Chef de Mission*,¹²² modeled after a diplomatic corps; the parade of the best athletes marching behind the respective national flag and, common at least until 1960, the swearing-in of the athletes on the "honor of the fatherland"¹²³ and the "glory of sport."¹²⁴ Finally, the hissing of the national flag as well as the playing of the national anthem of the victor of the match is the climax of national representation.¹²⁵ Consequently, the German question arose for the Olympic Games, considering that with the constitution of the GDR and the FRG there were two German states claiming to be the sole representatives of the entire nation. The following chapter will outline how the common German team came into existence.

The term *Querelle d'Allemagne*, which can be loosely translated into the strife of Germany, was coined by French IOC members and refers to the inner German conflict surrounding the constitution of the United German Teams. However, while *Querelle d'Allemagne* appertains to the confrontation between the East and West German NOCs, there were a myriad of factors and interest groups which were exerting a considerable amount of influence on the debate about and the constitution of the common German

¹²¹ Pabst, p. 41.

¹²² Geyer, p. 56.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 56.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 56.

team itself. Primarily, there was the IOC, without whose insistence said team would have never existed. Secondly, there were the respective NOCs of East and West Germany, who were constantly trying to walk the line between the IOC and their national governments, of whom constitute the third group of interest. Lastly, press and public opinion played an important role in pressuring the two NOCs as well as the governments.

Immediately after World War II it was not clear whether Germany would take part in the Olympic Games at all. Many of the member states of the IOC had been affected gravely by National Socialism and strongly opposed German participation. Since Germany did not have an Olympic address, or for that matter sovereign statehood (which is a stipulation for forming a NOC and thus being included in the IOC), it was not invited to participate in the first postwar Olympics in London in 1948. However, neither was it officially excluded which was, at least in part, certainly done to avoid a discussion about the IOC's own involvement in the so-called "Nazi Olympics" of 1936.¹²⁶

It is until today customary that the general secretary of the previous Olympics solemnly receives the Olympic flag at the current games. For London 1948, this posed a conundrum for the IOC, as the last games had been in 1936 and their general secretary none other than Carl Diem. Despite resistance from several IOC members, it seems that Diem was allowed to attend after exceeding pressure was exerted by IOC president Erdström, with whom he shared a close personal friendship. This was naturally not publicly well known and greatly improved Diem's international reputation. Furthermore, being one of the very few Germans present in London, he used the chance to lobby the German Olympic cause. Apparently, he did so rather successfully as this, in connection with the fact that since mid-1947 the integration process in the western zones had grown considerably economically, politically and socially that it caused Erdström to consider a reintegration of Germany into the IOC. As it had previously done in Palestine in 1948 and Ireland in 1949 the recognition of a German NOC was predicated on a stable political situation. Not only for Germany, this meant the official formation of statehood. At the IOC session on 19/20 April 1949 the Committee

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

¹²⁶ Nitsch, Franz, "Auf konflikträchtigen Weg. Initiativen 1945-1949." In *Rückkehr nach Olympia : Vorgeschichte, Gründung, erste Jahre; eine Dokumentation herausgegeben vom Nationalen Olympischen Komitee für Deutschland aus Anlass der 40. Wiederkehr seines Gründungstages am 24. September 1949*,

declared: “The Executive Committee recommends to the international federations to readmit the national federations of Japan and of Germany as soon as this country will be regularly constituted.”¹²⁷ Thus, the road to the re-admittance of Germany into the IOC was paved. The question *which* Germany would, at a thus far undefined future, be able to participate in the Olympics was not even considered by the IOC until the conference of minister presidents in Munich in 1947. Suddenly, in a kind of “reactive mechanism,”¹²⁸ it became clear that the two fronts had been hardened so much so, that the formation of the bipolar, two-block system into East versus West became unavoidable.¹²⁹

The NOC for West Germany was constituted merely one day after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In order to compete in the Olympic Games, National Committees had to, and still have to, be recognized by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which, next to statehood, stipulated recognition by several international sport associations as a condition for forming a NOC. Until the beginning of the 1950’s the interests of German Sport in the international sphere were mainly represented by West German sport functionaries with their clubs and associations recognized by far more associations than those of East Germany. This situation changed drastically when East Germany, having been incentivized by Moscow, decided to form their own Olympic committee in 1951.¹³⁰ This meant that there were two competing German claims to representation at the Olympic Games. According to Guttmann “The IOC had three options: (1) accept East Germany as a sovereign state and to recognize its national Olympic committee as well as that of West Germany; (2) to insist that West Germany was the only German state in existence and to consider its committee the only German national Olympic committee; (3) to ask that the two hostile states form a single national Olympic committee and field a single Olympic team.”¹³² The third option was clearly the most blatantly political one. Paradoxically, the IOC’s insistence on a common German team was legitimized with the IOC’s own view that it would symbolize the victory of sport over politics as well as

edited by Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland. München: Copress-Verlag 1989, p. 15-17, 20.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 38.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 34.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

¹³⁰ Birck, p. 72.

¹³² Guttmann, Allen. *The Olympics, a history of the modern games*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002, p. 94.

proof of the effectiveness of the Olympic notion of peace.¹³³ It must be mentioned that the personality of the IOC president, Avery Brundage, most likely played a large roll in this. During his presidency he handled the problem of three divided countries, China, Korea and Germany, with what Krüger calls “American pragmatism.”¹³⁵

In September 1949 the West German sport functionaries were still confident that the IOC would officially recognize their NOC.¹³⁶ Due to anti-German sentiments however, especially in Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, the West German NOC was only recognized provisionally. In the provisional recognition, neither Berlin nor the GDR were mentioned, however the NOC of the Saarland, which was at that time independent, was fully recognized without any difficulties due to French influence.¹³⁷ At the following meeting of the IOC in Vienna, a delegation from West Germany¹³⁸ apologized officially for the crimes of the Nazi-regime and expressed the hope, that the German sport youth would soon be able to compete internationally and thereby aid the reconstruction of peace. The following vote unanimously recognized the West German NOC as well as the team’s participation for the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952.¹³⁹

In 1951 the GDR followed suit by establishing its own NOC. This was done under the premise that contact through sport should be intensified in order to fight against US-imperialism, which was trying to separate Germans from each other. Initially the Eastern German NOC was to be *gesamtdeutsches Nationales Olympischess Komitee*, yet after vigorous objection from the West German side, the *Nationales Olympische Komitee für Ostdeutschland* was constituted.¹⁴⁰ West German functionaries were indignant about the creation of a East German NOC, stating that it was neither free and independent, nor politically neutral, as IOC Statutes stipulated. According to Meyen, the recognition of an East German NOC would have been tantamount to an official recognition by a great power, due to the status of the IOC as well as the role of sport in public life.¹⁴¹ Part of this outrage certainly was due to the fact that the

¹³³ Pabst, p. 238.

¹³⁵ Krüger, Arnd, “The unfinished symphony: A history of the Olympic Games from Coubertin to Samaranch.” In . *The international politics of sport in the 20th century*, edited by James Riordan and Arnd Krüger. London New York: E & FN Spon Routledge 1999, p. 18.

¹³⁶ Pabst, p. 178.

¹³⁷ Birk, p. 73.

¹³⁸ The delegation’s personell was changed after McCloy objected to some of the Member’s Nazi past. He forced the decision by revoking their passports, see Birk, p. 73.

¹³⁹ Birk, p. 74.

¹⁴⁰ Birk, p. 74-78.

¹⁴¹ Geyer, p. 61.

recognition of the Saarland's NOC had created precedence that could be used to argue for the recognition of the East German NOC, and that the IOC had demonstrated it could recognize political realities.¹⁴² The public did not however share the opinion of West German functionaries. According to a poll from 1951, 62% of Interviewees supported the creation of a common German team and only 9% in opposition.¹⁴³

At the IOC's Vienna session in 1952 both German applications were voted upon separately: while the West German NOC was recognized, the East German application was denied. The IOC did however stipulate that negotiations about a forming a United German Team should be taken up immediately between the two rivaling states.¹⁴⁴ For the East German side this was a clear success and seen as a first step in the eventual recognition of its own NOC. In West Germany, united German teams in general were viewed with skepticism, since they were mainly results of efforts of propaganda campaigns such as "*Deutsche an einen Tisch*" by the GDR.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, it impeded efforts to isolate the GDR in international sport in accordance with the claim to sole representation. Von Halt even went so far as to purposefully manipulate the negotiations, on one hand undermining every suggested compromise and on the other using his personal contacts to IOC functionaries to gain a favorable outcome for the West German NOC.¹⁴⁶

In East Germany Ulbricht himself formulated the maximum goal as the recognition of the East German NOC and the minimum goal as the creation of a common German team. At the negotiations, which took place in Hannover in May 1951, East and West German functionaries were unable to reach to an agreement until Brundage himself forced a positive outcome of the negotiations. Finally the IOC came up with a Communiqué, known as the *Lausanner Vereinbarung*, which was signed by both Delegations. It stated that there would be only one NOC for Germany, namely that of the Federal Republic, under who's supervision the best German athletes would compete in the Olympics 1952.¹⁴⁷ According to the agreement, none of Ulbricht's goals had been reached, and the negotiators were personally reprimanded by him. In September 1951 the East German NOK officially stated that the agreement of Lausanne

¹⁴² Birck, p. 78.

¹⁴³ Pabst, p. 182.

¹⁴⁴ Birck, p. 79.

¹⁴⁵ Geyer, p. 61.

¹⁴⁶ In a letter to Adenauer he later voiced outrage at the willingness of the East Germans to accept every compromise as well as the lowest number of athletes on the common German team, see Birck, p. 81.

¹⁴⁷ Pabst, p. 183.

as void and null and that the constitution of a United German team had failed.¹⁴⁸ One of the contributing factors was that GDR-Leadership was opposed to having athletes under the supervision of ex-national socialist Ritter von Halt. Despite this fact, East German functionaries continued to rally for the recognition of their NOC, but thus far without success: at an IOC session in 1952 in Oslo it was decided that German athletes were only able to compete in the Olympic Games if they were represented by a recognized NOC.¹⁴⁹

The First Team

Finally, the Olympic Games of 1952 took place without East German participation. This meant that during the course of the first half of the 1950s East German sport officials continued to advocate the recognition of their NOC and improve the relationship to the IOC. Due to the increasing integration of the two countries into the respective blocs, the IOC's insistence on a common German Olympic team into an increasingly political battle.¹⁵⁰

During the early 1950's, there were several shifts in the relations of sport to politics as well as the interrelation between each Germany's attitude towards the respective other sport. In East Germany, this occurred at the fifth meeting of the Central Committee of the SED, where the role of sport in agitation and propaganda was officially articulated. Furthermore, athletic achievement gained more and more importance for the political agenda of the GDR. As it became clear that the ideological differences between the two states would not be resolved through revolutionary measures, the main way to demonstrate dominance towards the FRG was in being athletically and thus also societally superior.¹⁵¹ Already in 1954 the state committee for sport had decided: "*die Körperkultur un der DDR zum Vorbild für ganz Deutschland zu entwickeln, die Mehrheit der deutschen Rekorde und Meisterschaften bis Ende 1956 zu erobern und damit die Führung im deutschen Sport zu übernehmen.*"¹⁵²

Another step towards improving the strained relationship between the East German NOC and the IOC was replacing Kurt Edel with the more diplomatically

¹⁴⁸ Birck, p. 82.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 85-87.

¹⁵⁰ Pabst, p. 108.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 131-132.

inclined Heinz Schöbel.¹⁵³ Thus, in 1955 the East German NOC was provisionally recognized by a vote of 27-7 at the same meeting – however, only under the condition that Germans from both states had to compete in one team.¹⁵⁴ In addition, if there were would be any difficulties with the formation of the team, the president of the IOC, Brundage himself, would act as mediator. In the case of reunification, it was stated as obvious that only one NOC would be recognized for the whole country. According to Birck, this shows a shift in attitude of the IOC in regards to Germany. Through its decision it recognized the existence of two German states, but at the same time acknowledged that it was just a temporary solution until the time of reunification. Especially president Brundage saw the establishment of a common German team as an important step towards German unity.¹⁵⁵ During the Olympic winter games in Cortina d'Ampezzo, he went so far as to boast: “We have obtained more in the field of sport what politicians have failed to achieve so far.”¹⁵⁷

Brick states that there was a deep-rooted confusion in the FRG about how to handle the question of United German Teams. On one side, they wanted to see athletes of both German states united under one flag, thereby internationally demonstrating the wish for reunification of the German people. However, occasionally political reservations were stronger than this wish. West German officials did not want to give the impression of sympathizing, or even fraternizing, with the GDR. The opinion that one could not threaten the termination of diplomatic relations according to the Hallstein-doctrine, while at the same time having one common German NOC and team pervaded most ministries and sport organizations.¹⁵⁸ However, Freudenreich paints a slightly different image of the relationship between East and West German sport officials. According to him, the DSB and DSA made an agreement to shape their relationship according to Olympic rules and to refrain from political propaganda. The *Fachverbände* of the West German DSB even vowed to support the East German DSA in gaining international recognition. That official politics disapproved of this is a given, but perhaps it illuminates that not all contacts between East and West were as black and white as often defined.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁵³ Birck, p. 115.

¹⁵⁴ Guttman, p. 95.

¹⁵⁵ Birck, p. 115.

¹⁵⁷ Guttman, p. 95.

¹⁵⁸ Birck, p. 117-118.

¹⁵⁹ Freudenreich, Maurer, p. 284.

This is also supported by a statement given by DSB President Willi Daume about inter-German sport relations: West German sport officials did not want to loose contacts to athletes from the GDR, once integrated into international organizations the GDR would be more or less forced to adhere to the rules, which mostly prohibited political instrumentalization, and finally the attitude of un-political sport prohibited the purposeful obstruction of *anyone* taking part in international competitions such as the Olympics.¹⁶⁰ With some slight hiccups and interference by the government, which will be outlined later, this line was more or less kept by West German sport functionaries until the construction of the Berlin Wall.

Politics constantly intervened in the efforts of East and West German sport officials to create smoother relationships and sport travel. The ministries of interior and foreign affairs went so far as threatening to cut the financing of West German NOC if it did not boycott the Olympic games in Melbourne in 1956. This would have been extremely problematic, since it would have most likely resulted in the GDR competing nevertheless, therefore gaining de-facto official and final recognition of its NOC.¹⁶¹

The NOC was advised by the government not to accept the common German team, but von Halt was able to mollify its concerns by giving assurance that he had pushed through a five-point list of demands, which included West German superiority in matters of decision as well as only the provisional recognition of the East German NOC. This again shows how much von Halt's personal contacts to the IOC were beneficial to the FRG.¹⁶² Furthermore, the premise that had been set by the SED to outperform West Germany athletically slowly turned into reality. In 1956 alone, East German athletes broke six world records, seven European and 107 German records.¹⁶³ As long as Western athletes had bested eastern ones in competitions, their victories were silently taken as proof of the moral and political superiority of the West. However, by the mid of the 1950s this drastically started to change with athletes from the Eastern bloc regularly outperforming Western ones. Moreover, the fact that their leaders claimed that this was due to socialism shook the ideological foundation of un-political sport substantially, since this simple fact raised the question whether athletic

¹⁶⁰ Pabst, p. 174.

¹⁶¹ Brick, p.118-119.

¹⁶² Pabst, p. 242.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 211.

performance of western athletes would adequately represent the political system disproved the concept of un-political sport.¹⁶⁴

The provisional recognition of the East German NOC and the constitution of the common German team were a further step for the GDR towards political recognition of its sovereignty.¹⁶⁵ In 1956 the government of the FRG finally had to accept the common German team, since this was still preferable to an internationally acknowledged team of the GDR. The debates about the constitution of the United German Teams highlight several important aspects which will be important for the following analysis: The entire struggle between the two competing sport systems centered around the United German team, symbolized each Germany's stance towards the respective other, as well as its own national self-reflection. This created immense tension between claim to sole representation, the East German struggle for recognition, and the wish for reunification. Especially in the case of West Germany, the undefined relationship between sport and politics proved to be problematic, but eventually sport functionaries such as von Halt and Daume managed to stand up to political meddling. However one of the reasons for this may have been that neither the IOC nor the public would have had any sympathy for not competing at all due to too strong political opinions.¹⁶⁶

Finally the Olympics in Melbourne were held in a tense atmosphere. The conditions for the 138 West and 37 East German athletes were far from favorable. The Hungarian Uprising, as well as the exacerbation of the political course in the GDR were noticeable. Despite all outer similarities the United German Team was more divided than ever - GDR sport leadership insisted on having separate housing facilities due to reasons of "collective discipline."¹⁶⁸ The relationship between the officials was more than strained, and between the athletes they were virtually non-existent. Still the IOC awarded both NOCs with the Bonacasse trophy honoring their activity in the constitution of a common German team and thereby displaying Olympic spirit.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 241.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 243.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 244.

The Second Team

In the time between the Olympics of 1956 and 1960, the framework for the common German Team hardly changed in the sense that the IOC continued to insist on it. The GDR continued to push for Olympic as well as political recognition, using the existence of the team as an example for its propagated suggestion of a German confederation and its two and three-state theory. The largest points of conflict for this time period lay in the questions of which symbols should be used to represent the united German team. Naturally, neither side was willing to accept the respective other's flag or anthem for the Olympic protocol.

Initially it was envisioned that the common Olympic team would compete in Rome under the same athletic protocol as it had in 1956, where national anthems had been substituted with Beethoven's more neutral "Ode to Joy" and the German colors (black, red, gold) with the Olympic rings on them for flag and emblem as a matter of compromise. However, conflict arose when on October 1, 1959 the GDR officially integrated the hammer and sickle into their flag. Consequently, the FRG forbade this flag on its territory. To settle the matter Brundage declared that the previously used flag would be accepted, and any NOC refusing to participate under said flag would not participate at all. This was met with strong resistance from the West German government, with Adenauer officially commenting: *"Die Bundesregierung hält es mit der nationalen Würde für unvereinbar, daß die Mannschaft bei den Olympischen Spielen ein anderes Emblem als die deutsche Bundesflagge zeigt."*¹⁷¹ Through issuing this statement, Adenauer himself put the East German NOC in the perfect position to accept the compromise flag, which it proceeded to do immediately. This way, it was the West Germans hindering Olympic unity, which the East German press commented on as: *"Störenfried Nr. 1 ist weiterhin Konrad Adenauer in Bonn."*¹⁷³ The matter was settled when the West German NOC, even after von Halt and Daume had been summoned to Bonn and put under immense pressure by Adenauer and several other ministers, decided to accept the compromise flag against the government's wishes. This opinion was shared by the public – polls from that time show that 72% of West

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 251.

Germans approved the neutral flag.¹⁷⁴ How strained the negotiations had become at this point is illustrated in the nine NOC, 79 sport association meetings as well as 41 qualification competitions and matches, all amounting to a sum of 670 000 DM on the West German side alone, to constitute the German for the second time. At the Rome Olympics in 1960, the ratio of East and West Germans competing had already shifted considerably, from 132 West Germans and 37 East Germans to 189/130.256, 257¹⁷⁵

The Third Team – After the Wall

The year 1961 marks an important turning point in the inter-German relations. Through the construction of the Berlin Wall the GDR stopped the constant stream of refugees to West Germany via Berlin, which had reached a high point with a total of 30,415 *Republikflüchtlinge* in July 1961 alone. Furthermore, the federal court of West Germany had declared the DTSB an enemy of the constitution. Both of these developments put West German sport under pressure by politicians, the public and press to reconsider their relationship to the East German counterpart. Willy Brandt, at the time Mayor of Berlin, as well as foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano made public appeals for sport functionaries to stop all contacts with the GDR. Furthermore, the outrage and indignation felt by the public at the inaction of the government as well as the Western allies demanded action from sport functionaries. The resolutions of Düsseldorf (*Düsseldorfer Beschlüsse*) of August 16, 1961, terminated all sport contacts between East and West Germany and were the answer of the DSB to the construction of the Berlin Wall. In support of these measures the FRG government achieved that all NATO states refused to give athletes from the GDR visas to attend European or World championships if they were not part of united German teams. International sporting organizations on the other hand were not pleased with this political meddling in sport and found several inventive ways to circuit this policy of exclusion.¹⁷⁶

While sport functionaries were debating the principal question in how far a common German team was justifiable considering that the division of Germany had become cemented, the foreign ministry changed its opinion in the opposite direction.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 253.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 253.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 256-257.

¹⁷⁶ This is for instance why Mexico city was chosen for the OG 1968, see Brick, p. 172-174.

From 1961 onwards, it supported the common German team, with the compromise flag as well as Beethoven's anthem, since it would demonstrate the claim to sole representation as well as the defeat of Ulbricht's policy of recognition. The common team was to act as the last beacon of German unity, thus if Ulbricht insisted on the two-state theory, he should not be able to use the Olympics as a venue to support it. Despite resistance from Adenauer's office, a secret cabinet decision was issued which articulated the government's support for the common German team,¹⁷⁷ which however was kept secret, since: *“Die Propagierung deutsch-deutscher Gemeinsamkeiten im Sport wurde in der Öffentlichkeit als purer Zynismus und in den Reihen des Sport zudem als Zumutung empfunden.”*¹⁷⁸

Despite, or perhaps rather because of the construction of the Berlin Wall the IOC insisted on the common German team for the 1964 Olympics. The negotiations were conceivably more strained than before, especially since the power balance between both NOCs had shifted considerably. While in 1952 the West German officials clearly had the upper hand, the negotiations were now dominated by the well-trained and professional East German functionaries. West German sport functionaries on the other hand had always been honorary.¹⁷⁹ Despite the strained negotiations, Brundage made the proud declaration: “Another example of an important victory for sport over politics has been the united German teams that have now appeared on four different occasions at the Olympic Games in 1956 and in 1960. [...] The spectacle of East and West German athletes in the same uniform behind the same leaders and the same flag is an inspiration under present political conditions and a great service to all the German people who wish for a united country.”¹⁸¹ In reality however, a United German team never existed. Apart from meeting at the actual qualification and then at the Olympic competitions themselves, the athletes hardly had any contact, which partially lead to catastrophes in sport for which team training was required.¹⁸² The last common German team was unique in the aspect that for the first time more East German athletes were part of the team. Consequently this meant that the *Chef de Mission*, Gerhard Stock, was also supplied by the GDR.

¹⁷⁷ Brick, p. 175.

¹⁷⁸ Geyer, p. 82.

¹⁷⁹ Brick, p.176-178.

¹⁸¹ Birck, p. 179-180.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 181.

1964 was the last time a United German Team participated in the Olympics, despite the cemented division of the country forced by the construction of the Wall. The IOC once again celebrated this as a victory of politics over sport and thus clearly entered the political playing-field. The construction of the wall and the Cuba crisis heated up the struggle over flag, anthem and emblem and at the same time jeopardized the United German Team. The negotiations had intensified significantly, causing West German sport functionaries to be caught in constant deliberation with the government, who in turn viewed the Olympic matter as being too important to leave it in the hands of said functionaries. The West German sport leadership was in an especially unrewarding position. It was supposed to represent the interest of athletes, while having to show consideration for the government if they did not want to lose financial support. At the same time, the professional Sport functionaries of the GDR, who had the undoubted backing of their government without having to constantly negotiate with it, made claims that undermined the West German *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* while advancing the cause of recognition for their NOC. Moreover, after the intensification of the East-West conflict due to the construction of the Wall, the political climate relaxed temporarily. Not only did it stop the economic downfall of the GDR, but it also saved the Hallstein-doctrine, since by constructing the wall the GDR had isolated itself further. Adenauer's resignation marks the end of an era. However, the new chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, did not change his stance towards the common German team. The only slight modification that was made, was that the United team was seen as a defeat of Ulbricht's policy of demarcation.¹⁸³

The first independent Olympic Teams 1968

In 1965 Brundage and the IOC tried to uphold the common German team, now with the support of the FRG's government, who did not want the other German NOC to be recognized. However, the GDR's NOC was now able to support its claim for recognition by precedence which had been established by the Chinese case:

“The following Olympic Committees have been recognized by the IOC under the name of the territory in which they operate. The interpretation of

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 204.

this rule is of universal application, and serves to underline that fact that: whereas the IOC is not concerned with political questions and therefore considers it to be outside its function to pronounce on what any country should call its domestic Olympic organization, the name and the limits of the territory under which it is recognized by the IOC is essentially a matter of decision by the IOC and must be used in all international Olympic activities.”¹⁸⁵

Daume kept pleading for a common German team, stating that two German teams would only be appropriate if all connections between the two countries would have been severed - which was not the case *especially* due to United German Teams. Finally, the IOC gave in and fully recognized an independent East German NOC. Another victory for the GDR was the inclusion of Heinz Schöbel into the IOC, replacing von Halt, who had passed away in 1964. The previously pro-West German feelings in the IOC were beginning to shift due to the fact that the well trained East German functionaries were seen as easier to deal with. Even though in 1968 the two German teams still competed under the same flag, anthem and emblem, West Germany was forced to make concessions in this regard in 1966 due to its application to host the Olympics in Munich in 1972. By the Munich Olympics, the IOC had finally accepted the political realities and East and West Germany competed with their respective own national teams, flags, anthems and emblems.¹⁸⁶

The Role of the Media

The mass media is what connects sports as organized play and national identification. Therefore, it seems necessary to briefly examine the connection between sports, media and politics, concerning the relation to the formation of national identity. In order to do this, the following chapter will briefly outline the reorganization of the media, specifically printed press, in the Occupation Zones and then both German states.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 207.

¹⁸⁶ Brick, p. 207-209.

