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EU AND UN IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Hypothesis

In the world conflicts the European Union is a competent partner for the UN in the field of crisis management in spite of different agendas, policies and vocations.

Objectives

- Analyse necessity of a partnership and coherence among national and international actors

- Analyse important steps that have taken place in the last years at both the political and institutional level and which have had significant influence on the EU-UN relations development

- Analyse prospects for operational level cooperation and concerns connected

- Present scenarios providing models for the UN trend of involving the EU in the operations where force is used are presented

- Determine steps that have taken to make the EU-UN crisis management more efficient and generally develop capabilities of the collaboration in conflict management
- Evaluate cooperation of the EU and the UN in operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and analyse successes and failures

Structure

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Methodology

Qualitative analysis is applied to evaluate whether the particular cooperation between the EU and the UN has been successful enough and whether the EU was and still is a competent partner for the UN. The analysis will be led according to two sets of criteria. The first set of criteria comes from the case study of Darya Pushkina in which she determines the reasons for successes and failures of certain missions. The second set of criteria comes from practical steps of the EU and UN which they have taken in recent years in order to formalize their relationship.

Case study analysis is applied to show the advantages gained from strengthened partnership where the EU shall prove itself as a competent actor.

Literature, sources:

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- Major, C.(2008): ´EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU

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- Pugh, M. Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera, University of Plymouth, published in International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112Spillmann, K., Bernauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): ´Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives´

- Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006

1) http://ec.europa.eu

2) http://europa.eu/index_en.htm

3) http://www.crisisgroup.org/

4) http://www.europa-eu-un.org/

5) http://www.un.org

6) http://www.unac.org/en/about_us/index.asp

7) http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/dpko.shtml

DECLARATION:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 21015 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 86 manuscript pages.

Your name: *Pavlína Bertlová*　　　Your signature:＿＿＿＿＿＿＿　　　Date: *7.6.2010*

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1   Introduction

The organisation of the United Nations was founded as the follower of the League of Nations in order to prevent immense conflicts on a global scale; keeping international peace and security has remained for six decades one of the main missions of the organisation. Since its foundation, the United Nations have helped prevent numerous wars when convincing the adversary parties to negotiate, it was mainly the Security Council, the main body of the UN for the issues of international peace and security, that has made the most important decisions[1]. It can be said the Second World War showed the necessity for civilian presence and it took a very long time to strengthen this capability of the international community. It was the UN that included the lack of preparedness for its post-modern tasks. It can be said the UN as an architect of the concept of peacekeeping is the most important institution to deal with crisis management, nevertheless crisis management still lacked the civilian feature and then there appeared difficulties to respond efficiently to the conflict[2]. At the beginning of peacekeeping missions, the main task was to supervise cease fires with complete impartiality and with the condition to use force only for self-defence. Nevertheless, traditional UN approach to peacekeeping was not efficient and the responses were not appropriate[3]. As a consequence, some conflicts evolved in genocide or ethnic cleansing[4]. In this case, cease fires and peace agreements did not assure stability but nor did not end the violence. Subsequently, NATO came up with peace support operations where force was used and this approach was later used

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[1] UN Security Council: Background: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html (accessed 15/05)

[2] Malone David M., The UN Security Council (2004): 'From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International Peace Academy', p. 26

[3] Spillmann, K., Bernauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): 'Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives', p. 23

[4] Spillmann, K., Bernauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): 'Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives', p. 23

also in UN missions. Force was used in the UN missions since the 1950's but general opinion was still against force, nevertheless, afterwards, there were serious failures, such as in Somalia and in the Balkans where the UN devoted its missions to the humanitarian issues[5].

In the Cold War period, the United Nations started to promote strongly crisis management. In my thesis crisis management will be used for numerous parts of contemporary peacekeeping. Crisis management comprises numerous factors, military, civilian and humanitarian. An objective of military missions is security, civilian actors are unarmed conflicts and comprise security sector reform but also aim to reform the infrastructure and main objective of humanitarian actors is take care of the victims of the conflict. Conflicts occurring nowadays need to involve all three elements. It can be said when one of them is omitted, the mission is not likely to be successful. The reason is the mandates of the missions have also expanded which is a consequence of rising recognition of crisis management and necessity for peace promotion in other ways than militarily. Consequently, civilian element became an essential part in a conflict response[6].