FRG

Jürgen Wilke claims that the term *Stunde Null* can be used in relation to media more accurately than for other parts of society. Since the National Socialists had based their power largely on the instrumentalization of the Media and its propagandistic value, the Allies were more thorough in restructuring the existing framework than in other aspects of society, based on the belief that the Third Reich's utilization of Media was mainly responsible its rise to power, and thereby also for the catastrophe and horrors that followed.¹⁸⁷ This did however not mean that older German traditions, dating back to the Weimar Republic and before, did not continue in their existence: due to the federal structure of the Weimar Republic as well as the *Flickenteppich*, the press was relatively fragmented and regionalized from its very beginnings. Structurally, this was adapted by the Allies after 1945. Nonetheless, by licensing mainly larger, regional papers, they tried to avoid what the previous traditions had led to, namely small papers with such low circulation and profit becoming financially dependent on large publishing houses with clear political agendas, as had happened in the Third Reich with the Hugenberg group on the right and the Münzenberg group on the left. As in most other cases, Allied consensus about how to handle the reconstruction of media disintegrated quickly.

In the Western Zones, a plan for the reconstruction of German press as formulated by the American psychological warfare division was carried out, entailing three consecutive phases: 1. Ban of all German media; 2. Distribution of Allied media and the launch of licensing procedures for Germans; 3. Transition from Allied media to licensed German media under Allied control. The function of licensing the media was to support with the policy of denazification and reeducation from national socialism towards democracy, as well as help the population come to terms with crimes and guilt of the Nazi regime.¹⁸⁸ In regards to denazification, only persons with no affiliation to journalism or the press in the Third Reich were able to obtain licenses to publish newspapers or magazines, even if they had not been members of the NSDAP. This caused the rather curious effect that out of the 113 licensees in the American Zone,

¹⁸⁷ Wilke, Jürgen, "Überblick und Phasengliederung." In *Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Jürgen Wilke. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999, p. 15-16.

¹⁸⁸ Meyn, Hermann. *Massenmedien in Deutschland*. Konstanz: UVK Verl.-Ges, 2004, p. 80.

more than one quarter come from completely different vocations.¹⁸⁹ It has been stated that next to teachers, journalists were the professional group most affected by denazification, but it is hard to measure how far this was enforced in reality.¹⁹⁰ In order to obtain a license, the prospective licensee was required to pay a fee of 50.000 Reichsmark. Furthermore, to guarantee that Newspapers would not be clearly politically affiliated with one party, only *groups* of publishers were licensed, all of whom had to be exonerated persons as well as politically differentially oriented - something that was almost never entirely possible in reality. For instance, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, founded on 1 August, 1945, was clearly oriented towards the left. To remedy this, the Americans licensed the *Frankfurter Neue Presse* (15. April 1946), which had close ties to the Christian Democrats. In the Western Zones, there was no official censorship of content for the press. However, there were taboo topics such as the expulsion of Germans from Central and Eastern Europe as well as strife amongst the Allies. Furthermore, content was influenced unofficially by other means: for the coverage of events that were deemed important for reeducation and democratization, such as the Nürnberg trials, more paper was released to the newspapers.¹⁹¹

As planned, after the parliamentary council ratified the Basic Law for Germany on 23. May 1949, including the article about freedom of press, the licensed newspapers slowly started to become independent, a process which was completed by September 1949.¹⁹² Throughout the 1950s, smaller, regional publications were unable to compete with large newspapers and their high circulation and were shut down, causing a journalistic concentration that led to less diverse range in opinion and information. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* quickly became (and to a certain extent still is) the most dominant over-regional daily newspaper. Similarly, illustrated tabloids, containing more pictures and less text, became increasingly popular. Amongst them the *Bild Zeitung* was the most successful one, reaching millions of copies sold soon after its foundation in 1952.¹⁹³

In a comprehensive study about the credibility of media in the postwar era, Markus Schünemann has shown that West Germans viewed the press with a certain

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁹⁰ Koszyk, Kurt, "Presse unter Alliiierter Besatzung." In *Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Jürgen Wilke. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999, p. 32.

¹⁹¹ Koszyk, p. 41.

¹⁹² Only the press in Berlin and Saarland was still licensed until 1953, see Schütz, Walter, "Entwicklung der Tagespresse." In *Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Jürgen Wilke. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999, p. 113.

amount of skepticism. Most newspapers were thought to be affiliated with one party or another, something that rated decisively negative. On the contrary, state controlled radio was viewed as positive - but precisely due to the fact that the influence of the government was seen as something that could diminish party-political influence.¹⁹⁴ The loss of credibility of the press could also be attributed to the fact that in a time of an extremely polarized battle of opinions, which was carried out through the media, the press lost some of its credibility as it was unable to keep its status as “Advocate of the Public.”¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, academic literature in German language constantly refers to large publications such as the weekly *Der Spiegel* or the daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as *Meinungsmacher*,¹⁹⁶ something that can be loosely translated into opinion leader. This term implies a very much top-down approach, very simply speaking meaning that the public opinion was being led - in this case by *Der Spiegel* or the *FAZ*. This view has been contested by Andreas Schulz, who claims that it excludes the possibility of a pluralist and receptive public. If one looks at the construction of reality by the media as constitutive, and not as a functional element of communication, its changing role in society becomes apparent. The discourse between media, politics and the public then appears only as a loose connection between competing and dynamic interpretations of reality.¹⁹⁷

GDR

In the Soviet Occupation Zone, initially pluralism of press as well as the concept of licensing were also adhered to. Whether this was done out of concession to the Western Allies or to convince people that they truly aimed for democratization is hard to judge. Nonetheless, out of the six non-party affiliated newspapers that were established in the Soviet Zone after 1945, four were published in Berlin and therefore also under the jurisdiction of the Western Allies, and the other two were terminated by

¹⁹³ Schütz, p. 109-125.

¹⁹⁴ Schünemann, Markus, “Zur Glaubwürdigkeit der publizistischen Mittel in der Nachkriegszeit.” *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte* 5 (2003), p. 128.

¹⁹⁵ Schulz, Andreas, “Der Aufstieg der ‘Vierten Gewalt’: Medien, Politik und Öffentlichkeit im Zeitalter der Massenkommunikation.” *Historische Zeitschrift* 270/1 (2000), p. 86.

¹⁹⁶ Meyen, Michael, “Geistige Grenzgänger. Medien und die deutsche Teilung: Ein Beitrag zur Rezeptionsgeschichte in den ersten beiden Nachkriegsjahren.” *Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte* 1 (2009), p. 198.

¹⁹⁷ Schulz, Andreas, “Der Aufstieg der ‘Vierten Gewalt’: Medien, Politik und Öffentlichkeit im Zeitalter der Massenkommunikation.” *Historische Zeitschrift* 270/1 (2000), p. 92.

the early 1950s.¹⁹⁸ The remaining licenses were given to dependable anti-fascists, who were closely affiliated to the KPD. The purpose of the media in the construction of the antifascist-democratic society was clearly articulated in 1945 by Willhelm Pieck as follows:

*“Die Massen über die Kriegsschuld Deutschlands, die Verbrechen Hitlerdeutschlands und die Schuld an der entstandenen Katastrophe aufzuklären; die Massen um Kampf gegen die versteckten Reste des faschistischen Machtapparates zu organisieren; die Massen zur Selbsthilfe in der Überwindung der entstandenen Not zu organisieren und Saboteure, Provokateure und Spekulanten zu entlarven und unschädlich zu machen; den Massen die Perspektive zu zeigen: durch Arbeit, antifaschistische demokratische Erkenntnis und Unterstützung der im Interesse des deutschen Volkes wirkenden Besatzungsbehörde läßt sich das Vertrauen der Sowjetunion und der anderen friedliebenden Völker gewinnen; mit der planmäßigen ideologischen Umerziehung zu beginnen.“*¹⁹⁹

Apart from the last year of the existence of the GDR, the policies regarding the press stayed more or less the same from 1949 onwards. Media were supposed be the *“Die schärfste Waffe der Partei”*²⁰⁰ functioning as guarantor the Elite’s power.²⁰¹ Thus, the SED essentially created a *“Nachrichtenmonopol,”*²⁰² steered by the *Presseamt beim Ministerpräsidenten der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. It was responsible for enforcing the conformity of print media, giving out licenses, controlling paper contingencies, censorship of the church press and coordination of the state’s public relations and factually controlled by the SED Bureau for propaganda and agitation,²⁰³ in what Holzweissig has described as a perfectly functioning mechanism of

¹⁹⁸ Oren, Osterer, “Das Israelbild in den Tageszeitungen der DDR.” PhD. Diss. University of Munich 2014, p. 30.

¹⁹⁹ Koszyk, p. 45.

²⁰⁰ “Die schärfste Waffe der Partei” was the title of the first Press-conference of the SED Parteivorstand in January 1950, see: Holzweissig, Gunter. *Die schärfste Waffe der Partei : eine Mediengeschichte der DDR*. Köln: Böhlau, 2002, p. 87.

²⁰¹ Oren, p. 32.

²⁰² Impekoven, Holger, “‘Gewinnt alle christlichen Mitbürger zur Mitarbeit!’ Die CDU-Presse in der SBZ und DDR.” In *Feigenblätter : Studien zur Presselenkung in Dritten Reich und DDR*, edited by Holger Impekoven and Victoria Plank. . Münster: Scriptorium, 2004, p- 240.

²⁰³ Holzweissig, Gunther, “Massenmedien in der DDR.” In *Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, edited by Jürgen Wilke. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999, 576-578.

control.²⁰⁴ If journalistic freedoms did occur, this was allowed in order to create an illusion of pluralism.²⁰⁵

As opposed to literature and film production, there was no institutionalized censorship for the press, with the exception of church publications, in East Germany. Technically this was guaranteed by article 27 of the constitution of the GDR, which mandated freedom of press, radio and television. The editorial staff was merely advised to implement “suggestions“ by the SED Central Committee’s department for propaganda and agitation, which were usually implemented nearly word for word. What was not already clearly stipulated fell victim to inner censorship (*die Schere im Kopf*) by the journalists themselves, most likely out of fear of penalization. Textual variations were dependent on the respective general secretaries of the SED as well as of the heads of propaganda and agitation, but all of them collectively followed the guidelines for the press articulated by Lenin. In his concept, the press had the role of the collective propagandist, agitator and organizer. In reality this implied that, even if journalists were not party members, they were charged with the task of disseminating Marxist-Leninist teachings.²⁰⁶

Due to the central control of the press by the SED, the media did not reflect East German public opinion at all. On the contrary, embellishment, whitewashing and falsification were used to cover up the true state of partially dismal situation of consumer goods and housing. Especially in times of crisis the headlines in the GDR insisted on the close relationship between leadership and population. However, this most likely had the opposite effect, since it only highlighted the striking difference between propaganda and reality.²⁰⁷ A poll conducted by the SED’s central committee in 1970 showed that not even one third of the population deemed the press credible.²⁰⁸ To answer the question of why the GDR, despite being aware of the negative perception of the press by the population, did not change its press policy, Meyen and Fiedler have conducted a change in perspective, stating that GDR press was not so much propaganda, but rather “political PR” that was to support the interest of the elite in the struggle for

²⁰⁴ Holzweissig, “die Schärfste Waffe.“ p. 23.

²⁰⁵ Oren, p. 32.

²⁰⁶ Holzweissig, “Massenmedien.“ p. 573.

²⁰⁷ Heydemann, Roth, p. 210.

²⁰⁸ Oren, p. 33.

the “heads” of its own population.²⁰⁹ Still, the high circulation numbers, especially of ND, as well as newspaper density show that the East German population relied on the press for the orientation in every day life.²¹⁰

As is well known, the western media that penetrated into the eastern bloc most was the radio. Despite efforts of the GDR to disrupt the reception of western radio, stations like RIAS continued to transmit across the Iron Curtain until 1989. The circulation of print media was naturally easier to intercept than that of radio waves (waves?). From 1948 onwards a *Pressemauer* separated the distribution of East German press in the FRG, and vice versa. Officially the Allied Control Council had allowed the inter-zonal distribution of press in 1947, but the respective occupying force could legally intervene if it harmed security or if national socialist ideas were being disseminated through it. However, most likely due to the high popularity of dailies from the western zones (Leipzig daily sale of 13.000 *Tagesspiegel* and *Telegraph*) their sale was prohibited in the Soviet Zone in 1948. Henceforth, the postal service was the only authority to transport Western press into the GDR. This way, packages and letters from the West could be routinely checked for their content. However, even later, the *Pressemauer* could not be fully closed, despite the fact that the Ministry for state security assumed responsibility for postal censorship and the dissemination of (interestingly not the possession) of Western press was penalized. The situation was startlingly similar in the FRG. After its constitution several East German newspapers were sold temporarily, but this was quickly prohibited by the government. The only exception were specialized journals, however except for three medical journals they were not exceedingly popular. Not even journalists were allowed to possess press from the GDR, and the Ministry for intra-German relations in Bonn was forced to circumvent the prohibition by obtaining them through a private company in West Berlin. Nevertheless, the GDR used increasingly inventive ways to disseminate political pamphlets in West Germany through the post. However, many West German citizens, after having received such materials disguised as personal correspondence by hand-labeled envelopes, chose to alert the authorities and turned them in to the police, since the possession of anti-constitutional writings was penalized.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Meyen, Michael and Fiedler, Anke, “Totalitäre Vernichtung der politischen Öffentlichkeit? Tageszeitungen und Kommunikationsstrukturen in der DDR.” In *Wie im Westen, nur anders. Medien in der DDR*, edited by Stefan Zahlmann. Berlin: Panama 2010, p. 38.

²¹⁰ Oren, p. 33.

²¹¹ Meyen, “Gesitige Grenzgänger.” p. 207-215.

Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis

In order to examine how the discussion surrounding the constitution of the United German Olympic Teams reflected societal tensions regarding German identity and unity in the 1950s and 60s, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been chosen as the methodological approach. CDA is a part of a critical theory of language that interprets language as a form of social practice.²¹² CDA is most commonly used to point to social inequalities and how relations of power and hegemony reflected in the media are used to support these inequalities, and most importantly, how they might be changed. As the topic of this thesis is historical, this point of view will not be utilized. Several models of CDA are available²¹³, yet Fairclough's approach to CDA has been chosen, since, as Richardson states: "Fairclough's model of CDA, in my view, provides a more accessible method of *doing* CDA than alternative theoretical approaches."²¹⁴

In connection to the use of CDA in historiography, Flowerdew has illustrated how the "discourse- historical" approach in CDA emphasizes the importance of socio-historical background for understanding discourse: "In investigating historical, organizational and political topics and texts, the discourse-historical approach attempts to integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded."²¹⁵

In accordance with this, Fairclough distinguishes between the actual *story* of any given text and its representation. CDA assumes that there are always several options of representation, and that the option chosen by the producer of the text reflects on how the world is being represented. Textual representation can differ between absent, presupposed, backgrounded and foregrounded. For this, the concept of presuppositions

²¹² Fairclough, p. 16.

²¹³ Van Dijk, Teun A. *Handbook of discourse analysis*. London Orlando: Academic Press, 1985.; Yates, Simeon, Stephanie Taylor, and Margaret Wetherell. *Discourse as data : a guide for analysis*. London Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE, 2001.

²¹⁴ Richardson, John E. *Analysing newspapers : an approach from critical discourse analysis*. Basingstoke England New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 37.

²¹⁵ Wodak (2001) quoted Flowerdew, John. *Critical discourse analysis in historiography : the case of Hong Kong's evolving identity*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 8.

is used: “Presuppositions anchor the new in the old, the unknown in the known, the contentious in the commonsensical. ... presupposing something is tantamount to assuming that there are other texts (which may or may not actually exist) that are common ground for oneself and one’s readers, in which what is now presupposed is explicitly present, part of the ‘said’.”²¹⁶ Furthermore, purposefully left out facts can add yet another level of meaning to a text.²¹⁷ For instance, to use an example close to the topic of the thesis, it could be important whether the origin, stemming from East or West Germany, of medal winning athletes of a United German Olympic Team is mentioned in an article or not.

Language is socially constitutive, but at the same time socially and historically situated, which is why Fairclough highlights the importance of social and historical contextualization (“the social and cultural goings-on which the communicative event is a part of”²¹⁸) when applying CDA. This is why, as opposed to more homogenous methods, CDA links linguistic with social analysis: “language ought to be analysed in relation to the social *context* in which it is being used and the social consequences of its use; and, more specifically, the relationship(s) between discourse and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations need to be examined.”²¹⁹ This has been attempted in the previous chapters.

Moreover, “the ideational function of language is its function in generating representations of the world; the interpersonal function includes the functioning of language in the constitution of relations, and of identities.”²²⁰ CDA draws heavily from the theory of social constructionism. Stefan Weber has illustrated this by highlighting how, and if, Media reflects or perhaps rather is a constructive element of perceived reality.²²¹

Another major issue in CDA is how language might work ideologically. Fairclough understands ideology as “meaning in the service of power.”²²² Ideologies function as implicit assumption in texts, based on presuppositions created by previous texts or discourses, and aimed at reproducing (mostly unequal) relations of power and

²¹⁶ Fairclough, p. 107.

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 106.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 57.

²¹⁹ Richardson, p. 45.

²²⁰ Fairclough, p. 17.

²²¹ Weber, Stefan, “Was heißt ‘Medien konstruieren Wirklichkeit?’ Von einem ontologischen zu einem empirischen Verständnis von Konstruktion.“ *Medien Impulse* 40 (2002), p. 11.

²²² Thompson, 1984, 1990 cited by Fairclough, p. 14.

domination.²²³ Discourse is infused, implicitly or explicitly, with the ideological view of its creators. It can interpret reality in such a way that pre-imposes ideological values on its recipients.²²⁴ Moreover Fairclough points out that ideologies are not usually “adopted,” but taken for granted as common ground between the different parties of the respective discourse, and that the manipulation or distortion of the truth is often implied in the concept of ideology, however it does not necessarily have to be so.²²⁵

CDA furthermore links the use of language with the exercise of power, the creation of relationships, identities and ideology:

“Language use - any text - is always simultaneously constitutive of (1) social identities, (2) social relations and (3) systems of knowledge and belief (corresponding respectively to identities, relationships and representations...). That is, any text makes its own small contribution to shaping these aspects of society and culture.”²²⁶

CDA can thus also be helpful in examining questions of identity. By looking at how discursive interactions between the public and the “others” work, questions about the projection of cultural values can be answered: Do the articles project cultural values? If yes, then how? And whose cultural values do they project? How are these cultural values related to the “other”?²²⁷ At the same time, as Smith has shown, “The creation of a hegemonic discourse concerned with national and sociopolitical identities implies the projection of a common identity onto subjects as belonging to an autonomous community and expressing a single national and political culture.”²²⁸ Thus, the discourse on the United German Olympic Teams can give insight into the construction of a homogenous German identity on each side of the iron curtain, while projections on the “other” Germany can give insight into assumptions the national and socio-political “self.”

²²³ Fairclough, p. 14.

²²⁴ Flowerdew, p. 7.

²²⁵ Fairclough, p. 46.

²²⁶ Fairclough, p. 55.

²²⁷ Fairclough, p. 125-126.

²²⁸ Smith quoted in Flowerdew, p. 8.

Research Question

The main research question of this thesis is: “How were tensions concerning unity and identity projected through the media of a divided country?”

Related sub-questions include: “How was the “other” Germany referred to in the context of the United Teams?”; “How does this reflect on the image of the national “self”?”; “Was there a makeable change in the discourse throughout the eight year time period in which the United German teams existed?”

Research Design

For the examination of the discourse on the United German Olympic Teams one daily Newspaper from each East and West Germany has been selected: for the FRG the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)* and for the GDR *Neues Deutschland (ND)*.

The *FAZ* has been chosen since it turned into one of the leading over-regional newspapers of the FRG, soon after its foundation in 1949.²²⁹ From an initial circulation of 42.040 in 1950, numbers quickly rose. Circulation numbers of the years in which the Olympic Games were held were as follows: 1956 – 159.028; 1960 – 219.298; 1964 – 239.991.²³⁰ From its beginnings, the *FAZ* was closely connected through personal relationships to the government. Its founding was initiated by the *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft*, which sought to give a voice to the proponents of a market economic structure for post-war Germany. Amongst other prominent economists and politicians, Ludwig Erhard, at the time minister of finance and future chancellor, was a part of the *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft*. The *FAZ* repeatedly rallied for Erhard’s partially unpopular economic policies, for instance taking his side against the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* or Konrad Adenauer himself. Thus, the *FAZ* can be politically oriented on the neo-liberal, but socially conservative side. Despite its not insignificant historical role, until today there is no comprehensive overall work on the *FAZ*.²³¹

²²⁹ Kutzner, Maximilian, “Das Wirtschaftsressort der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung und die Medialisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik in den 1950er Jahren“ *Vierteljahresschrift für Zeitgeschichte* 101 (2014), p. 489.

²³⁰ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Medienportal, “Auflagenentwicklung.“ Accessed 22 April 2015, <http://verlag.faz.net/mediaportal/faz-auflagenentwicklung-12798136.html>.

²³¹ Kutzner, p. 489-494.

The *ND* was founded at the time of the fusion of KPD and SPD in 1946, replacing the party publications *Deutsche Volkszeitung* (KPD) and *Das Volk* (SPD), becoming the main mouthpiece for the SED.²³² Next to the regional publications of the SED, it was the most highly circulated daily in the GDR, however it must be mentioned that except for differences in regional news, the content of *ND* and the respective regional SED publications would have hardly varied. In 1950 circulation was 284.000, in 1960 769.000 and in 1971 955.000.²³³ The high circulation numbers must be interpreted with caution. Factors such as the control of all printing and press production as well as paper distribution through the SED, the low price of *ND*, the general shortage of paper (which the *ND* as an easily available source thereof) and the fact that in the 1950s much less households possessed a radio or television and therefore relied on the press as sole means of information, contributed to the high circulation numbers.²³⁴

The United German Olympic Teams existed for eight years, thus for the three Olympics of 1956 in Melbourne and Cortina d'Ampezzo; 1960 in Rome and Squaw Valley; 1964 in Tokyo and Innsbruck.²³⁵ The analysis will focus on the discourse about the negotiations between the NOCs, as this will give most insight into the questions at hand. While negotiations about the team took place intermittently between the Olympics, the research samples were selected from the years of and before the Olympics. Including the year before the Olympics was necessary, as the winter Olympic Games are usually held in January or in February. As new negotiations took place to constitute the team for the summer Olympics, the year of has been included into the research as well.

The articles were collected using two online databases. The *Staatsbibliothek*²³⁶ of Berlin offers *ND* completely digitalized and freely available. *FAZ* is digitalized in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Archiv – Bibliotheksportal*²³⁷, accessible via institutional log-on. For the respective years, the search terms “gesamtdeutsch,” “Olympia,” and “NOK”

²³² Osterer, p. 13.

²³³ Fiedler, Anke and Meyen, Michael, “Zeitungslesen in der DDR.“ *Presse in der DDR. Beiträge und Materialien*, 01 April 2012, accessed 05 May 2015, http://pressegeschichte.docupedia.de/wiki/Zeitungslesen_in_der_DDR.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Olympic, “Olympic Games.“ *Official Website of the Olympic Games*, accessed 10 February 2015, <http://www.olympic.org/olympic-games>.

²³⁶ Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, “DDR Presse.“ Accessed 15 April, 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/>.

²³⁷ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Archiv – Bibliotheksportal.“ Accessed 12 April 2015, <http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/>.

were used. From the three time frames, three articles per FAZ and ND were chosen that are concerned mainly with the United Olympic Teams. For the time frame of 1959/60 one article each was selected that reflects the problem of the united flag, as this was one of the main points of contention for this period. While it is common in CDA to include authorship of texts into the analysis, it will not be done in this case. The journalists are not noted in each case, and if so only with abbreviations, which I was not able to connect to a precise name in each case.

It must be noted that it is not the objective of this thesis to directly compare the East and West German media. As we are dealing with two completely opposite systems of press, a direct comparison would be obsolete. As been outlined in the chapter on press, especially the state- controlled East German media, was hardly representative of the public discourse, even if we apply the concept of CDA. Thus, for the GDR the analysis will reflect more on how the government used the concept of the United German Teams to increase its legitimization. The analysis in this case will reflect that shifts in East Germany policy can be observed through this medium. For the West German side, since only one newspaper has been chosen, it is hard to make definite assumptions about the discourse on the common Team in the FRG. However, as FAZ was the most widely read over-regional daily and tabloids such as *BILD* have been excluded from the analysis, it will give the best insight into the discourse that is available for the frame of this thesis.

Despite these reservations, the history of any given topic of German history for the forty-year time span of division, must be seen in connection to the other German state. As social historians such as Kleßmann and Sabrow have pointed out, both German governments and societies were inherently connected through confrontation and cooperation – more than they both liked to admit.²³⁸

Framing

The theoretical concept of framing is related to that of agenda setting. However, it is broader than agenda setting in the sense that it focuses on situating communication events in a field of meaning, rather than focusing on a specific topic. As Entmann states

²³⁸ Kleßmann, Cristoph and Sabrow, Martin, “Zeitgeschichte in Deutschland nach 1989.“ *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 39 (1996), p. 10.

“to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”²³⁹ De Vreese has illustrated that literature on the theory of framing is inconsistent, to say the least.²⁴⁰ For this thesis, I have used inductive approach, which does not use pre-defined frames, but frames that emerge throughout the analysis.²⁴¹ The concept of framing as well as that of CDA has been applied very broadly to this thesis, focusing more on the reflection of symbols and identity in the given context of German division.