According to Martín, it was considered the product of power politics and a way how to maintain 'friendly regimes' and promote economic interests[7]. On the other hand, it has to be noted that interventions were realized by impartial and smaller countries and had a high chance to achieve a conflict resolution. According to Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, there are two general approaches in relation to the debate that express the best the role of the United Nations in contemporary times. The UN may be considered the main representative of the

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[5] Spillmann, K., Bernauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds. (2001): 'Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives', p. 23

[6] McCallum, B. (2009): 'EU Civilian Crisis Management : A Vehicle for EU International Actorness, Dalhousie University

[7] Martín, A. Sola (2005): 'The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping', Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies p. 7, accessed at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf, 05/05

International community as a whole which is created for the purposes of great power politics, notably the United States[8]. According to Johan Galtung, peacekeeping practice and crisis management are the promotion of negative peace, or the absence of physical violence[9]. The second approach says that peacekeeping is related to the repressive mechanisms through which states protect their interests at an international level[10].

Nevertheless, during the 90s after finalization of the Cold War, the situation on the world scene changed. The number of international wars considerably diminished; on the contrary, the number of national conflicts increased[11]. After the Cold War, the role of the UN as the main entity in the international community became more prominent. The UN was willing to promote peace in those areas where instability and violence were brought during the Cold War. In this international framework, UN Peacekeeping became a conflict stabiliser in the world conflicts that intervenes as a third party and promotes transformative policies. Consequently, the UN has been related to the problem solving model of intervention and to the conflict resolution field of knowledge. Martín defines the objective of peacekeeping as follows: *'Peacekeeping within the problem solving paradigm addresses the peaceful transformation of conflict through societal accountability of power holders (processes of*

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[8] Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) in Martín A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf, 05/05

[9] Galtung (1976) in Martín A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf, 05/05

[10] Burton (1990) in in Martín A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf, 05/05

[11] UN. UN at a glance : http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (accessed 5/3 2010)

democratisation, self-determination, human rights monitoring, truth commissions) and reconciliation of divided communities.'[12]

Later, new global menaces emerged with the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and new civil wars raised numerous questions and concerns. Despite criticism of the organisation and its failures in some missions, the experience from recent years have proved its capacity in the terms of peace building and peacekeeping, i.e. the structures contributing to the peace: economic development, social justice, human rights respect, good governance and support of democracy[13]. Overall, the United Nations is still considered *'the indispensable global organization for a globalizing world'[14]*to promote these values. According to M. Pugh, after the Cold War, critical theory portrayed peace operations as essential to the ideology of 'liberal peace'. He also claims, there is a general gap in peacekeeping studies, he says that conflict management, more specifically peacekeeping has not been connected with a theory of knowledge yet. He supposes that because of the peacekeeping´s hybridity in IR theory, it might be connected with exceptionalism and marginalization[15].

The thesis will deal with the question of a necessity of a partnership and coherence among national and international actors. The study will come from analyzing of important steps that have taken place in the last years at both the political and institutional level and which have had significant influence on the EU-UN relations development. They are viewed

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[12] Martin A. Sola, The Contribution of Critical Theory to New Thinking on Peacekeeping, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies July 2005, p. 7, accessed at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR15.pdf, 05/05

[13] UN. UN at a glance : http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (accessed 5/3 2010)

[14] Government of Canada. Permanent mission of Canada to the United Nations: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponu/canada_un-canada_onu/index.aspx (accessed 4/3 2010)

[15] Michael Pugh, Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera, University of Plymouth, published in International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112

from the EU perspective whose role has been gradually rising and whose role has also strengthened within the UN. Next, prospects for operational level cooperation and concerns connected are discussed. These are especially concerns coming from the EU´s commitment to the United Nations. Also, importantly, scenarios providing models for the UN trend of involving the EU in the operations where force is used are presented. The concentration is devoted to the steps taken to make the EU-UN conflict management more efficient and generally develop capabilities of the collaboration in conflict management main hypothesis being as follows: ***In the world conflicts the European Union is a competent partner for the UN in the field of crisis management in spite of different agendas, policies and vocations***. After, cooperation of the EU and the UN is watched more closely in operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and analysis of successes and failures is provided.

To prove the hypothesis, qualitative analysis and a case study method will be used. Qualitative analysis shall evaluate whether the particular cooperation between the EU and the UN has been successful enough and whether the EU was and still is a competent partner for the UN. A case study will examine the operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo in the Democratic Republic of Congo as both are ones of the first missions deployed under the cooperation of the EU and the UN. They also follow the process of building the partnership between the two actors, growing political influence of the EU within the UN structures and the EU´s strengthened capacities for conflict management and scenarios for possible cooperation. Furthermore, EUFOR RD Congo is a precedent for the cooperation of the EU and the UN. The study shall show the advantages gained from strengthened partnership where the EU shall prove itself as a competent actor.