I will analyse the texts according to different units of analysis, or frames, outlined below for each respective time period, first for the *FAZ* and then for *ND*. The main focus of analysis will lie on recurring symbols and meanings and not on linguistic analysis. Although a valid method of analysis, I am neither a linguist, nor does the frame of this thesis allow for a too thorough linguistic examination. Even though many of the frames are interconnected, for the purpose of the analysis of the discourse on the United German Olympic Teams I have identified the following separate frames:

German unity is the predominant frame in which the common German Olympic team is situated. If we assume that the team was an instrument over which tensions about the question of unity were carried out, then it will be noteworthy to examine how the team is mentioned, for instance whether it is called “*gemeinsam*” or “*gesamtdeutsch*.” Unity in sport, despite the division of the country, can be described as something positive, in the sense that it was the last societal sphere in which East and West Germans could (relatively) freely interact. It can also be interpreted negative in the sense that it denied political realities, especially after the construction of the Berlin Wall. For instance, whether the teams, presidents or NOCs are mentioned separately or together as “*gemeinsam*” or “*beide*” could have a large difference in meaning. This can give insight into whether Germany was perceived as one state or two and if and how this perception changed over time. This frame will also include how the question of unity in

²³⁹ Entmann, Robert, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication* 43 (1993), p. 52.

²⁴⁰ De Vreese, Claes H., “News framing: Theory and Typology.” *Information Design Journal + Document Design* 13 (2005), p. 51.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

general is mentioned in articles concerning the common German team. The way the athletic success of the team, or individual athletes is reflected can furthermore ?!?!?

The “other” Germany is naturally a reoccurring frame in the examined articles. The topic is inseparably connected to that of German unity, but they have been separate for the purpose of the analysis. References to the other German state can be made derogatively, most usually in regards to functionaries or politicians, however positively in regards to the population or athletes. The connection made between the influence of politics on sport, or the instrumentalization of sport by politicians can give insight into broader fields of discussion about political freedoms, cultural values and the conflict between the two systems, namely socialism and capitalism. Furthermore, the way interactions between the representatives of the two states and the NOCs are described can give insight into the perception on the division of the country. At the same time, assumptions made about the respective other state in most cases indicate perception about the national “self” by juxtaposing contradicting phenomena.

Style and language – the last unit of analysis will focus on the style in which the texts are written, as well as examine some recurring or noteworthy linguistic features of the texts.

As Bergsdorf has illustrated, GDR leadership created its own use of language to reflect its policies and stabilize the regime. The most important instruments for this were *ND* and *ADN*.²⁴² Therefore it seems necessary to point out some broader characteristics of linguistic use in the GDR, which will not be repeated for the following analysis individually.

One characteristic of language use in the GDR is the repetition of phrases, coined by political leadership. Moreover, language was extremely emotional, with an almost compulsive use of superlatives, and borrowed many phrases from the military. Political terminology was extremely polarized, illustrated in the juxtaposition of phrases such as “*Kapitalismus – Sozialismus*,” “*Bourgeoisie – Bürgertum*,” “*militärisch – friedliebend*”²⁴³ and many more. Adjectives such as “*umfassend*,”

²⁴² Bergsdorf, Wolfgang, “Politischer Sprachgebrauch und totalitäre Herrschaft.” *German Studies Review* 17 (1994), p. 30.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

‘*vielseitig*, ‘*allseitig*’”²⁴⁴ played an important role in the political language of the GDR, implying complete consideration of problems or conflicts. Intense use of polemics and self-praise were also characteristics of GDR language. However, as Bergsdorf claims, it can be assumed that exactly through the constant repetition of propagandistic phrases, their effectiveness was diminished.²⁴⁵

Analysis

The previous chapters have contextualized the discourse on the constitution of United German Olympic Teams socio-historically. Furthermore, the role of the media and the chosen methodology for this thesis have been outlined. The next chapter will thus focus on the actual analysis of the articles.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

German Unity

The discourse on German unity for the time period leading up to the Olympics in 1956, as we will see in the course of the analysis, was not as strongly developed as in later years. The way the German team is described, namely whether it is described as “*gemeinsam*” or “*gesamtdeutsch*” could give insight into how the team represent German unity. The difference between the two is subtle, but “*gemeinsam*” indicates one team for two Germanys (i.e., Germany and France could very easily form a “*gemeinsames*” team should they so wish), while “*gesamtdeutsch*” implies one team for one country. Certainly the fact that the distinction “*gesamtdeutsch*” needs to be made in the first place points to some separatist tendencies, but it is not as clear with “*gemeinsam*.” The only article where the team is described as “*gemeinsam*”²⁴⁶ is the article that predates the final decision to form a united team. That it was used before the

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p 31.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁴⁶ “Im Interesse des Sports,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 July 1955, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv.approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=179161_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_4, Appenix A.

German team was formed for the first time could be an indicator of a will to cooperate. This should however not be overestimated, as using both phrases could also merely be the cause of stylistic considerations.

Despite the use of the phrasing “*gesamtdeutsch*,” other phenomena illustrate that the common team was, in fact, not seen as united, thus reflecting on the perception of the unity of the entire country. For instance, one article states that the Olympic German Flag will be black-red-gold, but specifies that this flag will be used for both teams.²⁴⁷ This implies that, even though mentioned in the same article as a united team, there are still two *separate* teams that will merely be represented by one flag.

Moreover, the way Berlin is described may give some insight to the topic, as, even before 1961, Berlin had become a symbol for the division of Germany. An example of this can be seen when one of the chosen articles mentions Berlin three times, yet only once the specification about it being East Berlin is made. This connotes that Berlin is, as the rest of Germany, seen as one official unit. However, in a negative context, such as referring to the use of polemics by journalists from *East Berlin*, the division is made explicit.²⁴⁸ Thus, it could be assumed that at this time German unity was perceived as a given, illustrated by the fact that a separation is only explicitly mentioned in negative contexts.

Nevertheless, the published list of participating athletes for the 1956 Olympics, categorizes each of the 1969 athletes according to “*Sowjetzone*” or “*Westdeutschland*,” with the athletes from the GDR being listed first in each athletic category.²⁴⁹

It seems noteworthy that the united German team was reflected upon much more strongly in the context of unity than that of athletic success. In general, the discourse on athletic success in connection with the United German Team is not very pronounced in the coverage by *FAZ*, especially when one compares it to that of *ND*, as will be shown later. This could have several reasons: as has been shown in the chapter about the

²⁴⁷ “Eine gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 August 1955, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=182794_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_6, Appendix B.

²⁴⁸ „Im interesse des Sports.“

²⁴⁹ “Mit 169 Aktiven nach Melbourne. Die Namen der deutschen Olympiakämpfer / Gerhard Stock ist ‘Chef de mission’,“ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 October 1956, accessed 12 April 2015,

United Olympic Teams, sport in the FRG was deemed something inherently unpolitical, which could be a reason for the separation in the coverage of *actual* sport and sport politics.

For the time period leading up to the Olympic Games of 1960, the question of unity in sport is still the recurring frame in which the common German team is mentioned. The fact that now statements such as “*das Nebeneinander*”²⁵⁰ of two German states are made without any addition that would express the illegitimacy of East German sovereignty could be an indication that the division of the country was more accepted than before. This can be further shown in bold statements about how German unity in sport is walking the line between “*Wunsch und Wirklichkeit*.”²⁵¹

A qualitative shift, however, in the way the constitution of the team is judged by the respective journalist can be observed. One article states that the constitution of the team “*muß erfreulich genannt werden*.”²⁵² The emphasis here lies on the choice of the word “*muß*.” The use of the modal verb “*müssen*”, instead of “*können*” or “*sein*”, implies that the joyfulness concerning the United German Team is only given grudgingly. This is mirrored in the fact that one article calls the negotiations about which flag should be used for the United Team “*traurige Affäre*.”²⁵³ This comment cannot just be viewed as a statement about the question of the flag itself, as it is embedded in the context of the United German Team and is thus a statement on the question of unity in general.

Moreover, who is at fault for the sad state of affairs is also clearly articulated: “*Die Zonen-Sportführung ist im Prinzip gegen gesamtdeutsche Mannschaften*.”²⁵⁴ This positions the East German functionaries in the role of the

http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=227670_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_10, Appendix C.

²⁵⁰ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31 December 1959, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=360424_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_16, Appendix E.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² “Daume: Die stärkste deutsche Mannschaft nach Rom,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 27 May 1960, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=378539_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_19, Appendix F.

²⁵³ “Das letzte Wort,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 08 December 1959, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=357820_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_13, Appendix D.

²⁵⁴ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.”

antagonists of unity in sport while at the same time presupposing upholding desirable, hence the above mentioned use of the word “*Wunsch*.”²⁵⁵

The first thing that needs to be noted for the time period leading up to the Olympic Games of 1964 is that the negotiations about the United German Team took place after the Berlin Wall had been built, and therefore the discourse on unity shifted more to one of division. Nevertheless, sport was the last realm in which unity, at least to a certain extent, existed. The discourse in this time about the United German Team is very clear on the fact that “*Gemeinsamkeit*”²⁵⁶ was a matter of the heart to every citizen of the FRG. Specifying the West German population in this context indicates that, for the East German population, it was not a matter of the heart. This specification is a change from the discourse of the previous years and implies a shift in attitude towards the East German population, which can furthermore be detected in the statement that the wall was not built by the GDR so that the population of both parts of Germany could further on think and act “*gesamtdeutsch*.” This presupposes that until the wall was built, both parts of the population had thought and acted in a united manner, however now ceased to do so. The division is underscored by adding “*getrennt*” when describing both parts of Germany. Still, the blame for this is clearly placed on the “*Zonenmachthaber*,”²⁵⁷ not the population itself.

In contrast to the discourse about the previous Olympics, the United German Team is now described decidedly positively and as something desirable. This is illustrated in the description of the fact that despite objections from the East German side, athletes were to be housed according to discipline - not which part of Germany they belonged to – which was deemed a great success. This is described as an opportunity “*echte Gemeinsamkeit mit den Sportlern aus dem anderen Teil Deutschlands zu demonstrieren*.”²⁵⁸ Moreover, the efforts of GDR sport functionaries to house athletes according to East and West Germany are described as constructing a wall

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ “Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 January 1963, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=498008_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_22, Appendix G.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft. Nominierung der Teilnehmer / Gemeinsame Unterbringung im olympischen Dorf gegen den Willen der Zonenfunktionäre,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 September 1964, accessed 12 April 2015, Appendix I.

through the Olympic village.²⁵⁹ Which wall was being referenced naturally did not need to be elaborated to the reader. In general, references to the Berlin Wall were commonly made in different contexts in the coverage of the common German Team. For instance, the negotiations about the constitution of the team are described as being held “*im Zeichen der Mauer.*”²⁶⁰

One article describing the long time and varied controls it took to cross the border into the GDR is particularly interesting: “*Wenn Willi Daume auch mit seinem gelben Ferrari (mit Telefon) in die Zone einreisen kann...*”²⁶¹ This construction at once highlights the division, by emphasizing the trials connected with crossing the inner-German border, while at the same time points out the preferential treatment of elites in the GDR. The mentioning of Daume’s Ferrari in this context most likely again hints at the desirability of Western products in the GDR. The Ferrari is in this sense also reflected as the means by which entry into the GDR is made easy.

That, by this time, the GDR had given up its sole claim to representation is reflected in the discourse about the United German Teams. As for the previous Olympics, it is described that GDR leadership did not want the United Teams, yet the propaganda as well as athletic efforts of the GDR to achieve the termination of the team were referenced more explicitly in the discourse on the division of Germany. One article directly quotes Ewald in saying that the United German Team is no longer about sports, but about victories for the GDR and that “*Deutschland gibt es für uns schon lange nicht mehr.*”²⁶² The journalist comments: “*Diesen Satz möge man sich merken; er charakterisiert genau die Lage, in der diese gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft sich heute befindet, und schließt jede Illusion aus.*”²⁶³ By using “today” the statement connotes that it had been different previously. Furthermore, by utilizing the term illusion in reference to the United Teams, the factual division of Germany is assumed.

Even though the United German Team is described in a more positive manner compared to the previous time periods, it is explicitly stated that without the insistence

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ “Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch.”

²⁶¹ “Die Tricks des Politruks,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 August 1964, accessed 12 April 2015, http://faz-archiv-approved.faz.net/intranet/biblionet/r_suche/webcgi?START=A20&DOKM=572805_FAZH_0&WID=27275-7860995-31231_25, Appendix H.

²⁶² “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft.”

²⁶³ Ibid.

of the IOC, a common German Team would not have existed. The role of the “*Amerikaner*” Avery Brundage is highlighted in this regard, by calling it “*sein*”²⁶⁴ team.

In 1964 the United German Team was, for the first time, made up of more East German athletes, as having an East German *Chef de Mission*. The majority of East German athletes was however relativized with the statement that even though they were higher in number, since more West German athletes were starting twice, the starting positions of the FRG were factually higher.²⁶⁵ That the GDR had by this time increased its athletic performance considerably, is not given as an explanation. On the contrary, the changed ratio of East to West German athletes is explained by the use of “*ständigen Protesten und anderen Tricks*”²⁶⁶ by GDR athletes. Amongst other things, referees were accused of not being impartial, and denial of entry into the GDR to mothers of West German athletes is highlighted. How unfair these methods were is highlighted by quoting a Soviet referee in this context. Moreover it is stated that these tactics were used to undermine the athletic superiority of the West German athletes.²⁶⁷

The “other” Germany

The “other” Germany is represented in the articles mainly by using terms such as “*die Zone*”²⁶⁸ or “*die Sowjetzone*.”²⁶⁹ These expressions were commonly used by West German media and politics to refer to the GDR. They negate the existence of the East German state while at the same time implying that it was still occupied by the Soviet Union, hence the use of “*Zone*.” Moreover, adding “*Sowjet*” to “*Zone*” implies that it was the Soviet Union, and not East German leadership, pulling strings behind the scenes. In essence it was the linguistic representation of the claim to sole representation as well as the Hallstein Doctrine. At the same time, for instance by declaring Schöbel as president of the East German NOC, despite the added “*der Zone*,”²⁷⁰ the existence of at least a NOC in the other part of the country is expressed. This hints at a certain degree of acknowledgment, if not acceptance, of the GDR.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ “Die Tricks des Politkruks.”

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ “Im Interesse des Sports.”

²⁶⁹ “Eine gesmatdeutsche Olympiamannschaft.”

²⁷⁰ “Im Interesse des Sports.”

The use of “(Sowjet-)Zone” is a recurring phenomenon, present in almost every chosen article and therefore will not be pointed out separately for every time frame. Thus, it is perhaps more interesting to note when such terms are *not* used. For instance, in one article the term “*der beiden Nationalen Olympischen Komitees*”²⁷¹ is used twice—once in connection to their members and once to the respective presidents, von Halt and Schöbel, while the term “*Sowjetzone*” is not used until the fourth paragraph, at this point in connection with the fact that GDR officials questioned the athletic proficiency of West German athletes and, thus, in a decidedly negative context. The otherwise sparing use of the derogative terms could be an indicator of satisfaction with the constitution of the team. Mentioning the East German NOC as one of two NOCs, and not specifically as that of the GDR, could also hint at acceptance, or at least acknowledgement, of the GDR, without having to use any official versions of its name. This grudging amount of tolerance can also be seen in the term “*kleine Feierstunde*,”²⁷² used to describe the official announcement of the United Teams. By adding the adjective “small,” a moderate and *decent* amount of happiness is implied, underlining that no excessive joy was felt at cooperating with GDR functionaries.

For the time predating the 1956 Olympics, no type of explicit connection between Politics and Sport is made in any of the chosen articles. While references to political tensions are made through the phenomena described above, it seems noteworthy that the discourse about the United Team at this time was not overly politicized in West Germany. This reflects, as shown in the chapter about the constitution of the United German Team, that West German politics had not fully realized the political importance of sport at this time. Moreover, it is also important in connection to the idea that the apparent politicization of sport in later years was not as strongly perceived by the GDR in later years.

Cultural and political values of the FRG are presented mostly in opposition to those of the GDR. For instance, the sentence “*Er bat vor allem die Journalisten Ost-Berlins, jede scharfe Polemik bei Behandlung dieser Frage zu unterlassen.*”²⁷³ holds several implications: the use of word “*unterlassen*” presupposes that in the past polemics were indeed undertaken – hence the necessity to clarify that they should be

²⁷¹ “Mit 169 Aktiven nach Melbourne.”

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ “Im Interesse des Sports.”

stopped. Moreover by specifying that “*vor allem*” journalists from East Berlin were the ones engaging in polemics, it implies that the West German ones were not.

For the time before the Olympics of 1960, a difference in terms used for the GDR can be observed. In addition to calling it different varieties of “*die Zone*,” the term of “*Ulbricht-Regime*”²⁷⁴ and “*sogenannte Deutsche Demokratische Republik*,”²⁷⁵ as well as simply putting “*DDR*” in quotation marks is now introduced, adding a ridiculing quality to the discourse on the GDR, which can be observed in several other respects as well: One article, for instance, describes the GDR’s flag as being four weeks old at the time of the last Olympics.²⁷⁶ While the observation is most likely correct, it implies that the FRG’s flag was the only rightful one deemed worthy to represent German identity and traditions.

Moreover, a stronger reflection of cultural and political values can be observed in this time period. For instance, that athletes were portrayed as victims of the GDR’s sport policies, incapable of independent action, points to the reflection of the difference in political and personal freedoms between East and West Germany. One of these statements is followed by two short, yet very significant sentences: “*So sind die Verhältnisse dort.*”²⁷⁷ and “*In der Bundesrepublik ist es anders.*”²⁷⁸ The article concludes with the statement that at least some satisfaction can be gained about the sad state of affairs between the two German states by “*...für diesen Staat, in dem das Recht das letzte Wort hat, auch einzustehen.*”²⁷⁹ – which adds a strongly moralizing undertone. Thus, a statement about infringements of freedom of GDR athletes is imbedded in the more general conflict of democracy versus socialism.

The problem of defections of East German athletes to the FRG is also connected to the discourse on the systemic conflict. Apart from giving hard evidence of inner workings of GDR sport, that was supplied by the athletes after their emigration, simply mentioning “*‘republikflüchtige’ Leistungssportler*”²⁸⁰ referenced the systemic superiority of the West German state. Moreover, by using the official term used by the GDR for the defectors, while putting it in quotation marks, adds a ridiculing and ironic

²⁷⁴“Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.“

²⁷⁵ “Das letzte Wort.“

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid..

²⁸⁰ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.

quality to the discourse. By not elaborating on the topic, it is assumed that reader will pick up on this automatically.

The political and cultural superiority of the FRG is furthermore reflected in use of symbols of consumerism. This situates the discourse on the United German Team as part of the Economic Miracle, while at the same time commenting on the lack of consumer goods and living standard in the GDR. When describing a meeting at which the constitution of the United German Team for 1960 was announced, the journalist comments: *“Auf dem Parkplatz stehen einige Westdeutsche Wagen, welche die Werktägigen der ‘DDR’ gerne hätten, aber vorerst nur von den Privilegierten erschwungen werden können: Typ ‘Wartburg’ zum Preise von etwa 15 000 Mark, Typ ‘Sachensring’ für die doppelte Summe.”*²⁸¹ This description implies that West German cars were not only desirable by East Germans, but also perceived as symbols of status by East and West Germans alike. Stating that only the privileged, as opposed to the *“Werktägigen,”* were able to afford them, comments on the societal and material cleavage between the population of the GDR and its elite. The article goes on to set the scene of the meeting by stating that it was celebrated with *“Tokajer Wein”*²⁸² and *“Krimsekt”*²⁸³ – both products of Soviet Satellite states. All of these statements portray an ironic and ridiculing image of the GDR, something that is mirrored in calling a *“Schlagbaum,”*²⁸⁴ a colloquial term for car-barriers: *“Wahrzeichen in diesem Land.”*²⁸⁵

Furthermore, the functionaries of the GDR are now described with an additional characteristic other than their official function in sport: *“Rudi Reichert, der ... zugleich Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der SED ist, ...;”*²⁸⁶ *“Heinz Schöbel, Direktor zweier volkseigener Buchverlage und Präsident des NOK der Zone;”*²⁸⁷ *“Manfred Ewald, Staatssekretär und Vorsitzender des Staatlichen Komitees für Körperkultur und Sport, als Ulbricht-Protege und entschlossener Verfechter der Sache geltend.”*²⁸⁸ This is most pronounced in the description of Alfred Heil, to whose official function a very personal description is added: *“Alfred Heil, im Sportbund der Zone Sekretär des Büros für Agitation und Propaganda, der als einziger im dekadenten bourgeoisen nachtblauen*

²⁸¹ “Daume: Die stärkste deutsche Mannschaft nach Rom.“

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.“

²⁸⁷ “Daume: Die stärkste deutsche Mannschaft nach Rom.“

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

Zweihreier einschließlich silbergrauer Krawatte erscheinen und gar wunderbarlich von manchem Schillerkragen abstach.”²⁸⁹ In case of the Ulbricht-protégé the meaning behind the statement becomes clear, however why Schöbels’ activities as a publisher are mentioned is not so readily apparent. Most likely the slight lies in “*volkseigen*,” criticizing the nationalization of cultural institutions while still being controlled by the elites. This message is underlined by calling Heil’s appearance “*bourgeois*.”

By the time leading up to the Olympic Games of 1960, the discourse on the relationship between sport and politics had increased significantly. On one hand, the political use of sport in the GDR turned into a large part of the discourse, clearly illustrated in titles or sub-titles such as “*Die politischen Ziele der Sowjetzonen-Funktionäre werden immer deutlicher.*”²⁹⁰ On the other hand, questions of how sport and politics should be related to one another in the GDR had arisen.

The political instrumentalization of sport in the GDR was reflected in the *FAZ* by directly quoting the statute of the DTSB, which it titles “*eine Massenorganisation der SED, (...) mit dem Ziel das kommunistische Gedankengut unter das Volk zu bringen.*”²⁹¹ Moreover, the statute is described as “un-Olympic” in its principles and explicitly questioning whether this still had anything to do with sports. The question is however, merely rhetorical, thus presupposing that the reader will know the implied answer: that it had nothing to do with sport, but everything with politics. It is also presupposed that this is something apparent to all readers by stating “*Nach dem Grund, ..., braucht man nicht lange zu forschen.*”²⁹²

According to the discourse in *FAZ* three levels of actors in the GDR can be identified in this sense: Top politicians like Ulbricht and Grotewohl, sport functionaries such as Schöbel and other GDR NOC members, and athletes. Each group was seen as exerting a considerable amount of pressure on the respective lower one. For instance: “*Das Nationale Olympische Komitee in der sogenannten Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat vor kurzem ausgiebig mit den Herren Ulbricht und Grotewohl über die olympische Fahne gesprochen.*”²⁹³ Even though the article claims that the NOC merely spoke with Ulbricht and Grotewohl, it is assumed that every reader knew what this meant – namely that orders were given in respect to the question of the flag. If the

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.”

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ “Das letzte Wort.”

reader at this point was still not aware of the ironic undertone of the statement, the meaning is underscored by calling it “*Fabel*.”²⁹⁴ The influence of functionaries on athletes was furthermore reflected by the incentive scheme that financially rewarded GDR athletes for high performances and breaking records, which went against the concept of Olympic amateurism.²⁹⁵

Regarding the discourse on politics and sport in the FRG, the political importance that sport had gained in the time period between the Olympics of 1956 and 1960 is illustrated by statements such as “... *wie ernst und streng man sein sollte, wenn nationale staatliche Symbole im Spiel sind*.”²⁹⁶ Moreover, united German sport is now constructed as a threat to state security, with one article going so far as to claim that it contained a “*gefährliche Wirklichkeit*.”²⁹⁷ The article goes on to state that “*sollte man die staatliche Sicherheit ebenso fest im Auge behalten wie den menschlichen Kontakt, wenn man die letzten menschlichen Gemeinsamkeiten nicht in Gefahr bringen will*.”²⁹⁸ This sentence implies that perhaps the government of the FRG should intervene more on the behalf of sport in order to protect the population.

While the names used to describe the GDR mainly negated the existence of the GDR in previous years, a shift towards demarcation and animosity can be observed in this regard for the time period 1963/64. While all of the above mentioned terms are still used, phrases such as “*Gegenseite*”²⁹⁹ and “*SED-regime*”³⁰⁰ now enter the discourse, clearly situating the GDR as an enemy which, paradoxically, at least to a certain degree, acknowledged its existence more than before. Another term to describe the GDR that enters the discourse at this time is “*mitteldeutsch*.”³⁰¹ As opposed to the others, this term neither connotes a negation of the GDR’s sovereignty, nor does it imply animosity, however, the more neutral phrase is only used in connection to the athletes or the population and not to functionaries or leadership. Moreover, it is now used when mentioning how many athletes from each Germany will be represented in the United Team.³⁰²

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.”

²⁹⁶ “Das letzte Wort.”

²⁹⁷ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.”

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ “Die Tricks des Politkruks.”

³⁰¹ “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft.”

³⁰² Ibid.

In the timeframe 1963/4 it can be observed that the professionalization of East German Sport functionaries, and their ever growing success in gaining international recognition, was reflected in the discourse on the United German Team, which, in turn, lets us draw conclusions about the concept of un-political sport in the FRG. East German sport functionaries were titled as being “*eigens dafür ‘weltanschaulich’ geschulten Taktiker(n)*”³⁰³ Daume and his colleagues on the other hand, are portrayed as naïve, yet good-hearted fellows, who after all were only “*ehrenamtlich*”³⁰⁴ and were martyring themselves in “*zermürbender Verhandlungsarbeit*,”³⁰⁵ with the professional East German functionaries, who’s negotiation tactics are called “*zäh(en), intrigant(en) und propagandistisch gewürzt(en)*”³⁰⁶ and “*unertraglich(en) Belastung.*”³⁰⁷ Daume and Colleagues are thus representatives of a world in which sport still fulfilled its societal function of recreation and entertainment and thus, such tactics were not necessary.

Leading up to the 1964 Olympics, the discourse on the influence of politics on sport became even more pronounced, which is illustrated by describing the East German functionaries with terms such as “*Ulbrichts Statthalter.*”³⁰⁸ Moreover, as mentioned previously in regards to defections, every accusation made by the East German side against the FRG is identified as propaganda, orchestrated carefully by Alfred Heil. Statements such as “*Mit Sport hat das alles nur noch sehr wenig zu tun,*”³⁰⁹ underscore the meaning that the United German Team indeed had more to do with politics than with sport, at least from the side of the East German functionaries.

In regards to defections the discourse in this time period became more explicit. The alleged poaching is referenced as propaganda against the United German Team, proven by the fact that when asked for written documentation, the GDR failed to give it. One specific example illustrates how cultural values were reflected in this regard: After having defected from “*the Zone*,” one young basketball player returned to the GDR.³¹⁰ The article states, that even though having been given “*gute Möglichkeiten und die Chance*”³¹¹ – note the use of two words very similar in meaning – the young girl was

³⁰³ “Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch.“

³⁰⁴ “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft.“

³⁰⁵ “Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch.“

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ “Die Tricks des Politkruks.“

³⁰⁹ “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft.“

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

overwhelmed by having to work in addition to being an athlete and thus chose to return. This implies that only weak characters would chose the FRG over the GDR, while at the same time referencing the non-amateur status of GDR Olympic athletes. The article goes on to describe the athlete as a “*Paradepferd*”³¹² at a press conference upon her return to the GDR.

Style and Language

For the time period 1955/56 the style of writing is neutral and rather dry, suggesting merely the conveyance of information. In this sense, one of the articles is particularly interesting, as, with the exception of two sentences, it is written entirely in the conjunctive mood II - indicated by the verbs “*sei*” and “*habe*” instead of “*ist*” and “*hat*,” and which is used in the German language for indirect quotes. Apart from the fact that this is almost never used in spoken language, it clearly demarcates what is claimed by the author of the text and what is merely being quoted, taking no responsibility for the truthfulness or accuracy of what he or she is quoting. That this is the case in this article can be demonstrated by the last sentence of the second paragraph: “*In einem Schrift- und Telegrammwechsel sei nunmehr die Sachlage - nach Auffassung Schöbels - vollauf geklärt.*”³¹³ The use of the conjunctive mood II already undoubtedly shows that the author is repeating what Schöbel said. Adding “*nach Auffassung Schöbels*” however conveys unmistakably that it is not the opinion of the author that the situation regarding the United Team is indeed clear.

Leading up to the Olympics of 1960, the discourse about the United German Team also changed drastically from a stylistic and linguistic point of view. Articles are written in a much more literary—and much less neutral—style illustrated by the use of metaphors and hypothetical situations to underline assumptions about the GDR.³¹⁴ As shown above in connection with consumerism, detailed descriptions of scenes allude to a common set of knowledge between author and reader about the GDR. Moreover, this creates a mocking tone in the articles when referencing East Germany. This is illustrated, amongst many other things, by describing the view from the

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ „Im Interesse des Sports.“

“schloßähnlichen Parkrestaurant” as “landwirtschaftliche Gartenbauausstellung.”³¹⁵

This mocking undertone is furthermore reflected in an exponentially increased use of quotations of GDR press and official statements: “die Politik des Bonner Atomkanzlers;”³¹⁶ “Grundsatzfragen des deutschen Lebens;”³¹⁷ “Geheimnisträger.”³¹⁸ However, these terms are not just any quotes, but phrases constantly used by GDR press and functionaries. By quoting them, it is implied that the reader is well aware of the propagandistic, outrageous and even partially untrue nature of these statements.

From a linguistic point of view, the discourse about the United German Teams reflects the increasing animosity towards East Germany, while at the same time reflects the wish to uphold the United German Team as the last connection between the two German states. These two contradictory directions the discourse takes are mirrored in an increasingly emotionalized use of language. For instance, the way in which the negotiations with the East German side are described has increased not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. To describe the negotiation tactics of the GDR functionaries adjectives such as “zäh(en), intrigant(en), propaganditsich gewürzt(en),” and “verbissen(er)” are used. The longevity of the negotiations is further supported by adding temporal phrases to the text: “Endlich;” “In den frühen Morgenstunden des Samstags, zwei Stunden nach Mitternacht;” “Genau ein dutzend mal;” “Zu mitternächtlicher Stunde;” “800 Olympia-Verhandlungen oder 22 Qualifikationen.” None of these phrases are merely factual statements about how much time actually had, but rather hyperbolic exclamations.

As mentioned above, the strain on the West German negotiators is highlighted by describing them as “fast unerträgliche Belastung;”³¹⁹ “Kein Außenstehender kann nur annähernd ermessen, welche Strapazen diese Verhandlungen...;”³²⁰ Text 2 which is done to increase the emotional identification of the reader with the West German negotiators. In the context of the negotiations, the use of two words almost similar in meaning next to each other supports emotional components in the text, since mentioning one of the two options would have been enough: “...Ausdauer und Zähigkeit.”³²¹

³¹⁴ “Das letzte Wort.“

³¹⁵ “Daume: Die stärkste deutsche Mannschaft nach Rom.“

³¹⁶ “Das letzte Wort.“

³¹⁷ “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr.“

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ “Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch.“

³²⁰ “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft.“

³²¹ Ibid.

“ständige Quengeleien und Belästigungen;”³²² “Proteste und Tricks;”³²³ “Proteste und Störungen”³²⁴

Neues Deutschland

German Unity

The discourse about the United German Team in *ND* for the years 1955/56 reflects that Germany was seen as one unit, often openly articulated by referring to the FRG with phrases such as “*im Westen unseres Vaterlandes*”³²⁵ instead of actually naming it. This is congruent with the GDR’s own claim to sole representation of the time. At the same time, differentiation from West Germany and the sovereignty of the GDR was reinforced. Unlike West Germany, however, the discourse in the GDR implies that it did not nominally deny the existence of two German states, which is shown in the fact that the existence “*der beiden deutschen Staaten*”³²⁶ was articulated, and therefore acknowledged. This situation is expressed in the statement that athletes “*der beiden Teilen Deutschlands*”³²⁷ took part in “*zahllosen nationalen Vergleichskämpfen*.”³²⁸ This statement again clearly distinguishes two German states, while at the same time competitions described as being national, therefore implying one nation. The conclusion that is drawn from this is, however, positive - reflected in statements such as: “*Gemeinsam sind wir am stärksten*.”³²⁹ Furthermore, the constitution of a United German Team is reflected as a success, moreover, something

³²² “Die Tricks des Politkruks.”

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ “Freude und Verpflichtung. Nach dem Beschluß, eine gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft zur Olympiade 1956 zu entsenden,” *Neues Deutschland*, 31 August 1955, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19550831-0-6-102-0&highlight=Freude%20und%20Verpflichtung%7CFreude%7CFreud%7Cund>, Appendix J.

³²⁶ “Sieg der Verständigung im Sport,” *Neues Deutschland*, 18 October 1956, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19561018-0-2-17-0&highlight=Sieg%20der%20Verst%C3%A4ndigung%7CVerst%C3%A4ndigung%7Cder%7Cder>, Appendix L.

³²⁷ „Freude und Verpflichtung.“

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

wanted by *all* German athletes and symbolic of their unity: “*Dieser Erfolg füllt alle deutschen Sportler mit tiefer Freude, ..., daß sie zusammengehören.*”³³⁰

In terms of athletic success the United German Team is represented as supplying the possibility that the truly strongest German team would participate in the game. This statement reinforces the wish for unity in sport on one hand, and at the same time implies that East German athletes were indeed more skilled than those of the FRG.³³¹

That the athletes and the population of West Germany were in favour of the Olympic team is reflected in the articles, however, the government of the FRG was constructed as the antagonist in reaching this. The West German government was accused of an “*olympische Offensive*”³³² orchestrated to hinder the constitution of the United team.

That, by the time frame leading up to the Olympics of 1960, the GDR had given up its claim to sole representation is reflected in the discourse about the United German Teams. For instance, one article states: “*Bonn, ..., musste sich damit nicht die erste Lektion von internationaler Seite über die Existenz und über die Souveränität der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik erteilen lassen.*”³³³ Even though the content of the article is about sport and the United Team, the statement reflects that the recognition of sport is equated with that of the sovereignty of the state. Recognition of GDR sport organizations by international associations, and the thereby included chance to show East German symbols such as the flag in West Germany, is not only described as a success, but also as something that “*den Regierenden in Bonn die Galle ins Blut trieben.*”³³⁴ The fact that this is mentioned so explicitly reflects that, in the view of *ND*, the struggle for sovereignty was an increasing success. Though not explicitly stated, it implies that the GDR was officially recognized from an undetermined international side, which by this time had not taken place by states outside of the Eastern Bloc. Moreover the success of GDR athletes is decidedly described as being the cause for growing

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² “Offensive der Korruption,” *Neues Deutschland*, 14 June 1956, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19560614-0-8-146-0&highlight=OFFENSIVE%20DER%20KORRUPTION%7Cder%20Offensive%7CKorruption%7COffensive%7Cderen%7Cder>, Appendix K.

³³³ “Bonn gegen gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft,” *Neues Deutschland*, 15 October 1959, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19591015-0-6-132-0&highlight=gesamtdeutschen%7Cgesamtdeutsche%7COlympischen%7COlympische>, Appendix N.

³³⁴ Ibid.

international recognition.³³⁵ Moreover, the for the constitution of the United German Team it is not mentioned that there were, at this point, still more West German athletes in the team. It is merely mentioned that East German athletes will represent the team in the most important disciplines.³³⁶

The United German Team is reflected as something desired by functionaries and athletes of both German states, with the West German government as the only antagonist in this scenario. One article for instance is titled “*Bonn gegen gemeinsame Olympiamannschaft*.”³³⁷ This is demonstrated in the discourse by highlighting West German athletes functionaries standing up to Adenauer, for instance in questions of the Olympic flag. However, it is made clear that this is not the functionaries’ accomplishment, but “... *in erster Linie der einheitlichen Front der Sportler gegen Bonn zu danken*.”³³⁸

Thus, by mentioning the United German Team in positive manner, the unity of Germany itself is still reflected as a given, were it not for the government of the FRG. This is supported by the statement that the policy of the GDR was directed towards “*Verständigung und Verhandlungen der Deutschen untereinander*.”³³⁹ By specifying the government of the GDR, it is made clear that the West German government was the one in opposition.

The United German team is for this time period still seen as a positive thing. It is explicitly stated that the GDR’s NOC would do everything possible to secure the team, however on the condition of equality.³⁴⁰ This could be seen as a pre-emptive relativization in case the team would not be constituted.

The discourse on the United German Team for the period leading up to the Olympics of 1964 fully reflects the by now developed three-state theory as well as the construction of the Berlin Wall as security measure by the state against the Western fascists. Without explicitly mentioning the three-state theory, one article for instance, explains why medals were listed according to three categories - GDR, FRG, and West

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ “Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung. NOK West stimmt gegen Adenauer für gemeinsame Olympiaflagge,” *Neues Deutschland*, 07 October 1959, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19591207-0-1-6-0&highlight=Spalterregierung%7Cgesamtdeutsche%7COlympischen%7COlympischen>, Appendix M.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ “Bonn gegen gemeinsame Olympiamannschaft.”

Berlin, which is not seen as a part of West Germany.³⁴¹ Moreover, it is explained by the fact that “*Es interessiert uns zuallererst, wie unsere DDR-Sportler im nationalen Vergleich bestehen.*”³⁴² The meaning behind this is that the interest in unity of sports, and thus German unity in general, had been given up.

Yet, in certain contexts the United German Team is still deemed to be desirable, illustrated in the fact that the previous two teams were called “*bewährte Vorbilder.*”³⁴³ However, in contrast to the previous timeframes, it is no longer presented as a success for the unity of Germany. On the contrary, it is reflected in the discourse as the successful rebuffing of the FRG’s attempt to isolate the GDR internationally in the realm of sport after the construction of the Berlin Wall.³⁴⁴ The date 13 August 1961, the day of the construction of the Berlin wall, enters the discourse frequently and is referred to as “*Sicherungsmaßnahmen der DDR.*”³⁴⁵ The consequent termination of the inter-German sport relations is titled “*Schwarzen Tag in der Geschichte des deutschen Sportes,*”³⁴⁶ as well as “*Düsseldorfer Schandbeschluss.*”³⁴⁷

The successful disruption of the GDR’s isolation is the only context in which the United Team is reflected in a positive way after 1961. In other contexts the United Team is not only put in quotation marks, but more explicitly described as: “*Sie ist ein schlechter Kompromiß. Eine Fiktion. Nicht mehr.*”³⁴⁸ This is then linked to the paradox that East and West German athletes were not allowed to interact normally, yet forced into a United German Olympic team. That the GDR is still part of the team is explained with the fact that they would otherwise not be able to participate at all, however it is added “*unter den gegenwärtig noch gegebenen Umständen.*”³⁴⁹ This implies that it was not desirable any longer.

³⁴¹ “Die deutschen Staaten im Medallienspiegel,” *Neues Deutschland*, 27 October 1964, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19641027-0-6-103-0&highlight=Medallienspiegel>, Appendix R.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ “Das Ende des ‘Pokerspiels’?” *Neues Deutschland*, 07 February 1963, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19630207-0-6-86-0&highlight=Pokerspiels%7CPokerspiel>, Appendix P.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ “Beschuß gegen den Sport,” *Neues Deutschland*, 17 August 1964, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19640817-0-1-6-0&highlight=Beschlu%C3%9F%20gegen%7CBeschlu%C3%9F%7CSports%7Cgegen%7CSport>, Appendix Q.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ “Die deutschen Staaten im Medallienspiegel.”

Contrary to the previous timeframe, the government of the FRG is now portrayed as being “*erpicht*”³⁵⁰ on the United German Team, which is described decidedly negatively as this was linked to the negation of the sovereignty of the GDR in referencing the claim to sole representation as “‘*Rechtsanspruch*’.”³⁵¹ That “‘*Rechtsanspruch*’”³⁵² was put in quotation marks presupposes that the West German claim to sole representation had no legitimacy. Moreover, the recognition of GDR sports by the IOC and other international associations is still equated with that of the recognition of the GDR as a state: “*Der Vormarsch der DDR und ihrer sozialistischen Sportbewegung ist nicht aufzuhalten.*”³⁵³

Despite the increased animosity towards the FRG’s government and sport officials, it is explicitly stated that “*keine Unfreundlichkeit*”³⁵⁴ is directed at West German athletes. This is noteworthy for two reasons: first, it again underlines that Germany was no longer seen as one country, by differentiating between the populations, since for the previous timeframes, the togetherness of East and West German athletes was implied by not designating which Germany athletes came from. Secondly, it demonstrates largesse in attitude towards the FRG, which is juxtaposed to derogative statements made by the West German press about GDR athletes, implying that the GDR, and its press, had the moral high ground in this conflict.

As in FAZ, Avery Brundage is now explicitly cast in the role of the sole architect of the United German Team. It is also stated, that sport functionaries of the GDR, such as Schöbel “*vertrat nachdrücklich und sachlich die Interessen des Sports und die des olympischen Gedankens.*”³⁵⁵ By adding that “*das Recht*”³⁵⁶ is on his side, it is presupposed that the West German functionaries did not.

The “other” Germany

For the time period leading up to the Olympics of 1956, the FRG is mentioned as “*Die Bundesrepublik*” or “*Westdeutschland*” in positive situations, for instance when the constitution of the team was decided. In other instances, it is made

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ “Beschluss gegen den Sport.”

³⁵⁴ “Die deutschen Staaten im Medallienspiegel.”

³⁵⁵ “Das Ende des ‘Pokerspiels’?”

clear, that the FRG's NOC was trying to undermine the East German NOC from being recognized.³⁵⁷ In negative contexts, i.e., when accusing the FRG of poaching East German athletes, more derogative terms such as "*die Nichtaktiven hinter den Kulissen*"³⁵⁸ are used to describe West German functionaries. This term, however, clearly differentiates between functionaries on one side and athletes on the other by using the negative form of the phrase "*Aktive*," commonly used for Olympic participants. Moreover, the West German functionaries are accused of having an "un-Olympic" attitude.

The importance for politics in sport and vice versa is, in East Germany, clearly reflected in the discourse on the common German team. The success of GDR athletes is directly attributed to legislative steps taken by the government in support of sport. Moreover, the athletes' increase in performance is portrayed as thanking their government.³⁵⁹

In regards to the government of the FRG, *ND* accuses it of an "*Offensive der Korruption*,"³⁶⁰ which is the title of the article and *ND*'s explanation for the emigration of a large number of East German athletes to the GDR. The article goes on to state that, despite the "*hervorragende(n) Führsorge unserer Republik*,"³⁶¹ East German athletes were lured into the West by financial and material promises. Thus, the discourse on the United German Team also reflects on the superiority of the system of the GDR. Moreover, that harming the GDR was more important for Adenauer's policy than actual sport is implied through stating that the FRG had enough talented athletes and did not need to rely on poaching the GDR's for athletic purposes.³⁶² Interestingly, this presupposes that poaching for athletic purposes would be less despicable. Moreover, Adenauer's policies are described as "*verhaßt*,"³⁶³ which implies a societal consensus on the negative public opinion on the West German government.

The sentence "*Die Sportler der DDR haben jede erdenkliche Unterstützung. Millionen erwarten von ihnen, daß sie die Zeit nutzen, damit sie ihre deutsche Heimat würdig vertreten können.*"³⁶⁴ illustrates the importance of sport in East German society.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ "Freude und Verpflichtung."

³⁵⁸ "Offensive der Korruption."

³⁵⁹ "Freude und Verpflichtung."

³⁶⁰ "Offensive der Korruption."

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ "Freude und Verpflichtung."

That this is a novelty and particular to the GDR is phrased as “*nie gekannte Unterstützung*.”³⁶⁵ At the same time by stating that *East German* athletes have every conceivable means of support, it is presupposed that West German athletes do not.

The discourse on Athletic success is more prevalent in *ND* from the start of the examined time frame: The fact that the GDR’s NOC was recognized *at all* is attributed to athletic “*Ergebnisse, an denen man nicht länger vorbeisehen konnte*.”³⁶⁶ Furthermore, the representation of the Olympic Football Team solely by the West German side, despite doubts about its athletic performance, is given as proof that the GDR functionaries weighed the cause of the entire German team as more important than athletic success only in football: “*Im Sinne der Zusammenarbeit, weil ihm die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft höher stand als das Teilproblem Fußball,..*”³⁶⁷

For the time period 1964/63 it can be observed that the FRG is now titled “*Westzone*,”³⁶⁸ mirroring West German phrases. The term also connotes that the FRG is still occupied by the Western Allies. Additionally, the term “*Bonner Spalterregierung*”³⁶⁹ is used in the discourse. This term does more than reinforce the two-state theory and the wish for sovereignty. It implies that it was, in fact, West Germany that defected from the only legitimate German state.

It can be observed that the interminglement of sport and politics in the FRG increasingly enters the discourse on the United German Teams. That Adenauer summoned Daume to Bonn to consider terminating inter-German sport relations is reflected as an indication that Adenauer was trying to prevent the United German Team from being formed. Moreover, the meeting is termed “*‘Gespräch’*,” but by putting it into quotation marks it is signified that it was not merely a conversation that was had, but that orders were received.

This is described as “*the bislang schwersten Schlag*”³⁷⁰ for the team. The alleged attempt to stop sport relations between the two German states is commented as follows: “*Aus den bisherigen Vorgängen ist unschwer zu erkennen, daß Adenauer heute*

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ “Sieg der Verständigung im Sport.”

³⁶⁸ “Adenauer will die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft sprengen. Kanzler bedrängt Westdeutsche Sportfunktionäre/ Völliger Abbruch des Sportverkehrs geplant,” *Neues Deutschland*, 05 August 1960, accessed 15 April 2015, <http://zeftys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/ddr-presse/ergebnisanzeige/?purl=SNP2532889X-19600805-0-1-10-0&highlight=Adenauers%7CAdenauer,Appendix O>.

³⁶⁹ “Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung.”

³⁷⁰ “Bonn gegen gemeinsame Olympiamannschaft.”

*versuchen will, die Politik 'Macht das Tor zu' auch auf den Sport zu übertragen."*³⁷¹

This illustrates how the discourse about unity in sports reflects on the division of the country – and clearly places the blame with Adenauer himself.

Interestingly, in this clearly negative context, none of the frequently used derogative terms for Adenauer are used - he is merely titled "*Der Bonner Regierungschef*." ³⁷² The reason behind this could be that the language describing Adenauer's alleged plan was already so strong, that adding a term like "*Atomkanzler*" would make the text seem over-propagandized. By directly quoting the West Berlin newspaper *Tag*, the allegations are supplied with concrete proof. The quoted text however, does not reference the termination of inter-German sport relations at all – on the contrary, it merely states that the questions relating to the common German team will be discussed between government and sport. The quotation is followed by: "*Damit ist unverhüllt gesagt, mit welchen Mitteln und Methoden Adenauer seine Provokation starten will.*" This is supposed to imply that the reader can clearly deduct from the quotation what provocations are meant.

The antagonism towards the West German government, however, was not directed solely at Adenauer. For instance, Ernst Lemmer, Minister for intra-German affairs of the FRG, was titled as "*Spionageminister Lemmer*" ³⁷³ and accused of interfering against the United German Team with the use of "*Lügen und Tatsachenverdrehungen.*" ³⁷⁴ This references reports in the West German press about the GDR not wanting a United German Team. Apart from the added value of being able to denounce Lemmer and the FRG for lying, by calling the reports lies, *ND*, to a certain extent accepts the fact that its readers were most likely aware of what was being written in the West German press.

As mentioned above, Adenauer and his government are represented as the clearly designated antagonists, while the representation of West German sport functionaries is not so explicit. They are mainly portrayed as positive actors in the discourse on the United German Team – Daume, for instance, is quoted saying that Adenauer's position did not equal that of the NOC.³⁷⁵

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ "Bonn gegen gemeinsame Olympiamannschaft."

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ "Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung."

The discourse in the West German Press is referenced by *ND* can be seen as part of a reflection on cultural values. They are titled “*Adenauer-Blätter*,”³⁷⁶ and accused of “*haarsträubende Beschimpfungen und Beleidigungen*”³⁷⁷ against the DTSB, East German sport functionaries, and athletes. It is also stated, that the “*Adenauer-Blätter*,”³⁷⁸ were only reproducing official government lines, implying that West German press was a tool of the government and, therefore, that no free press existed. Moreover, the West German press is accused of utilizing “*unverhohlenen Drohungen*”³⁷⁹ to pressure the FRG’s NOC into accepting Adenauer’s point of view. It could also be assumed that by situating the statements of the West German press in such a negative context, that the presupposition is included that *ND* itself would not revert to such tactics.

For the time leading up to the Olympics of 1964, a significant increase in animosity towards the FRG is reflected in the terms used to describe it: “*Ultras*,”³⁸⁰ “*Bonner Ultras*,” “*Revanchisten und Militaristen*”³⁸¹ enter the discourse.

For this timeframe Daume is no longer shown in a positive perspective. The fact that he changed his position several times in regards to the United German team in 1963 is explained with the “*Bonner Zwangsbestimmungen*,”³⁸² while at the same time implying a weakness of character on Daume’s side. One article polemically states that not much was left of Daume’s nine points³⁸³, which terminated sport relations with the GD: “*Genaugenommen, nur das Papier auf das sie geschrieben und gedruckt wurden.*”³⁸⁴

The connection of sport and politics in the FRG is reflected in the discourse in so far that the West German government is accused of misusing sport for political gain, and that with a “*hinterhältiger Aggressivität.*”³⁸⁵ Moreover, this is described as “*revanchistische Pläne*”³⁸⁶ as a means of revenge for the security measures – the construction of the Wall – undertaken by the GDR to protect its population from the fascist threat. These plans allegedly aimed at “*den DDR Sport in die Kniee zu zwingen.*” and reverted to such measures as “*Polizeiterror. Verleumdungen und*

³⁷⁶ “Adenauer will die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft sprengen.“

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ “Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung.“

³⁸⁰ “Beschluss gegen den Sport.“

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² “Das Ende des ‘Pokerspiels’?“

³⁸³ This most likely references the termination of the Düsseldorfer Beschlüsse.

³⁸⁴ “Das Ende des ‘Pokerspiels’?“

³⁸⁵ “Die deutschen Staaten im Medallienspiegel.“

hinterhältige Abwerbungen.”³⁸⁷ These plans are however described as unsuccessful, which is deemed as proof of the athletic performance of GDR athletes.³⁸⁸ Additionally, mentioning that “*Wir weisen in dieser Art die hinterhältige Aggressivität der Bonner Politik, die den Sport zu politischen Mitteln mißbraucht, zurück.*” implies that the GDR’s government did not revert to such methods as misusing sport for politics.