First, it is necessary to explain the basis of the EU and the UN relations which starts with the legal basis of their relationship and continues with the question of the partnership

balance. After, the development of the relations is treated from the European point of view and its strengthening role within the UN structure. Next, case study will research EU-UN cooperation on the operations EUFOR RD Congo and Artemis. The difference comes from the fact that Artemis was an emergency force, deployed to hold ground, protect civilians in the eastern DRC. On the contrary, EUFOR RD Congo was a deterrent force to provide extra power for pre-positioned UN forces in and around Kinshasa.[16]. Qualitative analysis will be led according to two sets of criteria. Considering the first set of criteria, I will come from the case study of Darya Pushkina in which she determines the reasons for successes and failures of certain missions. The second set of criteria comes from practical steps of the EU and UN which they have taken in recent years in order to formalize their relationship.

As for the criteria by Darya Pushkina, she claims that conflict management, more specifically peacekeeping, is considered being *'… one of the most important tools at the disposal of the international community for dealing with the violent conflicts characteristic of the post-cold war period'[17]*; nevertheless, not all the operations have had a positive result, some missions being more successful than the others. First, Pushkina poses the question how success can be determined and how the UN's performance might be assessed[18], then she claims fulfilment of the mandate is not enough as numerous scholars state *'the need for qualitative criteria and the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values such as world*

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[16] SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? Accessed at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/globalpeace/PDFs/EU%27sAfricaStrategyDiscussionRGcontributio n_richard.pdf, (25/05)

[17] Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission. International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133–149

[18] Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; William Dixon, 'Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement', International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.653–81; Duane Bratt, 'Peace Over Justice: Developing a Framework for Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts', Global Governance, Vol.5, No.1, 1999, pp.63–78 in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133–149

peace, justice, and the reduction of human suffering'[19]. According to Bratt, peace is connected to *'the number of lives that have been saved from likely death'*[20] and the improvement of political, economic, and social justice by *'defending human rights, establishing the rule of law, and fostering economic and social cooperation'*. Still, Anthony Lake claims that the political success of the mission is also crucial to overall success'[21].

The criteria are set as follows:

'Criterion 1: Limiting violent conflict in the host state is the primary goal of peacekeeping. Since peacekeepers are often deployed after a ceasefire agreement is in place, the peacekeepers' task is often to maintain that peace. This is a particularly challenging task in intrastate conflicts where various military factions may continue fighting despite any general ceasefire and where international borders that might separate warring parties are absent. This criterion is applied by analysing whether a mission succeeded in curbing large-scale violence, sustaining ceasefire agreements, reducing the number of conflict related casualties and supervising demobilization, and by assessing the progress of disarmament.

Criterion 2: Reduction of human suffering is another primary goal of peacekeeping missions. The UN is supposed to prevent atrocities against civilian populations, and peacekeeping missions are a major instrument towards achieving this goal. This criterion is

[19] Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern, 'Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions', Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.41, No.1, 1997, p.152 in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133–149

[20] Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; William Dixon, 'Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement', International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.653–81; Duane Bratt, 'Peace Over Justice: Developing a Framework for Peacekeeping Operations in Internal Conflicts',
Global Governance, Vol.5, No.1, 1999, pp.65-66 in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133–149

[21] Anthony Lake, 'Peacekeeping: Defining Success', Peace Colloquy, No.1, 2002, pp.8–9, accessed at www.nd.edu/_krocinst/colloquy/issue1/feature_lake.html in Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133–149

operationalized by estimating the extent of any reduction in human rights abuses and the mission's success in resettling refugees.

Criterion 3: Preventing the spread of conflict beyond the object state's borders is also important for ensuring regional security. An internal conflict can spread to other countries in the region by the process known as 'contagion'. Violence against civilians often creates refugee flows, and diaspora populations can cause competition for resources, provoking further conflict in neighbouring countries. To evaluate this criterion, the study assesses the extent to which the integrity of neighbouring countries has been kept intact.

Criterion 4: Promoting conflict resolution is a final measure of the effectiveness of the UN mission. For peacekeeping, it requires the creation of a stable environment that is capable of preventing the recurrence of hostilities after the peacekeeping mission withdraws. This criterion will thus be assessed according to the extent to which the environment fostered by peacekeepers inhibits future violence'[22].