Style and Language

For the timeframe leading up to the Olympics of 1956, the coverage of the United German Olympic Team in *ND* the language varies very much according to the topic of the article. Two of the chosen articles, which describe the common German team in a positive context, are written in a more neutral, informative style. It must be added that this means neutral style for the GDR, as in general, positively-toned articles were written in a quite festive, yet not necessarily official, manner. They strongly rely on escalating narratives, in which the athletes of the GDR are revealed as the underdogs, whose athletic proficiency was the main force in the struggle for recognition. The third article however, “*Offensive der Korruption*,”³⁸⁹ which is about *Republikflucht*, is written in a very aggressive style. To describe the actions of the FRG it uses phrases such as “*sprengen*,” “*Breschen reißen*,” “*unlautere Mittel*,” and “*verhaßten Politik*.”³⁹⁰ Moreover, allusions to war and military are frequently made – not only in articles with a negative undertone. This is illustrated by the use of such words as “*Offensive*,”³⁹¹ “*Kampf*,”³⁹² and “*Schüsse*.”³⁹³

The style and language used in the articles leading up to the 1960 Olympics is far more neutral than that of the previous time period. It conveys a sense of merely informing the reader with factual information. This is supported by an increase of quoting West German newspapers and officials. One article relying on this concerns itself with an alleged strife between Adenauer and the sport functionaries about the constitution of the team – Adenauer being the one in opposition. Directly quoting sport

³⁸⁶ “Beschluss gegen den Sport.“

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ “Offensive der Korruption.“

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ „Freude und Verpflichtung.“

officials is most likely used as proof of providence of the statement, however the two quotes merely state: “*Der Weg ist frei für die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft nach Squaw Valley und Rom.*”³⁹⁴ and “*Wir stehen zu unserem Entschluss.*”³⁹⁵ These statements could have easily been made in a very different context, and are thus up to interpretation by the reader. The content of the surrounding article however clearly presupposes which interpretation the reader is supposed to make.

The style and language for the time period predating the Olympics of 1964 an increase in the use of aggressive phrases in relation to the actions of the FRG can be observed: “*Hetzjagd,*” “*Terrorurteile,*”³⁹⁶ “*Verbrechen,*”³⁹⁷ “*Polizeiterror,*”³⁹⁸ “*Verleumdungen.*”³⁹⁹ All of these words imply a strong animosity emanating from the FRG, and in this case the government is not specified, thus could include the entire population, towards the athletes of the GDR.

One stylistic method that is used in regards to the policies of the FRG, as well as decisions and statements by sport functionaries, is making statements that are intended to be self-explanatory. This use of presupposition creates closeness between the text and the reader, drawing on a common set of knowledge: “*Diese Worte bedürfen keines Kommentars;*”⁴⁰⁰ “*Es lohnt nicht, auf jeden der neun Punkte einzugehen, um das zu beweisen;*”⁴⁰¹ “*Sicher liegt kein Grund vor; lange Überlegungen darüber anzustellen, wessen Erfolg Lausanne ist.*”⁴⁰²

Another stylistic tool utilized by *ND* is integrating letters to the newspaper into articles. As mentioned above, one article explains why medals are listed according to GDR, FRG and West Berlin. The respective article starts by stating that *ND* received a letter from a reader, inquiring why the medals were divided in this threefold manner.⁴⁰³ Thus, the whole reason for the existence of the article is apparently based on the letter. Several deductions can be made from this: first, it is supposed to show closeness to the reader, indicating that the newspaper cared about what its readers thought. Giving the

³⁹⁴ “Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung.“

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ “Beschluss gegen den Sport.“

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ “Das Ende des ‘Pokerspiels’?“

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ “Die deutschen Staaten im Medallienspiegel.“

name and location of the inquirer (“*Eberhard Wahner, Berlin-Weißensee*”⁴⁰⁴) not only supports this closeness, but also adds a degree of credibility that would otherwise be lacking from a text that was otherwise clearly disseminating the party line.

Conclusion

The premise of this thesis is based on the assumption that the existence of the United German Teams were essentially a paradox, considering that they were constituted in a divided country. Even though this paradox was imposed from the outside, namely by the IOC and especially its president, Avery Brundage, who saw it as a victory of sport over politics, German society and politicians had to accept it on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

This thesis is primarily concerned with answering the following primary research question: How were tensions concerning unity and identity projected through the media of a divided country? In addition to the questions: How was the “other” Germany referred to in the context of the United Teams? How does this reflect on the image of the national “self”? Was there a makeable change in the discourse throughout the eight-year time period in which the United German Teams existed?

The analysis of the articles has shown that, despite the fact that it was the IOC’s insistence, which led to the constitution of the United German Teams for three consecutive Olympics, both ND and FAZ clearly stipulate it as something desirable at different points in the discourse, thus allowing us to draw conclusions about how unity was perceived. For the time before the 1956 Olympics, FAZ did not make any particularly strong statement alluding to the question of unity. However, that the factual, if not political, division of the country was already acknowledged can be seen in the referral to two separate teams and NOCs. ND is much more explicit in this time. Unity in sports, as well as unity of the population is clearly articulated, with the West German government being portrayed as the only hindering factor in this common wish.

For the time period of 1960, the discourse in ND concerning the United Team slightly shifted. First, it reflected the abandonment on its own sole claim to

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

representation and was now propagating the two-state- theory. Nevertheless, unity in sport and unity of the population were still seen as desirable and given. For this time period FAZ also reflects that unity in sport, and unity in general, was perceived as a *Wunsch*. At the same time, the East German government was articulated more clearly as the factor of opposition in achieving it.

After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, we can see a significant shift in both newspapers. For ND, while the constitution of the team is still deemed a success, is now only represented as an achievement in the rejection of West German efforts to isolate the GDR internationally. No allusions to unity in general can be seen anymore. The perhaps most interesting finding of the analysis is, that this is the time frame discourse in FAZ is far more explicit about the desirability of the United German Team. Even though it can be deduced that the population was not viewed as united anymore, the constitution of a United Team is situated in a positive discourse far more positively than before. This also goes against official government policy, which was decidedly for the complete termination of inter-German sport relations.

This thesis was based on the premise that the construction of post-war German identities relied heavily on demarcation from the respective “other Germany.” Thus the analysis concerned itself with the image of the “other Germany” in the discourse on the United German Team and how projections on the national “self” were explicitly stated or can be deduced from the discourse.

For the time frame leading up to the 1960s FAZ mainly referred to the GDR in such terms as *Sowjetzone* or *Zone*. Apart from this, the discourse on the United German Team was not as polarized as in the following time frames. In ND, the discourse already clearly articulated the connection between sport and politics in the FRG and the GDR, while at the same time projected cultural values about itself. This can be observed by pointing out the superiority of the East German welfare state in connection to the accusation of alleged poaching of athletes by the FRG. Furthermore, it directly linked athletic success to the superiority of the state.

For the time period leading up to the Olympics of 1960, the connection of sport and politics enters the discourse in FAZ. Apart from clearly articulated statements, this can be seen for instance in the description of East German sport functionaries and the addition of their political office when describing them. Moreover, at this point FAZ clearly takes a ridiculing stance towards the GDR. Calling a barrier for cars a national symbol of the GDR is only one of many things that illustrated this. At the same time,

sport enters the political discourse in the FRG by designating inner-German sport relations, and the United German Team, as a potential threat to national security. In ND, the discourse also reflects a qualitative increase in animosity and demarcation towards the West German state. By denouncing the West German press as liars, it also presupposes that the press in the GDR was morally superior to that of the FRG.

For the time period of 1963/64 an increase in animosity from the side of the FAZ towards the GDR can be observed. The East German state is now, more clearly than ever, portrayed as an enemy. At the same time, contrasting the professionalization of East German sport functionaries, which was described in a decidedly negative context, with the voluntary work of the West German functionaries, lets us draw conclusions about how the FRG was constructed as a *heile Welt*, namely a place in which sport could still afford to be unprofessional. Moreover denouncing the East German accusation of poaching athletes as propaganda, shows how the superiority of West German society was reflected in the discourse. In ND again the policy of demarcation and legitimization after the construction of the Berlin Wall is reflected in the discourse on the United German Teams. Not the construction of the Wall, but the termination of inter-German sport relations in reaction to it were portrayed as being at fault for the division in sport, and thus, to a certain extent, that of the entire country.

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List of appendices

Appendix A: “Im Interesse des Sports,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.07.1955.

Appendix B: “Eine gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft,“ FAZ, 29.08.1955.

Appendix C: “Mit 169 Aktiven nach Melbourne,“ FAZ, 16.10.1956.

Appendix D: “ Das letzte Wort,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 08.12.1959.

Appendix E: “Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr,“ FAZ, 31.12.1959.

Appendix F: “Daume: Die stärkste deutsche Mannschaft nach Rom,“ FAZ, 27.05.1960

Appendix G: “Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch,“ FAZ, 14.01.1963.

Appendix H: “Die Tricks des Politruks,“ FAZ, 28.08.1964.

Appendix I: “Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft,“ 21.09.1964.

Appendix J: “Freude und Verpflichtung,“ ND, 31.08.1955.

Appendix K: “Offensive der Korruption,“ ND, 14.06.1956.

Appendix L: “Sieg der Verständigung im Sport,“ ND, 18.10.1956.

Appendix M: “Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung,“ ND, 07.10.1959.

Appendix N: “Bonn gegen gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft,“ ND, 15.10.1959.

Appendix O: “Adenauer will die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft sprengen,“ ND, 05.08.1960.

Appendix P: “Das Ende des ’Pokerspiels’?“ ND, 07.02.1963.

Appendix Q: “Beschluß gegen den Sport,“ ND, 17.08.1964.

Appendix R: “ Die deutschen Staaten im Medaillenspiegel,“ ND, 27.10.194.

Appendices

Appendix A

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.07.1955.

Im Interesse des Sports

Vor Verhandlungen der beiden deutschen Nationalen Olympischen Komitee Berlin (dpa/AP). Seine Bereitwilligkeit zu Besprechungen mit dem Nationalen Olympischen Komitee der Bundesrepublik erklärte der Präsident des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees der Zone, Heinz Schöbel (Leipzig), am Montag in einer Pressekonferenz in Berlin. Schöbel teilte außerdem mit, daß er dem NOK-Präsidenten der Bundesrepublik, Dr. Ritter von Halt, und dem Präsidenten des Deutschen Sportbundes, Willi Daume, geschrieben habe, um bestehende Mißverständnisse aufzuklären. Mit diesem Schreiben an Daume sei der 6. oder 7. August als Termin und Berlin oder Dortmund als Tagungsort für verbindliche Besprechungen zwischen Vertretern der beiden NOK-Präsidiien vorgeschlagen worden. Das NOK-Präsidium der Sowjetzone sei zu solchen Besprechungen auch am 30. und 31. Juli und auch an einem Wochentage bereit.

Schöbel betonte, daß er überzeugt sei, durch Verhandlungen mit dem NOK der Bundesrepublik im Interesse des deutschen Sports ein gutes Ergebnis für die Beteiligung an den Olympischen Spielen herstellen zu können. Er bat vor allem die Journalisten Ost-Berlins, jede scharfe Polemik bei Behandlung dieser Frage zu unterlassen. Das Scheitern der bisher geplanten Besprechungen zwischen den beiden NOK-Präsidenten führte Schöbel auf Mißverständnisse zurück. Bei den Vorschlägen des NOK der Sowjetzone vom 26. Juni für die Aufstellung einer gemeinsamen deutschen Mannschaft für die Olympischen Spiele 1956 sei die Erwartung auf eine offizielle Behandlung am 16. und 17. Juli in Berlin oder München ausgedrückt worden. Dr. Ritter von Halt sei der Auffassung gewesen, daß Schöbel zunächst ein unverbindliches Gespräch unter vier Augen herstellen wollen. In einem Schrift- und Telegrammwechsel sei nunmehr die Sachlage - nach Auffassung Schöbels -vollauf geklärt.

Schöbel teilte ferner mit, daß sich der Präsident des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees, Avery Brundage, in einem Schreiben an ihn bereit erklärt habe, falls erforderlich, vermittelnd einzugreifen. Brundage habe in seinem Schreiben unter anderem die Ansicht vertreten, daß der Leiter einer Sportlergruppe zu den Olympischen Spielen jeweils von dem Teil Deutschlands gestellt werden solle, der in der jeweiligen Disziplin die Mehrheit der Sportler in die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft entsende.

Appendix B

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.08.1955.

Eine gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft

Westdeutschland und Sowjetzone einigen sich über Cortina und Melbourne Hinterzarten (Schwarzwald). Die Vertreter der olympischen Komitees der Bundesrepublik und der Sowjetzone kamen am Wochenende in Hinterzarten (Schwarzwald) überein, zu den olympischen Winter- und Sommerspielen 1956 eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft zu entsenden. Am Schluß dieser Verhandlungen am Sonntag wurde ein Kommuniqué herausgegeben, aus dem hervorgeht, daß die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft für beide Olympischen Spiele nach dem Leistungsprinzip ausgewählt werden wird.

Den Fachverbänden der Bundesrepublik und den einzelnen Sektionen der Sowjetzone wird auf Grund der Beschlüsse von Hinterzarten empfohlen, für ihre Sportzweige gemeinsame Vorschläge zur Bildung dieser gesamtdeutschen Mannschaften zu unterbreiten. Die Auswahl der Sportler soll unter Zugrundelegung eines olympischen - also strengen. - Maßstabes erfolgen. Weiter wurde in folgenden Fragen eine Einigung erzielt:

1. Leitung: Verantwortlich für alle Teilnehmer aus der Bundesrepublik ist der Präsident des Olympischen Komitees der Bundesrepublik, Ritter von Halt. Verantwortlich für alle Teilnehmer aus der Sowjetzone ist der Präsident des dortigen Olympischen Komitees, Heinz Schoebel.
2. Hymne: Bei Einzelsiegen wird die Nationalhymne gespielt, die der Herkunft des Siegers entspricht, das heißt bei Siegern aus der Bundesrepublik das Deutschlandlied und bei Siegern aus der Sowjetzone die dortige Hymne. Bei Mannschaftssiegen wird die Frage der Hymne noch geklärt werden.
3. Fahne: Die Fahne ist für beide Mannschaften schwarz-rot-gold.
4. Trainer und Aerzte: Trainer und Aerzte werden nicht auf das Kontingent der offiziellen angerechnet. Es ist jeder Seite anheimgestellt, die von ihr erforderlich gehaltenen Aerzte und Trainer zu den olympischen Spielen mitzunehmen.
5. Einheitliche Kleidung: Die Offiziellen und die Aktiven tragen ein© einheitliche Kleidung einschließlich des Wettkampfdresses und des Trainingsanzuges.
6. Finanzierung: Jedes nationale olympische Komitee trägt die Kosten für seine Teilnehmer selbst.

Außerdem wurde festgelegt, daß über folgende Punkte bei der nächsten Zusammenkunft, die am 12./13. November dieses Jahres in Ost-Berlin stattfinden wird, noch entschieden wird: 1. Hymne bei Mannschaftssiegen. 2. Embleme auf den Sporttrikots, 3. Mannschaftsführer für die Winter- und Sommerspiele. Die Delegierten der beiden Komitees teilten nach Abschluß der Verhandlungen mit, daß die Sektionen Wintersport der Sowjetzone und auch die Wintersport-E!achverbände der Bundesrepublik ihre Besprechungen für die Olympischen Winterspiele bis spätestens Ende Oktober abhalten müssen.

Die Tagung in Hinterzarten verlief in einer Atmosphäre des guten Willens, wie Ritter von Halt, der Präsident des NOK der Bundesrepublik auf einer Pressekonferenz am Sonntagvormittag betonte. Von Halt meinte, das gehe schon daraus hervor, daß man sich bereits am Samstag innerhalb von vier Stunden über die Frage einer gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft habe einigen können. Die Besprechungen seien auch deshalb als erfolgreich zu bezeichnen, weil man sich auch über eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft für die Olympischen Winterspiele habe einigen können, nachdem der Präsident des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees, Averyy Brundage (Vereinigte Staaten), bei der letzten Tagung des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees in Paris dem Olympischen Komitee der Sowjetzone lediglich anheimgestellt habe, sich mit der

Bundesrepublik über die Entsendung einer gemeinsamen Mannschaft für die Sommerspiele in Melbourne zu einigen.

Appendix C

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16.10.1956.

Mit 169 Aktiven nach Melbourne

Die Namen der deutschen Olympiakämpfer / Gerhard Stock ist "Chef de mission"

Köln (sid). Im Mittelpunkt einer kleinen Feierstunde stand in Anwesenheit von zahlreichen Mitgliedern der beiden nationalen olympischen Komitees, der Fachverbände und der Sektionen die Bekanntgabe der Namen der 169 Angehörigen der gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft für die Olympischen Sommerspiele durch die beiden Präsidenten der Nationalen Olympischen Komitees, Dr. Karl Ritter von Halt und Heinz Schöbel.

Dr. Karl Ritter von Halt, der die kleine Feierstunde im Isabellensaal des Kölner Gürzenich eröffnete, teilte mit daß zu den 169 Sportlern aus 14 Sportarten 30 offizielle Begleiter und einige von internationalen Fachverbänden angeforderte Kampfrichter kommen. Chef de mission ist mit Direktor Gerhart Stock, dem Speerwurf-Olympiasieger von 1936 und heutigen Leiter des Sportamtes der Hansestadt Hamburg, einer der erfolgreichsten deutschen Leichtathleten aus der Vorkriegszeit. Ritter von Halt erklärte, daß die hohe Zahl der jetzt nominierten Mannschaft dadurch zu erklären sei, daß man für die Fußball-, Hockey- und Wasserballmannschaft keineswegs Medaillenchancen erwarten könne und deshalb auch bei den anderen Sportarten etwas freie Hand walten lassen mußte.

In einer anschließenden Diskussion nahm Heinz Schöbel Stellung zu der Entsendung der Fußballmannschaft, die ausschließlich vom Deutschen Fußball-Bund gestellt wird. Der westdeutsche Bundestrainer Sepp Herberger habe den Standpunkt vertreten, daß der Zeitpunkt zur Bildung einer schlagkräftigen Mannschaft zu spät sei und jede der beiden Mannschaften stärker sein müsse als eine gesamtdeutsche Auswahl. Da die Sektion ohnehin nicht das Interesse hatte, das der DFB zeigte, habe sie dem Deutschen Fußballbund die Vertretung beim Olympischen Turnier überlassen. Eine Aenderung dürfte es noch im Kanu-Aufgebot geben, da hier in der offiziellen Teilnehmerliste noch der Duisburger Schmidt aufgeführt ist, während sich bei den Ausscheidungen am Sonntag in Duisburg der Mannheimer Zweier-Weltmeister Ernst Steinhauer qualifizierte. Da bei den Besprechungen am Montag der Deutsche Kanu-Verband nicht vertreten war, wurde offensichtlich versäumt, das früher benannte Aufgebot noch abzuändern.

In dem offiziellen Kommuniqué der beiden deutschen Olympischen Komitees, das im Rahmen des Festaktes veröffentlicht wurde, heißt es, im Interesse einer gesamtdeutschen Olympiamannschaft habe die Sowjetzone zugestimmt, daß im Fußball, Hockey und Wasserball die Spieler der Bundesrepublik die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft vertreten, obwohl sie, vom olympischen Leistungsstandpunkt aus betrachtet, starke Bedenken habe.

"Hymne an die Freude"

Der Schlußabsatz des Kommuniquees behandelt die Frage der Nationalhymne: "Der Vorschlag, den das NOK der DDR bereits am 27. August 1955 in Hinterzarten machte, an Stelle der beiden Nationalhymnen ein Motiv klassischer deutscher Musik für die

Siegerehrung auszuwählen, fand die Zustimmung des NOK der Bundesrepublik. Man einigte sich auf Beethovens 'Freude, schöner Götterfunken'."

Abwechselnd verlasen Dr. von Halt die Namen der westdeutschen, und Heinz Schöbel die Namen der sowjetzonalen Olympiateilnehmer. In die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft wurden berufen:

Boxen: Behrendt, Nitschke, Sehröter, alle Sowjetzone. Basel oder Homberg (die beiden Fliegenwidtler müssen erst noch einen Ausscheidungskampf bestreiten), Kienast, Kurschat, Roth, Wemhöner. alle Westdeutschland,

Fechten: Stratmann (Westdeutschland).

Kanu: Thérèse Zenz, Briell, Drews, Johannson, Kirschnet. Kleine, Miltenberger, Soltau, Scheuer, Schmidt, alle Westdeutschland.

Leichtathletik: Gisela Köhler, Johanna Lüttge, Barbara Mayer, Erika Raue, Christa Stubnick, Beckert, Härtung, Herrmann. Jahnke, Lindner, Mann, Meier, Porbadnik, Preußger, Richtzenhain, Steinbach, alle Sowjetzone; Almut Brömmel, Erika Fisch, Inge Fuhrmann. Zenta Gastl, Helga Hoffmann, Inge Kilian, Annekatrin Lafrenz, Maria Sander, Marianne Werner, Dohrow, Fütterer, Germar, Haas, Knörzer, Konrad, Koschel, Kühl, Lauer, Läufer, Oberste, Pohl, Pörschke, Schade, Steines, Wegmann", Will, Schmidt, alle Westdeutschland.

Radsport: Hagen, Köhler, Malil.z, Nitsche, Schur, Tüller, alle Sowjetzone. Gieseler, Neuser, Pommer. Ziegler, alle Westdeutschland.

Rudern: Arndt, Borbowsky, von Fersen, Fitze, von Groddeck, Hipper, Kaschlun, Montag, Schneider, Stobbe. Heß, Sauermilch, alle Westdeutschland.

Schießen: Albert Sigl, Rudolf Sigl, beide Westdeutsdiland.

Gewichtheben: Mieske, Sowjetzone, Kolb, Westdeutschland.

Ringern: Kämmerer, Schäfer, Tischendorf. alle Sowjetzone. Dietrich, Sterr, beide Westdeutschland.

Schwimmen: Eva Maria ten Elsen, Jutta La-n-genau. Christile Steffin, Pfeifer, Reich, Zierold, alle Sowjetzone. Herta Haase, Ursula Happe, Kati Jansen, Birgit Klomp, Ingrid Künzel, Helga Schmidt, Blecker, Klein, Köhler, Miersch. Voll, Weber, alle Westdeutschland,

Wasserball: Bildstein, Bode, Hilker. Pennekamp, Neuse, Obschernikat, Osselmann, Scher, Schneider, Sturm, alle Westdeutschland.

Segeln: Vogler, Wegener, beide Sowjetzone. Bielenberg, von Bredow, Fischer, Dr. Lubinus, Mulka, Natusch, Nowka, Stein, Thomsen, alle Westdeutsdiland.

Turnen: Bantz, Dickhut, Kiefer, Klein P"arm Erich Wied, Theo Wied, alle Westdeutschland.

Die Namen der Hockeyspieler und der Fußballspieler werden später noch bekanntgegeben.

Wie wir erfahren, sollen folgende 15 Fußballspieler nach Melbourne fahren: Görtz, Eglin, Gerdau. Höfer. Jäger, Karl Hoffmann, Schwall, Semmelmann, Mauritz, Geiger, Zeitler, Schäfer, Habig Bruells, Rudi Hoffmann.

Appendix D

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 08.12.1959.

Das letzte Wort

N. B. Das Nationale Olympische Komitee in der sogenannten Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat vor kurzem ausgiebig mit den Herren Ulbricht und

Grotewohl über die olympische Fahne gesprochen. Es wurde den Mitgliedern des NOK - fahren wir fort mit der Fabel - gesagt, die Mannschaft der "DDR" dürfe hinter keiner anderen Fahne in die Arena einziehen als hinter Schwarz-Rot-Gold mit dem Hammer-und-Zirkel-Emblem. Trotzdem hat das NOK beschlossen, den Vermittlungsvorschlag des Mr. Brundage anzunehmen und die schwarzrotgoldene Fahne mit den olympischen Ringen zu akzeptieren ...

Jedermann, der auch nur über die bescheidenste politische Erfahrung verfügt, hätte bei einer solchen Meldung, wäre sie irgendwo zu lesen gewesen, gestutzt. Daß die Ost-Berliner Regierung den Wunsch hat, ihre Fahne in der Welt einzuführen, ist zwar altbekannt. Daß man dieses Endziel bei dem bevorstehenden Auftreten in Squaw Valley und Rom nicht forcieren wollte, beruht auf taktischen Ueberlegungen: man muß nicht zu viel auf einmal wollen. Aber ganz gewiß kann man sein, daß, wenn Herr Ulbricht den Sportlern der Zone seinen amtlichen Wunsch zum Ausdruck gebracht hätte, sie sollten auf seiner damals, wenn wir nicht irren, Vier Wochen alten Fahne beharren oder auf die Spiele verzichten, es für die Sportler der Zone keine Möglichkeit gegeben hätte, anders und gegen die Regierung zu entscheiden. So sind die Verhältnisse dort.

In der Bundesrepublik ist es anders. Darum geht das Triumphgeschrei, das jetzt in der kommunistischen Zeitung "Neues Deutsch-land" angestimmt wird, daneben. Bei uns wußte man von vornherein, daß keine gesetzliche Handhabe besteht, die Sportler daran zu hindern, mit Schwarz-Rot-Gold und den fünf Ringen gemeinsam mit den Kollegen aus der Zone in die Arena einzuziehen.

Man kann darüber streiten, ob es klug war, in Kenntnis dieser Tatsache sowie des bisherigen Verlaufs der Angelegenheit in der Kabi-« nettsitzung vor vierzehn Tagen so nachdrücklich aufzutreten. Man kann auch fragen, ob die Sportler sich von vornherein im klaren darüber waren, wie ernst und streng man sein sollte, wenn nationale staatliche Symbole im Spiel sind.