The second set of criteria comes from practical steps of the EU and the UN which they have taken in recent years in order to formalize their relationship. Basically, it can be summarized there have been certain points that were important for advanced communication and understanding. Two objectives from the period of the Swedish EU Presidency from the first half of 2001 were *'...(1) to develop mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and (2) to ensure that the EU's evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management'[23]*. The conclusions from the European Goteborg European Summit launched strengthened contacts between the two institutions and in June 2001 a platform for intensified cooperation was agreed. It comprised of four levels:

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[22] Pushkina D. (2006): A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.2, June 2006, pp.133–149

[23] General Affairs Council: EU-UN Co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis management, Conclusions 2001): accessed at http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/EU-UN%20cooperation.htm (20/05)

Firstly, *'EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Secretary-General'*; secondly, *'Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative and European Commission External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary-General and UN Deputy Secretary-General'*; thirdly, *'Security Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretaries-General; and other levels and formats as appropriate'*; fourthly, *'Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels'.*[24]

The procedures had the influence on the official level as well as on the working one when regular information exchange was started between the two secretariats. UNDPKO was identified as a UN partner and the EU Policy Unit identified the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Europe in UNDPA as its partner and regular exchange of information was settled between the EU Police Unit and the UN Police Division mainly in the period of transition from the UN Mission in Bosnia-Hezegovina (UNMIBH) to the EU Police Mission (EUPM)[25].

Consequently, the criteria will be determined as usual criteria for assessment of cooperation used for multilateral military operations. They can be denominated as the criteria of internal effectiveness which means the cooperation between the EU and the UN itself and general operational parameters. They should provide assessment of EU-UN cooperation in practice, determine successes and failures; first, political decision-making and planning process before and in the course of the operation; second, cooperation in the field; and third, support and logistics.

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[24] General Affairs Council: EU-UN Co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis management, Conclusions 2001): accessed at http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/EU-UN%20cooperation.htm (20/05)

[25] Vainio L. (2008): Policing Missions: 'The Case of EUPM', European Security Review

A case study will provide evaluation of the two operations. Each operation will include the background of the mission where general set of the operation will be explained. Second, the objectives of the mission will be provided as it is essential for final consideration of successes or failures of the mission. Third, first set of criteria will be considered according to provided scheme which will show external effectiveness as well as internal effectiveness of the mission. After setting the criteria, analysis of each operation as well as general evaluation will follow. Last but not least significance of EU-UN partnership will be explained. For the first part of my thesis, I will come from mainly official websites of the organisations which provide information about all necessary policies, resolutions, communications etc. (europa.eu, un.org); the second part of the research is based on the research of literature on crisis management (Thardy), peacekeeping (Martín, Pugh, Pushkina), UN-EU cooperation and coordination (Farrell) and the research on particular missions (Major, Nzongola-Ntalaja).

2   EU-UN cooperation

The United Nations could not be efficient without effective multilateralism and participation of other institutions and regional organizations in responding to the global challenges, threats and crises to maintain the world values and rule. The UN is considered to have the most multilateral relations, competence, and impartiality and coordination ability to reach such objectives[26]. In recent years, it is the European Union which has been mainly contributing to the UN conflict and crisis management as well as to numerous peacekeeping missions at the time when the organisation needs to face the crises and at the time when it

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[26] The European Union and the United Nations: Choice of Multilateralism
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00009_en.htm (20/04)

seeks support of other world players to carry out the missions so that a chance to succeed in these difficult tasks would be higher. On the other hand, the cooperation with the United Nations is also beneficial for the EU as it can be said it is seeking cooperation of the UN as a recognized and moral authority in international relations[27]. According to R. Keohane, multilateralism has two different definitions, *'the definition that is more consistent with ordinary usage conceives of multilateralism as institutionalized collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent states.'[28]* He also claims that definition of multilateralism is provided in institutional terms. The second definition is provided by John Ruggie who states that *'multilateralism is limited to action among three or more states, on the basis of generalized principles of conduct, such as reciprocity'[29]*. According to Keohane, such definition is meaningful for transformations studies in world politics.

As for the European Union, it started to develop its capabilities in both terms, military and civilian. The character of its crisis management helped the EU to be considered as a credible organisation promoting peace in international relations. After the World War II Europe needed to strengthen its military capabilities and started to focus more on civilian missions. Europe transformed its military doctrine to be able to respond in a civilian way[30]. At the time, Europe had to face numerous challenges, such as economic revitalization, war criminals, population resettlement, overall reconstruction, rule of law reestablishment[31].