Aber der Hergang beweist nicht, wie die Zonenzeitung behaupten möchte, daß "die Politik des Bonner Atomkanzlers" vom Volk isoliert ist. Sondern er beweist, daß Bonn die Freiheiten der Bürger respektiert, selbst da, wo heikle, ja die Existenz des Staates berührende Dinge im Spiel sind. Die Genugtuung darüber mag in dieser traurigen Affäre noch einen Trost gewähren und in dem Entschluß bestärken, für diesen Staat, in dem das Recht das letzte Wort hat, auch einzustehen.

Appendix E

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31.12.1959.

Gefährliche Realitäten im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr

Die politischen Ziele der Sowjetzonen-Funktionäre werden immer deutlicher / Von Klaus Dieter Ulrich FRANKFURT, 30, Dezember. "Es kommt nicht mehr darauf an, Siege für Deutschland zu erringen. Deutschland gibt es für uns nicht mehr. Unser Ziel sind Siege für die DDR. Deshalb sind wir auch uninteressiert an gemischten Mannschaften, die nur falsche Vorstellungen und falsche Hoffnungen wecken. Daß bei den Handball-Weltmeisterschaften zwei Staaten mit völlig verschiedener Gesellschaftsordnung von nur einer Mannschaft vertreten wurden, war eine Ausnahme. Die Erfahrungen dieser Ausnahme sollten uns genügen." Das antwortete vor einigen Wochen Staatssekretär Manfred Ewald, Vorsitzender des Staatlichen Komitees für Körperkultur und Sport, auf die Einladung von Fußball-Präsident Dr. Bauwens, nach den Siegen der westdeutschen Amateur-Auswahl über die Zone doch noch eine

gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft im Fußball für die Olympischen Spiele zu bilden. "Unsere Realität sind zwei deutsche Staaten und zwei gleichberechtigte Olympische Komitees." Die Zonen-Sportführung macht es dem gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr nicht leicht. Die Zielsetzung des Ulbricht-Regimes, seine politische Souveränität zu gewinnen und im Zuge eines solchen Machtzuwachses zunächst und vor allem im Sport die Welt an das Nebeneinander zweier deutscher Staaten zu gewöhnen, läßt den Sportverkehr zwischen Ost und West nur in dem Maße zu, wie es sich davon durch Briefaktionen, Kampfaufträge und Gespräche über die "Grundsatzfragen des deutschen Lebens" Förderung seiner politischen Absichten verspricht.

Die Zonen-Sportführung ist im Prinzip gegen gesamtdeutsche Mannschaften. Sie erfüllt entsprechende internationale Auflagen widerstrebend nur noch dort, wo sie bestehen - im Handball, Rudern, in der Leichtathletik und bei den Olympischen Spielen. Dabei unterläßt der Zonensport nichts, um die Geduld des westlichen Gesprächspartners auf die Probe zu stellen und die Langmut der internationalen Verbände mit allen möglichen "Querelles Allemandes" abzunutzen, um auf dem Weg der langsamen Zermürbung die noch fehlende internationale Anerkennung zu erreichen.

Gegen olympische Prinzipien

Nach dem Grund, weshalb sich Turnen und Sport in der Politik der Zone höchster Gunst erfreuen, braucht man nicht lange zu forschen. Er ist in den Satzungen des sogenannten Deutschen Turn- und Sportbundes (DTSB) nachzulesen, in denen mehr von Erhöhung der Verteidigungsbereitschaft, Mehrung der Produktion und Erhaltung der "sozialistischen Errungenschaften" als vom Sport die Rede ist. Schon im Paragraph 1 heißt es: "... bekämpft entschieden alle Formen der reaktionären bürgerlichen Ideologie wie die Theorien des Nurtsportlertums und die politische Neutralität des Sports." Das verstößt entschieden gegen alle olympischen Prinzipien, gegen den Geist des Sports und gegen die Grundsätze der internationalen Verbände, ist aber wenigstens klar: Es entlarvt den sonst so geschickt getarnten politisierten DTSB als eine Massenorganisation der SED mit dem Ziel, (wie in der FDJ und dem FDGB) das kommunistische Gedankengut unter das Volk zu bringen. Das deutsche Turn- und Sportfest von Leipzig ist eine Art "Parteitag des Sports" und der von Ulbricht so groß propagierte Massensport nichts anderes als der Versuch, über den Sport auch den letzten Menschen sozialistisch zu aktivieren.

"In unwandelbarer Treue zur Arbeiterklasse und ihrer Partei wird der DTSB unseren Staat der Arbeiter und Bauern und die sozialistischen Errungenschaften festigen und den Frieden gegen die Todfeinde des deutschen Volkes, die westdeutschen Imperialisten und Militaristen, verteidigen", so heißt es im Absatz zwei der Gründungsurkunde des Deutschen Turn- und Sportbundes vom 28. April 1957. Was das noch mit Sport zu tun hat, wird das Geheimnis von DTSB-Präsident Rudi Reichert, der als solcher zugleich Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der SED ist, und seiner Funktionäre bleiben.

Eine Gesinnungsprüfung

Willi Daume, der Präsident des Deutschen Sportbundes, der den Zonensport-Gewaltigen bisher mit bewundernswertem Gleichmut begegnete, hat die menschlich verbindende Haltung der Sportler von hüben und drüben und die vielen prächtigen Siege gemeinsamer Mannschaften bei den Olympischen Spielen in Cortina und Melbourne, bei den Europameisterschaften der Leichtathleten in Stockholm und bei den Handball-Weltmeisterschaften unterstrichen: "Der Sport kann nicht Freundschaften unter den Völkern besiegeln oder Kriege verhindern, das vermochten selbst die Olympischen Spiele der Antike nicht. Aber der Sport ist eine großartige Weltfriedensidee, in der die gesamtdeutsche sportliche Gemeinsamkeit ihre besondere

Bedeutung hat. Der Sportverkehr mit der Zone ist für den Sport der Bundesrepublik eine Gesinnungsprüfung. Hier geht es nicht um den Rekord der Zahlen, sondern um einen Rekord der Menschlichkeit. Die Freiheit ist unteilbar, erst recht im Sport am Rand, der Unfreiheit."

Leider ist nun die Spalterflagge für den gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr zu einer weiteren erheblichen Bedrohung geworden. Es hieße, den Sinn des gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehrs ins Gegenteil verkehren, wenn er bei den gesamtdeutschen Veranstaltungen das Zeremoniell des internationalen Sportverkehrs annehmen würde. Nicht weniger als der Flaggenstreit belastet im Augenblick aber auch das viel diskutierte Prämiensystem für Rekorde und Weltklasseleistungen des Zonensports die gesamtdeutschen Verbindungen, denn die Meldungen zu den Olympischen Spielen müssen von beiden NOK-Präsidenten gemeinsam unterschrieben werden. Die Prämienanweisung von Staatssekretär Ewald ist international nicht verborgen geblieben. Schon hat der Präsident des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees, Brundage, den NOK-Präsidenten der Zone, Heinz Schöbel, um eine Stellungnahme gebeten und von Manfred Ewald eine eidesstattliche Erklärung verlangt, daß die in der westlichen Presse erschienenen Meldungen über Geldprämien für Zonensportler nicht stimmen.

Manfred Ewald wird bei dieser Angelegenheit nicht ganz wohl sein, denn es sind neben den "republikflüchtigen" Leistungssportlern und Trainern auch noch viele andere "Geheimnisträger" in die westliche Freiheit geflohen, die bis in den SSD hinein Einblick in die Gepflogenheiten des Zonensports und klare Beweise erhalten haben, daß in den Kuverts, die bewährten Athleten, wie Recknagel oder Schur oder Gisela Birkemeyer, des öfteren überreicht wurden, nicht etwa weiße Zettel, sondern Banknoten steckten.

Was die Zone im gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr exerziert, ist nur ein Teilgefecht der großangelegten östlichen Offensive nach dem Plan des sowjetischen IOC-Mitgliedes Adrianow: ein Angriff gegen "alle Formen der reaktionären bürgerlichen Ideologie, die demagogischen Theorien des Nussportlertums und die politische Neutralität des Sports", wie es in der Satzung des sowjetischen DTSB heißt In der östlichen Welt gibt es keinen Sport, sondern nur die Körperkultur, die "systematische und umfassende Vervollkommnung des menschlichen Körpers im Interesse der Verteidigung der Errungenschaften der Arbeiterklasse", wie die kleine sowjetische Enzyklopädie, Band 9, Spalte 314, definiert. Unter solchen Vorzeichen darf der Sport den gesamtdeutschen Sportverkehr nicht allein unter dem Gesichtspunkt des menschlichen Verbindunghaltens mit dem abgesplitterten Teil Deutschlands sehen, sondern muß sich auch die Bedrohung durch die politischen Absichten deutlich machen, die Ost-Berlin dahinter versteckt.

Der gesamtdeutsche Sportverkehr bewegt sich im Zwiespalt von Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. Er enthält allerdings gefährliche Wirklichkeit. Wenn Radweltmeister "Täve" Schur in Castrop-Rauxel zu einem Sportgespräch angekündigt wird und dann als Volkskammerabgeordneter über "Hammer und Zirkel" spricht, so mag das als Einzelfall hinzunehmen sein; wenn aber der gesamtdeutsche Sportverkehr zu einer einzigen Kette von politischen Eingriffen wird, dann sollte man die staatliche Sicherheit ebenso fest im Auge behalten wie den menschlichen Kontakt, wenn man die letzten menschlichen Gemeinsamkeiten nicht selbst in Gefahr bringen will.

Appendix F

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.05.1960.

Daume: Die stärkste deutsche Mannschaft nach Rom

Die entscheidende Verhandlung der beiden Olympischen Komitees in Leipzig / Ernste Klippen überwunden Von unserem nach Leipzig entsandten Redaktionsmitglied Bernd Naumann

LEIPZIG. HO-Großgaststätte in Leipzig-Markkleeberg. Ein Schlagbaum, eines der Wahrzeichen in diesem Land, öffnet sich, und unser Wagen rollt durch die gepflegten Anlagen zu dem weit geschwungenen schloßähnlichen Parkrestaurant hin, von dessen riesiger Terrasse der Blick hinüberschweift zum Gelände der landwirtschaftlichen Gartenbauausstellung. Auf dem Parkplatz stehen einige westdeutsche Wagen und die Autos, welche die Werktätigen der "DDR" gerne hätten, die aber vorerst nur von den Privilegierten erschwungen werden können: Typ "Wartburg" zum Preise von etwa 15 000 Mark, Typ "Sachsenring" für die doppelte Summe.

Drinne, im holzgetäfelten sowjetischen Klassizismus, spielt in weinroten Jacken eine Kapelle zum Tanz unter Neonleuchtern. In einer Ecke warten die Vertreter der Zonenpresse, die sozialistische Solidarität meist mit dem über dem Rock getragenen offenen Hemdkragen bekundend. Die Delegierten der beiden Olympischen Komitees wollen hier nämlich der Presse das Kommunique übergeben, in dem die Ergebnisse der am Mittwoch in Leipzig geführten Gespräche über die Bildung einer gesamtdeutschen Olympia-Mannschaft niedergelegt worden sind. Am Abend zuvor waren in Averbachs Keller mit Tokajer Wein und Krimsekt die Herzen und Zungen gelockert worden, doch Dr. Wülfing (Hannover) - der nach dem dritten Glase, der Zustimmung Schöbeis sicher, Thiedemann auf dem Zebra "Luise" starten lassen wollte - warnte: "Morgen wird wieder mit harten Bandagen gekämpft."

"Der Weg nach Rom völlig frei"

Um es vorwegzunehmen: es ist anders gekommen. Was sich in Averbachs Keller anbahnte, hat sich am nächsten Tag offensichtlich fortgesetzt. Lächelnd präsentierten sich in aller Eintracht die beiden Delegationen der Presse. Heinz Schöbel, Direktor zweier volkseigener Buchverlage und Präsident des NOK der Zone, erhebt sich: Man habe im Geiste von Squaw Valley, im Geiste beiderseitigen Verständnisses verhandelt, und es hätten daher ernste Klippen überwunden werden können. "Der Weg nach Rom ist völlig frei geworden." Einige Probleme seien noch vorhanden, doch könnten auch sie gelöst werden.

Willi Daume, der Präsident des Deutschen Sportbundes und Führer der westdeutschen Delegation in Leipzig, sagt, die in Rom an den Start gehende gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft werde die stärkste sein, die augenblicklich aufzubringen sei. Manfred Ewald, Staatssekretär und Vorsitzender des Staatlichen Komitees für Körperkultur und Sport, als Ulbricht-Protege und entschlossener Verfechter seiner Sache geltend, nimmt Stellung zu den jetzt nochmals geänderten Absprachen einzelner Fachverbände - die von dem westdeutschen Olympiakomitee nicht akzeptiert worden waren und diese Leipziger Verhandlung notwendig gemacht hatten.

Im Prinzip, so sagt Ewald, seien sie der Meinung, daß getroffene Verabredungen bestehenbleiben sollten, zumal die Fachverbände die beste sportliche Lösung gefunden hätten - die westdeutsche Delegation war nicht dieser Ansicht -, doch habe man beiderseits Kompromisse gemacht, wie ja auch das Zustandekommen der ganzen Mannschaft ein Kompromiß sei. Zur Frage Thiedemann-Winkler erklärt Ewald, daß die Zone von Anfang an für eine Nennung dieser beiden Springreiter gewesen sei, doch habe der westdeutsche Verband alle Reiter ohne Ausscheidung stellen wollen, und zwar mit dem Bemerkten, nur die Plazierungen bei den großen internationalen Turnieren seien ausschlaggebend für die Olympia-Nominierung. Gerade diese Starts aber habe der westdeutsche Reiterverband unmöglich gemacht, indem er die Aufnahme des Verbandes der "DDR" in die Internationale Föderation hintertrieben habe. Im übrigen

sei die Zahl der "DDR-Repräsentanten" in der gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft für sie eine Ehrensache und keine Prestigefrage. Man habe nicht die Absicht, Leute nach Rom zu schicken, von denen zu befürchten sei, daß sie mit internationalem Maße nicht gemessen werden könnten; es solle die absolut stärkste Mann-, schaff fahren.

Das Ergebnis der Leipziger Verhandlungen muß erfreulich genannt werden-Dr. Wulfig bezeichnete sie als die beste aller Verhandlungen -, da es zweifellos bei beiden Partnern Verständnisbereitschaft einschließt. Beide Seiten verfolgen ihren Standpunkt mit fairer Noblesse, und niemand bediente sich falscher Zungenschläge. Abgesehen von Alfred Heil, im Sportbund der Zone Sekretär des Büros für Agitation und Propaganda, der als einziger im dekadenten bourgeoisen nachtblauen Zweireiher einschließlich silbergrauer Krawatte erschienen war und gar wunderlich von manchem Schillerkragen abstach. Dieser Herr Heil wußte unter dem zustimmenden Beifall der Vertreter der Zonenpreise, beizutragen, daß ja jedermann sattam bekannt sei, was vom Wahrheitsgehalt der westdeutschen Zeitungsberichte zu halten sei.

Winkler und Thiedemann starten auf jeden Fall

An der Sitzung nahmen teil als Vertreter des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees der Bundesrepublik: Willi Daume als Delegationsführer, Bernhard Baier, der Präsident des Westdeutschen Schwimmverbandes. Dr. Danz, der Präsident des Leichtathletikverbandes, Dr. Wulfig, der Präsident des Ruderverbandes, und Walter König, der Generalsekretär des Nationalen Olympischen Komitees; als Vertreter des Olympischen Komitees der Sowjetzone: Heinz Schöbel, Manfred Ewald, Roland Weißig, Sekretär im Deutschen Tur- und Sportbund der Zone, Alfred Heil und Helmut Behrendt, Generalsekretär des NOK der Zone.

In dem von den beiden Delegationsleitern Schöbel und Daume unterzeichneten Kommuniqué sind folgende Beschlüsse niedergelegt worden:

Reitsport

"Im Jagdspringen werden die Reiter Thiedemann und Winkler fest nominiert. Um die Plätze 3 und 4 werden je ein Ausscheidungsspringen in der Bundesrepublik und in der DDR durchgeführt. Einzelheiten dazu legen die beiden Reitsportverbände fest. In der Dressur bleiben die Vereinbarungen der Reitsportverbände bestehen (Vertretung durch die Bundesrepublik). Die Verhandlungen ergaben, daß gesamtdeutsche Ausscheidungen in der Military nicht mehr möglich sind. Aus diesem Grund nominiert die Bundesrepublik drei und die DDR einen Reiter."

Fechten

"Es finden Ausscheidungen in allen Waffengattungen statt. Im Damen- und Herren-Florett werden je acht gegen acht Wettkämpfe durchgeführt. Nach der Plazierung der Ausscheidungskämpfe wird eine Rangfolge nach einfacher Punktzahl ermittelt. Gehören die ersten vier der Rangordnung demselben Verband an, stellt dieser Verband alle Fechterinnen beziehungsweise Fechter für Einzel- und Mannschaftswettbewerbe. Im Degen und Säbel werden gleichartige Ausscheidungswettkämpfe ohne die einschränkenden Formulierungen durchgeführt; die ersten fünf der Rangordnung bilden die gemeinsame Mannschaft. Es finden zwei beziehungsweise vier Wettkämpfe wechselseitig in der Bundesrepublik und in der DDR statt. Die technischen Einzelheiten regeln die beiden Verbände."

Basketball

"Entsprechend den Vereinbarungen zwischen den beiden Basketballverbänden vom 24. 4. 1960 in Berlin stellte das NOK der DDR die Frage der Aufstellung der Basketballmannschaft zur Diskussion und beantragte die Nominierung der Mannschaft der DDR auf Grund der Ergebnisse der Ausscheidungsspiele. Das NOK der

Bundesrepublik wird mit seinem Basketballverband Rücksprache nehmen und ihn veranlassen, bis zum 10. 6. 1960

eine endgültige Stellungnahme zu übermitteln. Sollte diese Stellungnahme nicht der Auffassung des Basketballverbandes der DDR entsprechen, wird die Frage der Nominierung der Basketballmannschaft auf einer außerordentlichen Sitzung der beiden NOK in Berlin entschieden werden."

Radsport

"Die beiden Radsportverbände werden aufgefordert, die offiziellen Protokolle über das Vierermannschaftsfahren (Bahn) ihrer Mannschaften in Mailand innerhalb drei Wodien vorzulegen. Dann soll über die Nominierung der Mannschaft entschieden werden."

Abschlußtagung

"Die Sitzung der beiden NOK zur endgültigen Nominierung der gesamtdeutschen Olympiamannschaft wird auf den 8. August 1960 nach Dortmund anberaumt." ,

Appendix G

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.01.1963.

Unternehmen Gesamtdeutsch

Die Entscheidung, auf einer gesamtdeutschen Olympiamannschaft zu bestehen, sei dem Nationalen Olympischen Komitee leichtgefallen, hat der Sportpräsident Willi Daume am Samstagabend in Frankfurt gesagt. Diese Formulierung umfaßt zwei Gegebenheiten zugleich. Einmal ist es Herzenssache jedes Bürgers der Bundesrepublik und damit auch jedes Sportführers, die Gemeinsamkeit im ganzen deutschen Vaterlande bis zur letzten Möglichkeit aufrechtzuerhalten, und zum anderen kann darunter der »technische Vorgang verstanden werden, daß von außen her die Verantwortung übernommen wurde. Wenn der Präsident des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees, der Amerikaner Avery Brundage, die Initiative an sich gerissen hat - wozu er kraft eines Beschlusses der Vollversammlung des IOC berechtigt ist -, dann darf das natürlich nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß in innerdeutschen Verhandlungen eine solche Regelung kaum zu erreichen gewesen wäre. Die Zonenmachthaber haben schließlich nicht eine Mauer durch Berlin und ganz Deutschland gezogen, damit die Bevölkerung aus beiden getrennten Teilen weiterhin gesamtdeutsch denken und handeln soll. Und die Sportbewegung umfaßt doch hüben und drüben - aktiv oder inaktiv - die Masse der Bürger. Wer also meint, eine gemeinsame Olympiamannschaft sei auch den kommunistischen Sportfunktionären Herzenssache, der ist ein träumerischer Idealist, den hereinzulegen keinem Ulbricht-Jünger schwerfällt.

Die Männer, die jetzt in Frankfurt für eine wirklich integrierte Olympiamannschaft sich entschieden haben, wissen natürlich, was sie sich an zermürender Verhandlungsarbeit mit den Delegierten der Zone aufgebürdet haben. Das fängt bei der Besetzung einzelner Mannschaf tsposen an und endet bei dem Prestigekampf um den Chef de Mission. Wer diesen ganzen Fragenkomplex durchdenkt und die zähen, intriganten und. propagandistisch gewürzten "gesamtdeutschen" Gespräche im Hinblick auf die Olympia-Mannschaften von 1960 kennt, der weiß, was vier "Jahre später im Zeichen der Mauer auf Daume und seine sportlich gutwilligen Verbandspräsidenten zukommt. Aber dieser fast unerträglichen Belastung am Konferenztisch mit den eigens dafür "weltanschaulich" geschulten Taktikern müssen sich die nebenberuflich der Sache des Sports dienenden westdeutschen Sportführer wohl oder übel unterziehen, und sie

werden es gern tun, weil es um die letzten Bindungen mit den Menschen von drüben geht.

Ob das ganze Unternehmen "Gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft" im Sinne der Entscheidung von Avery Brundage, die vom NOK der Bundesrepublik freudig begrüßt worden ist, Wirklichkeit wird, das hängt allerdings weitgehend davon ab, ob das Ost-Berliner Politbüro bei seinem Sandkastenspiel nicht doch noch Tricks erfindet, die alles zunichte machen können.

Appendix H

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.08.1964.

Die Tricks des Politruks

Mit ganz offensichtlich hochgespielten Detailfragen versucht das Olympische Komitee (NOK) der Sowjetzone, unterstützt von einer lärmenden Agitationskampagne, die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft für die Olympischen Spiele 1964 in Tokio kurz vor ihrer endgültigen Aufstellung noch einmal in eine Krise zu treiben. Wie bei der letzten ergebnislosen Sitzung der beiden deutschen NOK in Köln verabredet wurde, hat auch Heinz Schöbel, der Präsident des Zonen-NOK, an Avery Brundage, den Präsidenten des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees (IOC), einen Brief geschrieben. Er fordert darin Brundage auf, die Verhandlungen über strittige Fragen zu übernehmen. Dabei geht es Schöbel auftragsgemäß nur darum, auch Avery Brundage durch ständige Quengeleien und Belästigungen die Freude an "seiner" gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft zu verderben, damit das IOC auf der Session in Tokio die Zone vollgültig aufnimmt und ihr auch eine eigene Mannschaft zugesteht. Vorher sollen die Turn- und Sportverbände der Bundesrepublik allerdings noch zu Sündenböcken und Störenfrieden gestempelt werden; denn Ulbrichts Sportstatthalter möchten den Schwarzen Peter loswerden, daß sie am Ende die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft gesprengt hätten. Dabei haben Schöbel, Ewald und Heil doch vielfach beteuert, sie hätten die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft nie gewollt und wünschten eine eigene Mannschaft.

Ulbricht eilte davon

Auf dieser Generallinie des SED-Regimes hat man drüben nichts unversucht gelassen, der gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft auch 1964 ihr kurzes Leben sauer zu machen. Es begann schon im Winter, als man mit allen Tricks die aufstrebenden Eisschnellläufer, Rodler und nordischen Skisportler der Bundesrepublik ausmanövrieren wollte. Das reichte von Behinderungen bis zu Protokollfälschungen. Im Eiskunstlauf wurden dann Pfersdorf/Matzdorf von parteiischen (Block-) Kampfrichtern um ihre Innsbruck-Fahrkarte betrogen. Der sowjetische Preisrichter Wasilew, der verspätet in Ost-Berlin ankam und nicht mehr eingesetzt wurde, sagte dazu: "Eine solche Unfairneß hat mit Sport nichts mehr zu tun..." Beim entscheidenden Spiel im Eishockey in der Ost-Berliner Seelenbinder-Halle wollte Ulbricht auf der Ehrentribüne einen "DDR-Sieg als Beweis für die Überlegenheit der sozialistischen Ordnung über die kapitalistische" sehen. Ein zum großen Teil bestelltes Publikum schrie rücksichtslos alles nieder, was sich für die Männer um Trautwein regte. Als diese dann den Spieß umdrehten und aus dem 0:2 ein 4:3 machten, da eilte Ulbricht flugs davon.

Diese winterlichen Episoden, sollten aber nur ein Vorgeschmack für den Sommer sein. Als der Tokio-Run begann, da erlebten die westdeutschen Judokas in Rostock, daß nur Soldaten als Zuschauer auf den Tribünen saßen und jeder westdeutsche Erfolg von Pfiffen und Grölen begleitet wurde. Bei den Endkämpfen der Boxer verschoben

parteiische Kampfrichter in Schwerin, wo man schon 1960 eine Reihe von Fehlurteilen erlebt hatte, den jungen Hans Freistadt (Ludwigshafen) gegen den Ost-Berliner Babiasch. Bei den Ringern wurde mit ständigen Protesten und vielen anderen Tricks die Überlegenheit der Athleten aus der Bundesrepublik auszugleichen versucht. Norbert Fehr, der sich bereits in der Gewichtheber-Qualifikation in Mannheim durchgesetzt hatte, erhielt wenige Tage später keine Aufenthaltsgenehmigung für Leipzig, wohin er seine Mannschaftskameraden begleiten wollte und wo dann Arthur Haun von den Kampfrichtern zugunsten des mitteldeutschen Rieger an die Wand gespielt wurde. Im Fechten verweigerte man den Müttern von Heidi Schmid und Helga Mees, die als deren Betreuerinnen schon rund um die Welt mit dabei waren, die Einreise nach Leipzig. Der "republiknüchtige" Turner Kurt Friedrich mußte in Magdeburg gegen bestellte Claqueure turnen, die ihn bei jeder Übung störten. Und Willi Jaschek erlebte dort, daß man ihn noch bei der letzten Übung auf die gemeinste Weise rücksichtslos zum "Ersatzturner" herunterwertete. Bei den Fünfkämpfern wurde Klaus Hunke durch ständige Proteste und Störungen der Ostzonen-Funktionäre beim Pistolenschießen um die Tokio-Fahrkarte gebracht: einen Ring hatte er am Ende zuwenig geschossen.

Nun ankern sie vor Brundage

Im Augenblick muß Avery Brundage sich mit dem Teamsegeln der "Volksmatrosen" beschäftigen und mit der Verweigerung der Mallenkontrolle (Rumpfabmessung) der Rostocker Drachen durch-den ostdeutschen Bund der Segler. Nebenbei hatten die Zonen-Segler bei der Festlegung der Teilnehmerzahlen für die Qualifikationskämpfe in Warnemünde und Travemünde noch mit falschen Protokollen gearbeitet. Und was gab es nicht alles im Radsport? In Gießen und Erfurt, Friesenheim und Leipzig war kein Mittel zu schlecht, um nicht vorexerziert zu werden. Da hörte die Vierer-Bahnmannschaft unter Vortäuschung falscher Tatsachen auf, als Barleben nicht mehr mithielt. Da wurde entgegen allen Vereinbarungen mit Hancke ein neuer stärkerer Mann in die Vierermannschaft hineingeschmuggelt, wofür Barleben, Wiezorek und Staps krank werden mußten. Am weitesten wagte man sich im Schießen vor, bei dem man erheblich von den internationalen Vorschriften abweichende Scheiben vorlegte und sich erst nach einem Gutachten der Internationalen Föderation dazu bequeme, die entsprechenden Korrekturen vorzunehmen.

Dennoch stellte sich Alfred Heil in Ost-Berlin vor die Presse und versuchte der Öffentlichkeit weiszumachen, daß "die Störmanöver gegen die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft "aus Bonn" kämen. Wenn Willi Daume auch in seinem gelben Ferrari (mit Telefon) in die Zone einreisen kann und an den Übergangsstellen schnell abgefertigt wird, so haben es doch viele andere, die zu den inzwischen fast 80 Olympia-Verhandlungen oder 22 Qualifikationen nach drüben fahren mußten, immer und immer erlebt, daß sie lange zu warten hatten und bis tief in die Aktentaschen (mit den Verhandlungsunterlagen), Koffer und Portemonnaies hinein kontrolliert wurden.

Das ist die Wirklichkeit. Wenn Alfred Heil dagegen von den Zonen-Turnern berichtet, die "in Essen unter Polizeiaufsicht" gestanden hätten, so weiß er selbst doch ganz genau, daß die Rücksprache der Polizei im Essener Hotel Waldfrieden, in das die Turner gerade eingezogen waren, auch nicht das geringste mit den mitteldeutschen Sportlern zu tun hatte. Oder aber er weiß mehr - zum Beispiel über die Verbindungen zu den "Freien Deutschen Turnern", die sich im Augenblick im Nordrhein-Westfalen gerade in 38 "Sportvereinen" ausbreiten, die bei genauerem Hinsehen aber nichts anderes sind als Neugruppierungen jüngst ausgehobener kommunistischer Betriebsgruppen.

Sie wollen die Mannschaft nicht

Was nun die sogenannten Abwerbungen bei den olympischen Qualifikationswettkämpfen angeht, von denen die Zonen-Propaganda immer wieder

berichtet, so geht es hier lediglich um eine Agitation gegen die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft. Das Zonen-NOK hat am 10. 4. 1964 in Frankfurt dem NOK für Deutschland berichtet, der mitteldeutsche Rodeltrainer Geinitz habe von einem offiziellen Vertreter des westdeutschen Verbandes ein Angebot erhalten, doch in die Bundesrepublik zu kommen. Willi Daume hat, wie auch in allen anderen angesprochenen Fällen, um schriftliche Berichte gebeten. Nicht ein einziger ist bisher übergeben worden. Bekannt geworden ist dagegen, daß Geinitz selbst nachgefragt hat, ob man ihm nicht bei einer Übersiedlung helfen könne. Das scheint der obersten Zonen-Sportführung über ihr gutes Spitzelsystem in der Mannschaft zu Ohren gekommen zu sein. Unter Druck gesetzt, hat der Trainer dann genau das ausgesagt, was man von ihm hören wollte. Nicht anders verhält es sich mit Adelheid Nenntwig. Die Basketball-Nationalspielerin war nach dem Europapokal-Turnier in Bern Ende 1963 nicht mehr in die Zone zurückgekehrt, sondern nach Groß-Gerau gegangen. Dort bot man ihr gute Möglichkeiten und die Chance, in Mainz zu studieren. Aber offensichtlich konnte sich das junge Mädchen nicht damit abfinden, daß sie nun nicht nur Sport treiben durfte, sondern auch beruflich tätig sein mußte. Ihr früherer Trainer holte sie schließlich zurück - als Paradepony einer Pressekonferenz.

Die Schaubühne einer Pressekonferenz

Alle diese Hintergründe kennt man drüben natürlich sehr genau. Aber sie passen nicht ins Konzept. Wider besseres Wissen muß dann der Radsportler Mikein erzählen, daß er "von westdeutschen Radsportlern bei den Qualifikationskämpfen über den Haufen gefahren worden ist". Kein Wort ist daran wahr. Der Turner Beyer wurde auch nicht von der Polizei aus dem Zug geholt und "wie ein Verbrecher verhört", sondern stand im Gang des Interzonenzuges, als er von der Kontrolle angesprochen wurde. Aber das gibt natürlich für die SED-Agitatoren nichts her. Und so mußten sie auf der Schaubühne einer Pressekonferenz die Geschichte erzählen, die ihnen Alfred Heil, der Chef für Agitation und Propaganda, vorher zurechtgemacht hatte. Die Absicht ist doch klar: weg von der gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft! Dafür ist jedes Mittel recht und keine Unwahrheit zu schlecht. Leider kann man an dieser Stelle einigen westdeutschen Verbänden den Vorwurf nicht ersparen, daß sie nicht sorgfältig genug verhandelt und protokolliert haben und so jene Vorfälle mit heraufbeschworen, die jetzt von Schöbel, Ewald oder Heil gegen die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft ausgespielt werden.

Aber über die Wahrheit kann dies alles nicht hinwegtäuschen. Zu mitternächtlicher Stunde gab Manfred Ewald, Ulbrichts oberster Sportführer, in der Bar des Leipziger Hotels Astoria selbst preis, um was es hier geht, als er zum überraschenden Abschneiden der bundesrepublikanischen Straßenfahrer in Gießen sagte: "Ich nehme es den westdeutschen Fahrern nicht übel, daß sie im Spurt die Straße blockierten und alle taktischen Möglichkeiten ausspielten. Aber ich werfe unseren Fahrern vor, daß sie den Gegner nicht einfach mit Gewalt über den Haufen gefahren haben." Genau das ist die Devise, nach der dann tags darauf die Zonen-Radsportler in Erfurt fuhren. Sie gibt das Klima an der gesamtdeutschen olympischen Front zu erkennen. Mit Sport hat das alles nur noch sehr wenig zu tun. Um Sport geht es der anderen Seite hier auch längst nicht mehr und schon gar nicht um die gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft. Hier geht es - wie Ewald es bereits am 23. September 1959 in Düsseldorf sagte - "um Siege für die DDR. Deutschland gibt es für uns nicht mehr."

Diesen letzten Satz möge man sich merken; er charakterisiert genau die Lage, in der diese gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft sich heute befindet, und schließt jede Illusion aus.

Appendix I

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21.09.1964.

Letzte zähe Verhandlung um gesamtdeutsche Tokio-Mannschaft
Nominierung der Teilnehmer / Gemeinsame Unterbringung im olympischen Dorf gegen
den Willen der Zonenfunktionäre

BADEN-BADEN (sid). Endlich ist die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft für die XVIII. Sommerspiele vom 10. bis 24. Oktober in Tokio - mit kleinen Schönheitsfehlern - unter Dach und Fach. Sie steht auf zwanzig Seiten Saugpostpapier. In den frühen Morgenstunden des Samstags, zwei Stunden nach Mitternacht, wurden im Kurhaus von Baden-Baden 19 Blatt, beschrieben mit den Namen der Athleten, herausgegeben. Das zwanzigste Blatt mit der Aufstellung des Radsportteams wird nach Abschluß der letzten Qualifikation nachgeliefert.

Unter dem gleichen Dach tagte vor knapp einem Jahr das Internationale Olympische Komitee (IOC). Da hatten die Olympier nicht nur ihren Beschluß bekräftigt, an der gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft festzuhalten, sondern es gab auch viele schöne Reden, in denen diese Mannschaft als hehres Denkmal für die alle Hindernisse überwindende Kraft des Sports, als "eindrucksvollster Sieg der olympischen Idee über die Widrigkeiten der Politik" gefeiert wurde. Unter dem gleichen Dach war im olympischen Jahr von Rom die damals sechzehnjährige Schülerin Ingrid Krämer aus Dresden, zweifache Goldmedaillengewinnerin, unter tosendem Jubel zur "Sportlerin des Jahres" ausgerufen worden.

Vom Pathos der Kongreßreden, vom Jubel der Sportlerwahl ist nur die Erinnerung geblieben. Am Konferenztisch hinter verschlossenen Türen wurde mit verbissener Zähigkeit darum gerungen, ob jene Ingrid Krämer - sie heißt jetzt Frau Engel und wohnt in Rostock - die gleiche schwarzrotgoldene Fahne mit den fünf weißen Ringen in das Stadion von Tokio hineintragen darf, die sie vor vier Jahren aus dem Stadion von Rom hinaustrug. Noch darf sie nicht.

Genau ein dutzendmal hatten sich die Offiziellen der beiden Olympischen Komitees wegen der Bildung der Olympiamannschaften 1964 gegenübergesessen. Kein Außenstehender kann nur annähernd ermessen, welche Strapazen diese Verhandlungen für den Industriellen Willi Daume, die Rechtsanwälte Dr. Walter Wülfig und Herbert Kunze, den Arzt Dr. Danz und den Ministerialdirigenten Bernhard Baier gewesen sind, die im Sport nur ehrenamtlich wirken; welche Ausdauer und Zähigkeit dazu gehört haben, einer Mannschaft den Weg zu ebnen, die von den hauptamtlichen politischen Funktionären der Gegenseite nicht gewünscht wird. Vielleicht gelingt es dem einen oder anderen Athleten dafür in Tokio, was den Offiziellen nicht gelingen kann. Nicht etwa den Schein zu wahren, sondern noch eine echte Gemeinsamkeit mit den Sportlern aus dem anderen Teil Deutschlands zu demonstrieren. Die Grundlage dazu haben Willi Daume und die Seinen in Baden-Baden geschaffen. Sie machten den Zonenfunktionären einen Strich durch die Rechnung, die Berliner Mauer auch im olympischen Dorf von Tokio zu errichten. Im olympischen Dorf wohnt die deutsche Mannschaft nach den jeweiligen Disziplinen zusammen. Das war die freudigste Kunde aus Baden-Baden.

Am längsten wurde am Verhandlungstisch in Baden-Baden um die Finn-Dingi-Segler gerungen. Schließlich einigte man sich darauf, daß der Berliner Europameister Willi Kuhweide neben dem mitteldeutschen Segler Bernd Dehmel vorläufig in die Olympiaauswahl aufgenommen wird. Beide deutschen Teile wollen den IOC-Präsidenten und das japanische Organisationskomitee ersuchen, einen Ausnahmefall zu gestatten und zwei deutsche Boote in dieser Klasse starten zu lassen. Die Internationale Segler-Union hat dazu bereits schriftlich ihre Einwilligung erteilt. Falls das nicht

möglich sein sollte, muß ein internationales Schiedsgericht entscheiden, wer die deutschen Farben vertreten soll. Das Schiedsgericht, dessen Spruch bis zum 2. Oktober erbeten wird, setzt sich zusammen aus Peter Scott (Großbritannien), Orschonikodse (Sowjetunion) sowie je einem Vertreter der beiden NOK und der beiden Seglerverbände. Letzte Konsequenz dürfte ein Stichekampf zwischen Dehmel und Kuhweide in der Bucht von Sagami sein.

Sonst gab es keine Veränderungen mehr in der gesamtdeutschen Olympiamannschaft. Die nach den Qualifikationen von den jeweiligen Fachverbänden protokollierten Aufstellungen wurden ausnahmslos bestätigt, auch die anfangs vom NOK für Deutschland angefochtene Nominierung des mitteldeutschen Kajakfahrers Siegfried Roßberg als Ersatzmann. Ursprünglich hatte ' Daume die Meinung vertreten, daß der Zone, die in der gesamtdeutschen Kanumannschaft lediglich einen Teilnehmer stellt, kein Ersatzmann zusteht.

Chef de Mission ist erstmals der Präsident des Turn- und Sportbundes der Zone, Manfred Ewald, da die mitteldeutschen Sportler mit 194 zu 182 die Mehrzahl der Aktiven stellen. Dagegen hat sich bei der Zusammenrechnung der Startplätze - sie lautete am Freitagabend 207:203 für die Zone - noch ein leichtes Plus für die Bundesrepublik ergeben, da die Radsportler ihre Siege von Köln in Leipzig wiederholten. Gerhard Stock, Olympiasieger im Speerwerfen von 1936, wurde als stellvertretender Chef de Mission bestätigt. Beide sind jedoch keine Mannschaftsführer. Diese Aufgabe fällt nach dem IOC-Protokoll den beiden NOK-Präsidenten Willi Daume und Heinz Schöbe! zu.

Keine Einigung gab es in den Fragen der Einmarschformation zur Eröffnungsfeier und des Fahnenträgers. Darüber wird erst in Tokio entschieden werden. Dagegen verbuchte das NOK der Bundesrepublik einen bemerkenswerten gesamtdeutschen Erfolg. Entgegen den Bestrebungen der Zone werden die Athleten aus beiden Teilen Deutschlands nicht getrennt untergebracht, sondern - wie im Protokoll vom 9. März 1963 festgelegt - gemeinsam nach Sportdisziplinen einquartiert. Diesen Protokollpunkt wollte Ewald als nicht mehr gültig erklären. Darauf ließen sich die westdeutschen Partner jedoch nicht ein.

376 deutsche Aktive nach Tokio

Die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft ist nun ermittelt. Nach den letzten Qualifikationen der Radfahrer umfaßt die deutsche Tokio-Vertretung 376 Aktive, von denen 194 aus Mitteldeutschland und 182 aus der Bundesrepublik kommen. Damit hat die Zone einen Vorsprung von zehn Köpfen in der gesamtdeutschen Vertretung, die 1960 in Rom noch ein Verhältnis von 189:129 und 1956 in Melbourne von 141:37 für die Bundesrepublik aufwies. An Plätzen dagegen liegt die Bundesrepublik knapp vorne. Da sie die meisten Doppelstarter aufweist, belegt sie 210, die Zone 207 Startplätze.

Appendix J

Neues Deutschland, 31.08.1955.

Freude und Verpflichtung

Nach dem Beschluß, eine gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft zur Olympiade 1956 zu entsenden

Die wenigen Besucher aus der Deutschen . Demokratischen Republik, die vor drei Jahren Zeuge der zweiten Olympischen Spiele nach dem Krieg wurden, verfolgten den

Kampf im Stadion von Helsinki mit einem lachenden und einem weinenden Auge. Mit einem lachenden deshalb, weil die Schüsse, die unten auf der roten Aschenbahn ertönten, nicht mehr, wie wenige Jahre zuvor, Schreck und Entsetzen verbreiteten, sondern Athleten aus fünf Kontinenten, Sportler aller Nationen zum friedlichen Wettstreit riefen. Einem Wettstreit, der Vorurteile wie Schnee unter der Sonne schmelzen' ließ und Verständigung zwischen allen Völkern säte.

Mit einem weinenden Auge aber, weil in jenen Tagen in Helsinki zwar Deutsche aus dem Westen unseres Vaterlandes dabei waren, den Sportlern der jungen DDR aber die Möglichkeit genommen war, ihre wachsende Stärke zu beweisen.

Und dieses Wachstum war deutlich. Das Gesetz, das der Jugend und dem Sport eine nie gekannte Unterstützung gewährte, - nahm lebendige Gestalt an. Immer eher blieb der Zeiger der Uhr stehen, die beim Lauf Minuten und Sekunden stoppte. Immer länger mußte das Bandmaß ausgezogen werden, wenn die Springer über die Bahn wirbelten. Immer weiter wanderten die Fähnchen, die die Rekorde im Stoßen und Werfen anzeigten, immer schneller wirbelten die Beine unserer Radfahrer und immer kraftvoller pflügten die Arme unserer Schwimmer das Wasser. Bis der Tag kam, an dem wir mit einigen der Besten das Niveau erreichten, das zum Kampf um olympischen Lorbeer berechtigt. Die Erfolge bei zahllosen nationalen Vergleichskämpfen häuften sich, die Sportler der beiden Teilen Deutschlands lernten sich schätzen, und einstimmig lautete ihre Meinung: Gemeinsam sind wir am stärksten.

Doch als die DDR ihren Sportlern Gelegenheit geben wollte, sich international zu bewähren und das NOK der DDR in Athen um Aufnahme in das IOC bat, wurde dieser Antrag abgelehnt. Aber unsere Sportler gaben sich damit nicht zufrieden. Sie dankten ihrer Regierung mit immer besseren Leistungen und erzielten schließlich Ergebnisse, an denen man nicht länger vorbeigehen konnte. Die

Namen Gisela Köhler, Jutta Langenau, Ursula Domath, Christa Stubnick und Gustav Adolf Schur wurden zum Begriff.

Und als im Juni 1955 in Paris erneut der Antrag der DDR zur Debatte stand und ihre offiziellen Vertreter darauf hinwiesen, daß unsere Sportler Bürger eines unabhängigen, souveränen Staates sind und ein Recht haben, mit den Sportlern aller Völker in Wettstreit zu treten, da wurde diesem Antrag mit 27 zu 3 Stimmen zugestimmt. An die Aufnahme des NOK der DDR wurde jedoch eine Bedingung geknüpft: In Melbourne darf nur eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft an den Start gehen. Diese Bedingung entsprach durchaus dem Wunsch und dem Willen aller deutschen Sportler. Und obwohl der Vertreter der Bundesrepublik in Paris gegen den Antrag der DDR gestimmt hatte und auch in den folgenden Wochen zunächst keine Einigung über die Form der weiteren Verhandlungen erzielt werden konnte, kam es schließlich am vergangenen Wochenende in Hinterzarten im Schwarzwald doch zu Besprechungen der offiziellen Vertreter des NOK der Bundesrepublik und des NOK der DDR.

Bekanntlich wurde dort der Beschluß gefaßt, eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft nach Melbourne und, über die Empfehlung des IOCL. hinausgehend, auch zu den Winter* spielen nach Cortina d'Ampezzo zu entsenden und weitgehende Übereinstimmung über die Leitung, die Hymne, die Fahne, die Zahl der Trainer und Ärzte, die einheitliche Kleidung und die Finanzierung erzielt. Dieser Erfolg erfüllt alle deutschen Sportler mit tiefer Freude, denn der Beschluß von Hinterzarten gibt ihnen nicht nur die Möglichkeit, mit der wirklich stärksten deutschen Mannschaft an den Olympischen Spielen 1956 teilzunehmen, sondern er versetzt sie zugleich in die Lage, aller Welt zu zeigen: Die deutschen Sportler als Vertreter des deutschen Volkes wissen, daß sie zusammengehören, und sind gewillt, in einem einheitlichen und friedliebenden Deutschland an der Seite aller Völker zu leben.

Doch so groß die Freude ist, s« sehr muß den Sportlern der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik eins klar sein: Der Beschluß von Hinterzarten erlegt ihnen eine große Verpflichtung auf. Nur die Besten werden nach Cortina und nach Melbourne fahren. Und da zählt jede Minute eisernen Trainings, jede Sekunde unermüdlicher Lernens. Die Sportler der DDK haben alle nur erdenkliche Unterstützung. Millionen erwarten von ihnen, daß sie die Zeit nützen, damit sie ihre deutsche Heimat würdig vertreten können.

Appendix K

Neues Deutschland, 14.06.1956.

Offensive der Korruption

In der Bundesrepublik wurde eine olympische Offensive eröffnet. Nicht etwa von den Reitern, die zum festlichen Olympia-Auftakt in Stockholm weilen, sondern von Nichtaktiven hinter den Kulissen, die ihre eigenen unolympischen Auffassungen von olympischen Ideen haben. Die Offensive richtet sich in ihrer ganzen Breite gegen die demokratische Sportbewegung, deren täglich wachsende Stärke einigen offensichtlich zunehmendes Unbehagen verursacht. Nachdem alle Versuche fehlschlagen, die Verhandlungen zur Aufstellung einer gesamtdeutschen Olympia-Mannschaft zu sprengen und die internationale Anerkennung der DDR durch Föderationen und Verbände zu verhindern, verlegt man sich wieder auf die dunklen Mittel, will - durch Korruption Breschen reißen.

Am Sonntag wurde in Hamburg der lunge Schwimmer Peter Klier in ein Auto gelockt, nachdem man ihm ein Motorrad zum Geschenk versprochen hatte. Am Montag machte man den lange-vorbereiteten Vertrag mit Oswald Pfau perfekt. Der ehemalige Staatstrainer für Fußball in der DDR wurde bei Verhandlungen, die er in Westdeutschland führte, gekauft. Natürlich konnte man ihn nicht mit einem Motorrad ködern. Man mußte bessere Angebote unterbreiten. Und

jene Funktionäre, die vor einigen Monaten vergeblich versucht hatten, den Stopper unserer DDR-Auswahl, Bringfried Müller, zu kaufen, boten Oswald Pfau nun offensichtlich beträchtliche Summen (ob sie sie bezahlen werden, wird sich erweisen), ihn so auf die Bahn des Verräters am Staat der Arbeiter und Bauern bringend.

Wann Pfau, der kürzlich dank der hervorragenden Sozialfürsorge unserer Republik ein schweres Herzleiden auskurieren konnte, in der Bundesrepublik den Weg der meisten Republikflüchtigen, den Weg ins Elend, geht, dürfte nur eine Frage der Zeit sein. Diese Offensive ist bekanntlich nicht die erste. Die Abwerber haben in den vergangenen Jahren schon manch viel-stelliges Konto erschöpft. Nur eines gelang ihnen bei alledem nicht: den Vormarsch der demokratischen Sportbewegung aufzuhalten. Zur gleichen Zeit, da Pfau bei Nacht und Nebel die Republik verließ, lief "der junge ZSK-Läufer Janke in Warschau deutschen Rekord, siegte der Tabellenzehnte der DDR-Oberliga, SC Motor Karl-Marx-Stadt, in Schweden über einen guten Zweitdivisionär 8 : 2. lief Siegfried Herrmann in Turku über 5000 m Jahresweltbestzeit. Mit einem Wort, die Investitionen des Kaiser-Ministeriums brachten weder Zinsen noch Profit.

Vielleicht wird der eine oder andere einwenden, daß die Stuttgarter Kickers oder ein Bremer Schwimmclub doch mit der Adenauer-Politik nichts gemein haben, daß sie zwar unlautere Mittel im Sport anwenden, aber dennoch nicht mit Adenauer und seinen

verhaßten Politik in Verbindung gebracht werden können. Das ist ein Trugschluß. In der Bundesrepublik gibt es, um eines der Beispiele näher zu beleuchten, genügend talentierte Schwimmer, man ist auf den Nachwuchs der DDR nicht angewiesen. Man weiß nur nicht, woher man das Geld für Hallenmiete und vor allem für die Bezahlung der Trainer nehmen soll, ganz zu schweigen von der Sportkleidung, die in unserer Republik von den Clubs gestellt wird. Im Bremer Schwimmclub wird das offensichtlich vorhandene Geld aber eben doch nicht nutzbringend verwendet, sondern einem wegen Unterschlagung Gesuchten anvertraut. Der wiederum bietet es DDR-Schwimmern an mit der Bemerkung: „Ganz gleich, was du bist, ob Wasserballspieler, Schwimmer oder Springer, nimm unser Geld, wir brauchen alle!“ Es ist also nicht zu bestreiten, daß man in Bremen mehr Wert darauf legt, unseren Schwimmsport zu lähmen, als den eigenen zu fördern. Das aber ist Adenauersche Politik, die dem Sport der Bundesrepublik nicht nützt und nur das Ziel verfolgt, die DDR in die Knie zu zwingen. Ob also Stuttgart, Bremen oder Karlsruhe es ist, die Politik Bonns.

Nach historischen Traditionen wird die demokratische Sportbewegung der Offensive nicht tatenlos zusehen, sondern sie mit einer Gegenoffensive beantworten. Das wird nicht ein mit den Mitteln der Korruption und des Betruges vorgetragener Angriff sein, sondern ein echt olympischer, mit der Kraft und Stärke unserer Sportler bestrittener. Immer mehr deutsche Rekorde und Bestleistungen werden in unserer Republik ihre feste Heimat finden und damit den Initiatoren jener Korruptionsoffensiven das Sinnlose ihrer Aktionen vor Augen führen.

Appendix L

Neues Deutschland, 18.10.1956.