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[27] Major, C.: EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, p. 5

[28] Pugh M. (2003): 'Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera', University of Plymouth, published in International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112

[29] Pugh M. (2003): 'Peacekeeping and IR theory: Phantom of the Opera', University of Plymouth, published in International Peacekeeping, Volume 10, Issue 3 December 2003, pages 104-112

[30] Weiss, Thmoas W. (1999): 'Military-Civilian Interactions Intervening In Humanitarian Crises. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 16

[31] Weiss, Thmoas W. (1999): 'Military-Civilian Interactions Intervening In Humanitarian Crises. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 16

Consequently, there were general demands in contemporary conflicts which were connected with new international stability demands requiring other missions, such as humanitarian and political[32]. These suggestions were not really included in conflict resolutions earlier than in the 1990s, which was the period right after unsuccessful missions in the failed states. The conflicts were mostly of ethno-political character and needed a comprehensive solution which was not provided. It is presumed to have an outstanding opportunity to contribute significantly to crisis management operations as it disposes a high variety of instruments, such as political tools like conflict mediation, economic tools such as humanitarian aid, economic assistance, rule of law, police and military operations. Nevertheless, there are still challenges for the EU to use these instruments in an effective way. It can be said that the ESDP has been significantly developing recently and such development has contributed to the EU´s strengthened role in the world; it can be said that the evolution of ESDP was influenced by the relations with the UN and has had a convergent trend with the UN structures '... *as a recognised moral and legal authority in international relations*'[33]. Nevertheless, coordination within the EU structure also seems to be very difficult. Coherent approaches within the structure are necessary at all levels, the decision-making and the implementation ones mainly. Consequently, the political will as well as the structures for coordination are desirable. Also, in spite of common goals and interests, there are differences in the agendas and policies in terms of crisis management and sometimes there is a clash between what the EU offer and the UN demand[34]. Subsequently, the cooperation is aggravated by certain constraints.

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[32] Weiss, Thmoas W. (1999): 'Military-Civilian Interactions Intervening In Humanitarian Crises. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 18

[33] Major, C. (2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006', p. 5

[34] A Commissioned Paper by Dr Thierry Tardy, Director, European Training Course, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, for the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2008 hosted by Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Ministry of Defence in cooperation with CERI Science Po. The overall topic of the

2.1   *Legal basis*

The relations with the UN were established in the Treaty of Rome, originally for the European Community. It is the Article 302 of the Treaty on European Union from 1993 that declares that '... *the European Commission is to ensure the maintenance of all appropriate relations with the UN organs and its specialized agencies...* '[35] in the case of EC competence. In the case of mixed competence, it is the Commission and the presidency that represent the EC and the Commission which examines the ways of possible EU contribution to the efficient governance of the international society concerning the important global issues.

Support of multilateralism is a basic principle of the EU´s foreign policy since a great number of global problems cannot be solved without international cooperation and commitment to multilateral cooperation and consequently, cooperation with the United Nations is one of the conditions for good functioning of the European Union within the international system[36]. The European Union cooperates with the United Nations in various issues of global importance, i.e. human rights, the fight against terrorism, the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking, crisis management and peacekeeping. The European Union agreed to support the effective multilateral legal instruments, from the most important ones such as the Kyoto protocol or the International criminal court in recent years. Support of new initiatives is an indispensable contribution to the coherence promotion and the right

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forum is "Partnership - The United Nations, the European Union and the Regional Dimensions of Peace Operations: Examples of Cooperation within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter". P. 1

[35] European Union&United Nations: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_458_en.htm (05/04)

[36] Summaries of EU legislation: The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, accessed at
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00009_en.htm (0504)

balance between the institutions on a global scale, not only the UN, but other organisations and structures, for instance the Bretton Woods system, World Bank or IMF[37].

The fastest possible ratification of the UN instruments in all member states and the final implementation in practice is a good example of EU multilateral initiatives for which an agreement on common positions in all member states is crucial. More specifically, all EU member states are also members of the United Nations and each of them has one vote in the General Assembly[38] and there is a wide variety of issues that need to be addressed on the global level and it is indispensable the EU would respond in one voice. Numerous agreements have been signed between the EU and its neighbouring countries so these countries which consequently contribute to the influence of the EU in the General Assembly.