Sieg der Verständigung im Sport

Der mehr als einjährige Weg von Hinterzarten bis Köln hat zum Erfolg geführt. Die Nationalen Olympischen Komitees der DDR und der Bundesrepublik haben sich über die Entsendung einer gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft zu den Olympischen Sommerspielen in Melbourne geeinigt. Dieser Tat-Eache kommt zweifellos eine hohe politische Bedeutung zu. Das Ergebnis der Beratungen von Köln hat bewiesen, daß die Verständigung zwischen Vertretern der beiden deutschen Staaten möglich ist. Der Sport hat damit ein Beispiel für alle Gebiete des gesellschaftlichen Lebens gegeben. Bei vielen Sportlern hat die Zahl von 169 Aktiven Verwunderung hervorgerufen. Bekanntlich war bis zur letzten Beratung in Weimar der Grundsatz aufrechterhalten worden, nur Sportler mit Medaillenchancen nach Melbourne zu entsenden. Das NOK der DDR ist bei diesem Grundsatz geblieben. Alle von ihm vorgeschlagenen Kandidaten treten die Reise nach Melbourne an. Das NOK der Bundesrepublik dagegen ist offenbar unter dem Druck seiner Fachverbände von dem Prinzip der Medaillenchance abgewichen. Es konnte jedoch nicht Aufgabe des NOK der DDR sein, in dieses Tauziehen zwischen dem NOK der Bundesrepublik und den westdeutschen Verbänden einzugreifen.

Unter ähnlichen Gesichtspunkten ist die Regelung im Fußball zu betrachten. Die Sektion Fußball und das NOK der DDR sind stets für eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft eingetreten. Es ist notwendig festzustellen, daß diese gesamtdeutsche Elf durch die Methoden des westdeutschen Fußballbundes verhindert wurde. Er lehnte Ausscheidungsspiele ab, blieb dem Münchner Lehrgang fern und widersetzte

sich schließlich auch den vor- •geschlagenen letzten Terminen am 20. und 22. Oktober mit der Begründung, Pflichtspiele nicht verschieben zu können (was nichts anderes heißt als: Pflichtspiele sind wichtiger als Olympia-Ausscheidungskämpfe). Doch ungeachtet dieser wenig olympischen Handlungsweise mußte in Köln ein Weg gefunden werden. Er führte nach der Argumentation des westdeutschen Trainers Herberger, in der Kürze der Zeit sei an eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft nicht mehr zu denken und jede Mannschaft allein sei stärker, zu der Frage: DDR oder Bundesrepublik?

Der westdeutsche Fußballbund ließ sich bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage von reinen Prestige Gründen leiten. Das NOK der DDR blieb auch in diesem Falle seinem Grundsatz treu. Es gab zu verstehen, daß die Entsendung einer westdeutschen Amateurauswahl vom sportlichen Standpunkt aus wenig erfolgversprechend sei. Sowohl eine gesamtdeutsche Elf als auch eine DDR-Vertretung sei stärker, obwohl auch eine solche Mannschaft keine Medaillen-Chance hatte.

Im Sinne der Zusammenarbeit, weil ihm die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft höher stand als das Teilproblem Fußball, schloß sich das NOK der DDR schließlich der Ansicht des NOK der Bundesrepublik an.

Nicht unerwähnt kann schließlich bei der Betrachtung der Verhandlungen von Köln bleiben, daß die zahlenmäßige Erweiterung der Mannschaft vornehmlich in solchen Sportarten erfolgte, in denen wir das Leistungsziel des Jahres 1956 noch nicht erreicht haben. im Schwimmen und Wasserball, im Rudern, Kanu. Hockey und — auch im Fußball.

Appendix M

Neues Deutschland, 07.10.1959.

Schwere politische Niederlage der Bonner Spalterregierung

NOK West stimmt gegen Adenauer für gemeinsame Olympiaflagge

Hannover (ND). „Der Weg ist frei für die gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft nach Squaw Valley und Rom.“ Mit diesen Worten kommentierte der Präsident des westdeutschen Olympischen Komitees, Ritter von -Halt, am Sonntagvormittag die einstimmige "Entscheidung der Hauptverwaltung, -bei der von den beiden deutschen NOK vereinbarten Olympiaflagge für die Mannschaft zu bleiben. Sekunden zuvor hatten die 27 ordentlichen und persönlichen Mitglieder des westdeutschen Olympischen Komitees, unter ihnen die Präsidenten der größten westdeutschen Sportverbände, durch ein lautes und vernehmliches „Ja“ einzeln für den Vorschlag des NOK-Vizepräsidenten Willi Daume gestimmt, die schwarzrotgoldene Flagge mit den fünf olympischen Ringen als Fahne der gemeinsamen Mannschaft zu akzeptieren. Unmißver-

stänlich war durch Diskussion und Abstimmung das Ansinnen Adenauers , zurückgewiesen worden, auf die Olympiaflagge zu verzichten und die westzonale Fahne als einzig verbindliches Wahrzeichen zu erklären. Damit hat Adenauer eine schwere politische Niederlage erlitten. Nach der Einigung der beiden NOK über die gemeinsame Flagge in Berlin erklärte er zynisch: Die Olympiaringe, sind nicht mit der „nationalen Würde“ vereinbar. Auch nach dem ergebnislosen „Gespräch“ mit Daume und Ritter von Halt blieb der Kanzler bei seiner Meinung: Wir werden die Olympiaflagge kompromißlos ablehnen. Der Bonner Innenminister Schröder assistierte

ihm mit der lautstarken Erklärung: Die Flagge ist eine Zumutung. Und Pressechef Eckardt behauptete, die Bundesregierung werde auf keinen Fall zustimmen.

Daß die -westdeutschen Sportführer dennoch fest blieben, ist in erster Linie der einheitlichen Front der Sportler gegen Bonn zu danken. Der westdeutsche Rudererpräsident Wülfing erklärte während der Diskussion in Hannover unmißverständlich: ' Man muß die Meinung der Aktiven respektieren und berücksichtigen, daß sie fast ohne Ausnahme für

die Teilnahme an den Olympischen Spielen unter den gegebenen Bedingungen sind.

Der Beschluß von Hannover bestätigte die Richtigkeit der Politik der DDR, die auf Verständigung und Verhandlungen der Deutschen untereinander gerichtet ist.

Noch in den letzten Stunden vor der Hauptversammlung hatten einflußreiche westdeutsche Zeitungen mit unverhohlenen Drohungen die Sportfunktionäre da zu zwingen wollen, eine Entscheidung zu treffen, die den Wünschen und Vorstellungen der Bundesregierung entsprechen würde. Auf diese Weise war bekanntlich der Bonner Minister Lemmer „bekehrt“ worden. Als aus der Hauptversammlung heraus der Vorschlag unterbreitet wurde, die Abstimmung über diese entscheidende Frage geheim durchzuführen, wurde er mit überwältigender Mehrheit zurückgewiesen. „Wir stehen zu unserer Entscheidung“, - hatte der Präsident des westdeutschen Fußballbundes, Dr. Bauwens, erklärt und damit die Meinung der für eine offene Abstimmung eintretenden Mehrheit zum Ausdruck gebracht

Vor der Abstimmung hatte der Vizepräsident des westdeutschen Olympischen Komitees, Willi Daume, erklärt, die Mitglieder der Verhandlungsdelegation des westdeutschen Olympischen Komitees seien nach wie vor der Meinung, daß man den Standpunkt Adenauers nicht zum Standpunkt des NOK machen könne, weil er der Realität der bestehenden beiden deutschen Olympischen Komitees nicht Rechnung trägt. Er verwies auch ausdrücklich darauf, daß die beiden Komitees völlig gleichberechtigt sind, was unbedingt bei der Entscheidung in Rechnung gestellt werden müsse.

Daume verband die Abstimmung in der Flaggenfrage mit der Abstimmung über eine Erklärung des am Abend zuvor zusammengetretenen Vorstandes des -westdeutschen Sportbundes, in der nichts wesentlich Neues zur Flaggensituation in der Westzone gesagt wird. Die Tatsache, daß man sich notfalls auch dazu bereit finden will, auf Welt- oder Europa- meisterschaften zu verzichten, um die Staatsflagge der DDR nicht entgegen den polizeilichen Bestimmungen hissen zu müssen, stellte Daume in den Bereich des Möglichen. Er wiederholte jedoch beim Vorlesen der Erklärung zweimal die Worte „behalten wir uns vor“, womit zum Ausdruck kam, daß es sich auch in diesem Fall um eine sehr dehnbare handelt.

Appendix N

Neues Deutschland, 15.10.1959.

Bonn gegen gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft

Vom Allgemeinen Deutschen Nachrichtendienst übernehmen wir folgenden Kommentar:

Die Erfolge der Sportler der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und die damit verbundene Anerkennung der DDR durch 39 internationale Sportverbände werden für die Regierung der Westzone immer mehr zum Ärgernis. Auch in diesen Tagen gab es wieder einige Anlässe, die den Regierenden in Bonn die Galle ins Blut trieben.

In Stuttgart, Austragungsort der Weltmeisterschaften im Hallenradsport, wies der Internationale Radsportverband (UCI) die provokatorische Forderung bundesamtlicher Stellen zurück, die DDR-Fohne dürfe nicht gezeigt werden. Das Ergebnis: Die Staatsfahne der DDR wehte neben den Fahnen der anderen Teilnehmerländer. Bonn, vor allem Spionageminister Lemmer, mußte sich damit nicht die erste Lektion von internationaler Seite über die Existenz und über die Souveränität der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik erteilen lassen.

In Stuttgart verständigten sich der Radsportverband der DDR und der westzonale Radsportverband über die Entsendung der Radsportler zu den Olympischen Spielen auf der Grundlage des Leistungsprinzips. Die DDR-Fahrer werden in den wichtigsten Disziplinen die gesamte deutsche Mannschaft vertreten[^]

Angesichts des völligen Zusammenbruchs seiner Politik fühlt sich Herr Lemmer veranlaßt, direkt -in die gesamte deutschen Sportffagen einzugreifen. Er mocht das, wie es von ihm- nicht anders zu erwarten ist, mit Hilfe von Lügen und Tatsachenverdrehungert und läßt das- von Ih/n dirigierte undbezahlte „Informationsbüro West* etne völlig aus der Luft gegriffene. Meldung verbreiten. Der zufolge soll ein leitender Sportfunktionär des DTSB erklärt haben, die DDR habe .keine gesamte deutsche Mannschaft gewollt", wolle sie auch nicht für Rom und werde sich auch sieht an die vereinba, rungen der beiden NOK haften. Nach der Methode .Haltet den Dieb!" versucht er auf diese. Weise, dem DTSB und seinen Sportlern die eigenen Absichten in die Schuhe zu schieben. Wie ADN aus Kreisen des NOK der DDR erfährt, ist das Olympische Komitee der DDR nach wie vor bestrebt, alles zu tun, um eine gemeinsame deutsche Olympiamannschaft auf der Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung beider deutscher Komitees zu sichern.

Appendix O

Neues Deutschland, 05.08.1960.

Adenauer will die gesamte deutsche Olympiamannschaft sprengen
Kanzler bedrängt Westdeutsche Sportfunktionäre/ Völliger Abbruch des Sportverkehrs geplant

Bonn (ND). Heute, 24 Stunden vor den letzten gesamteutschen Olympia- Ausscheidungskämpfen, will Westzonenkanz- ler Adenauer den bislang schwersten Schlag zur Sprengung der gemeinsamen deutschen Rom-Mannschaft führen. Diese nahezu unglaubliche Provokation soll Maßnahmen zum völligen Abbruch des gesamten Sportverkehrs zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten einleiten. Der Bonner Regierungschef hat für heute die führenden westdeutschen Sportfunktionäre, darunter den Präsidenten des Deutschen Sportbundes, Willi Daume, - ins Palais Schaumburg zitiert. „Es besteht die Wahrscheinlichkeit, so kündigte bereits gestern die „Frankfurter Rundschau" vielsagend Adenauers Absichten an. „daß in dem Gespräch Bestrebungen auftauchen, die gesamteutschen Sportbeziehungen abzubrechen."

Adenauers Vorhaben, noch kurz vor Beginn der Olympischen Spiele die ge- meinsame Mannschaft aufliegen zu lassen, wurde durch einen ungewöhnlich scharfen Anariff im Bonner „Bulletin", dem offiziellen Orgarr der Bundesregie- rung, vorbereitet. In dem Artikel werden haarsträubende Beschimpfungen gegen den Präsidenten des Deutschen Turn- und Sportbundes. Ewald, und andere Sportfunktionäre der DDR ausgestoßen.

In einer fast aufs Haar sich gleichenden Sprachregelung kamen gestern schlagartig alle Adenauer-Blätter mit wüsten Beschuldigungen und Beleidigungen gegen die DDR-

Sportler heraus. Der Westberliner „Tag“ plaudert ziemlich offen aus, was Adenauer im Schilde führt. Unter der Überschrift „Noch vor Rom gibt es Übereinstimmungen zwischen Regierung und Sport“ geht das CDU-Blatt

näher auf die Tagesordnung des für heute geplanten Gesprächs im Palais Schaumburg ein: „In seinem Mittelpunkt stehen Fragen des gesamtdeutschen Sports im Hinblick auf die Olympischen Spiele. Hierzu gehören die Flaggenfrage und die Nationalhymne.“ Damit ist unverhüllt gesagt, mit welchen Mitteln und Methoden Adenauer seine Provokation starten will.

Aus den bisherigen Vorgängen ist unschwer zu erkennen, daß Adenauer heute versuchen will, die Politik „Macht das Tor zu“ auch auf den Sport zu übertragen. Westberlins Innensenator Lipschitz hatte am 21. Juli vor Journalisten diese Politik ungeniert dargelegt und gefordert, auch im Sport „politische Sicherungen einzubauen.“ (Siehe auch Seite 2: „Lipschitz will jeden Berlin-Besucher bespitzeln“.)

Appendix P

Neues Deutschland, 07.02.1963.

Das Ende des 'Pokerspiels'?

Am Nachmittag des 14. September 1962 übertrug der in Westberlin stationierte amerikanische Sender eine Diskussion, die der westdeutsche NOK-Präsident Willi Daume mit Westberliner Oberschülern über die Frage der gemeinsamen Olympiamannschaft führte. Daume erklärte im Verlauf dieser recht heftigen Debatte wörtlich! „Um eine gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft zu bilden, muß man natürlich miteinander sprechen und muß Ausscheidungen austragen, die auf Grund gesetzlicher Bestimmungen im Augenblick hier überhaupt nicht möglich sind.“

Diese Worte bedürfen keines Kommentars. Sie wurden vor wenigen Monaten geprägt und umreißen unmittelbar die Situation des westdeutschen Olympischen Komitees. Als sich Willi Daume am Mittwoch im Hotel „Palace“ von seinem Stuhl erhob; hatte er einer gemeinsamen Mannschaft wie 1956 und 1960 zugestimmt, er hatte Verhandlungen auf deutschem Boden zugestimmt und Ausscheidungskämpfen.

Natürlich erhob sich die Frage; wieso Willi Daume vor zwei Monaten nicht weit vom Hotel „Palace“ in der Villa „Mon Repos“ persönlich zwei deutschen Mannschaften zugestimmt hatte und sich dann wenig später eines anderen besann. Wie jetzt zu erfahren war; gehörte Daume sogar zu den Inspiratoren jener Idee. Die Ursache kann man ohne Mühe in seiner Antwort an die Oberschüler finden. Er sah keinen anderen Weg

aus den Bonner Zwangsbestimmungen als den zweier Mannschaften.

Indessen scheint man in Bonn für diese Regelung überhaupt keine Gegenliebe gezeigt, zu haben. So mußte Daume den Flug nach Chicago antreten, den er nach seiner Rückkehr scherzhaft und wohl auch ein wenig überheblich ein „Pokerspiel“ nannte. Doch in Chicago vermochte er nicht zu erreichen, was er sich möglicherweise erhofft hatte; eine endgültige Isolierung der DDR.

Avery Brundage ließ ihm keine andere Wahl als die einer Mannschaft nach den bewährten Vorbildern von Cortina-Maurice, Squaw Valley und Rom. Daume kehrte zurück und tat so, als hätte er die Pokerpartie gewonnen. Doch als er sich eben im Hotel „Palace“ in Lausanne von seinem Stuhl erhob, wußte man, daß er nichts gewonnen hatte. Der Kraftakt des 16. August 1961; mit dem er den Sportverkehr zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten abbrach und vom IOC den Ausschluß der DDR forderte, mißlang so,

wie das Pokerspiel wenig später verlorenging. Am 6. Februar 1963 wurde in Lausanne ausdrücklich, bestätigt, was seit 1955 feststeht: Die Bildung der gemeinsamen Olympiamannschaft hat auf deutschem Boden zu erfolgen, und oberstes Prinzip dabei ist und bleibt die Gleichberechtigung beider Olympischer Komitees. An Ausscheidungen wie die

der Leichtathleten in Prag und Malmö ist nicht mehr zu denken.

Von den neun Punkten; die Willi Daume vor Monaten zur „unabdingbaren Voraussetzung“ für eine gemeinsame Olympiamannschaft erhoben hatte, blieb nicht viel übrig. Genaugenommen nur das Papier, auf das sie geschrieben und gedruckt wurden. Es lohnt nicht, auf jeden der neun Punkte einzugehen, um das zu beweisen. Es genügt, darauf zu verweisen, daß man so verfahren wird wie vor Rom

Sicher liegt kein Grund vor; lange Überlegungen darüber anzustellen, wessen Erfolg Lausanne ist. Unser NOK-Präsident Dr. Heinz Schöbel vertrat nachdrücklich und sachlich die Interessen des Sports und die des olympischen Gedankens. Avery Brundage hatte keinen Anlaß, Ihm nicht recht zu geben, da er das Recht auf Schöbels Seite sah.

So war der 6. Februar — vorsichtig beurteilt — wohl eine der letzten Partien eines Pokerspiels, das am 16. August 1961 in Düsseldorf begonnen worden war und mit der Isolierung der DDR enden sollte. Deshalb damals Visabeschränkung und Boykott durch NATO-Regierungen; deshalb auch „neun Punkte“ und „unabdingbare“ Forderungen.

Doch Poker ist ein Glücksspiel; und wer sich von Bonn die Karten mischen läßt, scheint wenig Glück zu haben.

Appendix Q

Neues Deutschland, 17.08.1964.

Beschluß gegen den Sport

Vor drei Jahren vernahm der deutsche Sport jenen unseligen Beschluß, den am Abend des 16. August im Düsseldorfer Park-Hotel Westdeutschlands ^Sport- und NOK-Chef Willi Daume verkündete: „Ab sofort ist der Sportverkehr zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten unterbunden. Das ist die einzige Sprache, die die DDR versteht.“

Mit diesem Beschluß wurden Wettkämpfe westdeutscher Sportler mit DDR-Sportlern verboten, unter Strafe gestellt. Dahinter steckte natürlich Bonn. Die Ultras waren durch die Sicherungsmaßnahmen der DDR am 13. August 1961 mit ihren revanchistischen Plänen gescheitert und versuchten nun, sich auf dem Gebiet des Sports zu rächen, der ! ohnehin ein Stiefkind des Bonner Staates ist. Daume machte mit der Ausführung des Bonner Befehls die olympische Ebene zu einem Tummelplatz der 'Revanchisten und Militaristen.

Die Hetzjagd begann. Mit Polizeihunden gegen Leipziger Sportler in Bochum, mit Funkwagen gegen Olympiasieger Thomas Köhler und Olympia-Silbermedaillengewinner Hans Grodotzki. Man scheute nicht einmal Terrorurteile. Joachim Göritz, der west- . deutsche Langstreckenläufer, bekam das zu spüren, als er vor der Politischen Strafkammer in Dortmund stand: sechs Monate Gefängnis. Sein „Verbrechen“: Er startete in der DDR.

Heute, drei Jahre nach diesem schwarzen Tag in der Geschichte des deutschen Sports, bereiten sich die Sportler beider deutscher Staaten auf die XVIII. Olympischen Spiele in Tokio vor. In nervenaufreibenden Ausscheidungen wird einem Kompromiß Genüge getan, den IOC-Präsident Brundage verlangte: die „gemeinsame“ deutsche Mannschaft. Sie ist ein schlechter Kompromiß. Eine Fiktion. Nicht mehr.

Sportler der DDR und der Bundesrepublik dürfen einerseits nicht miteinander verkehren. Bei den Olympischen Spielen werden sie andererseits in eine gemeinsame Mannschaft gezwungen. Welch ein Widersinn

.Wir wissen, daß diese gesamtdeutsche Olympiamannschaft innerlich unaufrichtig ist", bemerkte die .Welt" dieser Tage. Sie trifft damit den Kern der Dinge, wenn auch sehr spät und offensichtlich nur unter dem Eindruck der drohenden Gefahr, daß die DDR aus dem Wettstreit um die Olympiafahrkarten als Sieger hervorgehen könnte.

Hier wird das Bonner Dilemma sichtbar. Mit dem Beschluß von Düsseldorf sollte die Sportbewegung der DDR getroffen und isoliert werden. Polizeiterror. Verleumdungen und hinterhältige Abwerbungen waren weitere Mittel, mit denen man den DDR- Sport in die Knie zu. zwingen glaubte,

Doch der Plan der Ultras scheiterte auch auf diesem Gebiet kläglich. Die Sportler der DDR haben sich in den letzten drei Jahren oft in die internationalen Siegerlisten eingetragen und sind geschätzte Mitglieder in 45 internationalen Föderationen. Der Vormarsch der DDR und ihrer sozialistischen Sportbewegung ist nicht aufzuhalten. Was aber den Sportverkehr zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten angeht, so wird er nur normalisiert werden können, wenn der Düsseldorfer Schandbeschluß fällt.

Appendix R

Neues Deutschland, 27.10.1964.

Die deutschen Staaten im Medaillenspiegel

In einem Leserbrief von Eberhard Wahner, Berlin-Weißensee, heißt es: „Neben der aktuellen Platzverteilung in den einzelnen Disziplinen veröffentlichen Sie auch den täglichen Medaillenspiegel. Dabei machen Sie die Unterscheidung DDR, Westdeutschland, Westberlin. Das verwundert uns einigermaßen, da in Tokio nur eine gemeinsame deutsche Mannschaft am Start ist

Weshalb ist man in Bonn so erpicht auf eine „gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft"? Etwa deshalb, weil man die DDR und ihre Sportler so gerne hat? Doch wohl nicht. Denn da hätte man ja am 16. August 1961 in Düsseldorf nicht den Abbruch des Sportverkehrs mit der DDR zu beschließen brauchen. Oder man hätte die Düsseldorfer Beschlüsse inzwischen wiederaufheben können. Mit der Mannschaft" verfolgt Bonn nur einen einzigen Zweck: Ein internationales Auftreten der DDR soll verhindert werden, die DDR darf nicht existieren, damit Bonn den „Rechtsanspruch" behält, sich das angebliche Niemandsland bei Gelegenheit einzuverleiben. Der Sinn dieser sogenannten .gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft" ist Revanchismus und Aggression.

Es ist klar, daß wir nicht einer Konstruktion zustimmen können, deren hinterhältiger Sinn darin besteht, die Existenz der DDR zu negieren. Gewiß, wir haben uns auf den Kompromiß einer ."gesamtdeutschen Mannschaft" so weit eingelassen, daß unter den gegenwärtig noch gegebenen Umständen unserer DDR-Mannschaft der Zugang zu den Spielen in Tokio möglich wurde. Im übrigen gehen unsere Überlegungen und Urteile von der Realität der DDR aus. Es interessiert uns zuallererst, wie unsere DDR-Sportler im internationalen VerWir

gleich bestehen. Das heißt, die Medaillen, die von DDR-Sportlern errungen wurden, waren in den Tabellen zu summieren und damit in Vergleich zu den anderen Ländern zu setzen. Daraus ergibt sich zwangsläufig, daß auch die Medaillen der Bundesrepublik gesondert aufgeführt wurden.

Wenn wir damit von dem Prinzip der In Tokio offiziell gemeldeten Mannschaften abgingen und im Medaillenspiegel dem Prinzip der wirklich vorhandenen Staaten folgten, so konnten, wir Westberlin nicht zu Westdeutschland rechnen. Denn Westberlin gehört nicht zur Bundesrepublik. Die hartnäckigen Versuche der Bonner Militaristen, in Westberlin Fuß zu fassen und diese Position gegen die DDR zu mißbrauchen, zwingen uns dazu, die wirkliche Rechtslage unter allen Umständen zu betonen.

Wir weisen in dieser Art die hinterhältige Aggressivität der Bonner Politik, die den Sport zu politischen Manövern mißbraucht, zurück. Das bedeutet aber keine Unfreundlichkeit gegenüber westdeutschen und Westberliner Sportlern. wir beglückwünschen jeden Sportler zu seinen olympischen Erfolgen, die er im fairen Wettkampf errungen hat. Wir denken da sportlicher als zum Beispiel der Westberliner „Tagesspiegel“, der zwar für eine „gesamtdeutsche Mannschaft“ ist, aber am 25. Oktober haßerfüllt schreibt: „Der fanatischen Kommunistin Ingrid (gemeint ist Ingrid Engel-Krämer. D. Red.) hotten wir in Tokio zwei und nicht nur eine Niederlage gewünscht.

würden es auch begrüßen, wenn man sich in Bonn entschlösse, das Verbot des Sportverkehrs zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten aufzuheben. Wir sind "für Verständigung der beiden deutschen Staaten, auch im Sport. Aber wir sind gegen die Diskriminierung der DDR, auch im Sport.