Article J.2 of the Maastricht Treaty declared: *'The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and then representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.'[39]* Nevertheless, there is a clash between the UN Security Council and the Article 19, 2 of the Treaty on European Union as in the Security Council, the most powerful organ within the UN structure, there are two EU member states holding permanent status, i.e. France and the UK but the EU Article declares to coordinate actions of the EU. … *'member states represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the member states participate shall keep the latter informed of any*

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[37] European Union&United Nations: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_458_en.htm (05/04)

[38] European Union&United Nations: Partnership in Action: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_458_en.htm (05/04)

[39] Maastricht treaty (1992): accessed at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf (05/04)

matter of common interest. Member states which are also members of the United Nations

Security Council will concert and keep the other member states fully informed. Member states

which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions,

ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their

responsibilities under the provisions of the UN Charter.[40]

In the communication treating the question of multilateralism from 2003 the EU strives to fulfil its potential as a central pillar of the UN system where the importance of enhancing co-operation with the UN is highlighted and the EU's voice in the UN strengthened[41]. Nevertheless, naturally, there are differences on multilateralism between the EU and the UN. The common positions are in the issues concerning the protection of human rights, security which is under the international law being the issue of the most frequent cooperation between the EU and EU non-members. On the other hand, the issue of state sovereignty differs between the EU and the UN. The EU keeps the right to intervene in case of endangered human security, the UN Charter, on the contrary, is against the use of force except the case of self-defence[42].

This Communication has set out from two basic premises. First, that a commitment to

multilateralism is more essential than ever and therefore must remain a central strand of the

EU's external action. Second, that the role of the United Nations as the backbone of the

multilateral system, and the need to make it deliver concrete solutions to many key global

challenges, are beyond doubt. On that basis, the Communication has sought to take a wide-

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[40] Maastricht treaty (1992): accessed at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf (05/04)

[41] EUR-LEX: Access to European Law: accessed at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2003&nu_doc=526&lg=en, accessed 29/03

ranging look at the way in which the EU works in, and with, the UN, with a view to determining whether, and how, its effectiveness in helping the UN deliver effective global governance can be improved, especially in the fields of sustainable development, poverty reduction, security and peace. One basic conclusion in that regard is positive: interaction and co-operation with the organisations of the UN system is already present at unprecedented levels across a wide range of areas. At the same time, the EU could be more effective in its contribution to shaping policy within the UN; and both the EU and the UN stand to gain from further improvements and greater synergy in their operational co-operation.

A series of practical proposals are put forward in the Communication as to how the EU might make a more effective contribution to global governance with the UN. Only some of these are within the exclusive responsibility of the Commission - many would require action from the Council and Member States; and in many cases, a concerted effort by several institutions and at different levels is needed. To clarify the implications and respective roles of different actors in the process of implementation, an action plan for implementation of the Communication is annexed to the text.

The Commission invites the Council and Parliament to consider the analysis and the Recommendations put forward in this Communication; and looks forward to working closely with the Member States and with the United Nations to advance the shared objective of more effective global governance and strengthening the architecture of the multilateral system.[43] '

The regular meetings take place at ministerial level in New York every year and the UN Deputy Secretary-General and other UN officials visit EU institutions in Brussels,

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[43] EUR-LEX: Access to European Law: accessed at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&type_doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2003&nu_doc=526&lg=en, accessed 29/03

Luxembourg and Strasbourg[44]. It is the UN Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General and the European Parliament that deal with the coordination of the policies between the UN and the EU. The common positions of the European Union are presented to the UN by the presidency. Nevertheless national interests of the particular presidency can also play a certain role[45]. Most of the EU statements are made to the Security Council and the General Assembly and most of all they concern peace and security issues, then economic and social development and human rights. It has to be noted that there is no common policy and supranationality. Generally, the UN and the EU agree on the necessity of strengthening of the Council working groups dealing with the UN issues. Other EU representatives should have more opportunities to promote the EU common positions in the UN, based on mandates and guidelines, the relevant Council bodies reinforced considering monitoring and adequate preparation of the implementation of agreed policies. Both, the EU and the UN intend to include third countries in their activities in order to share burden among the Member States, the Commission and the Presidency. The Political and Security Committee ensures the cohesion between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Union in the United Nations[46].

Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon established the position of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy in order to strengthen the role of the European Union on the international stage and establish a functioning EU common foreign and security policy. HR is the key position as his/her responsibilities are to help by making proposals and in institutional terms, the position is involved in both the Council and the European Commission

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[44]European Union@United Nations: Partnership in Action: accessed at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/articleslist_s33_en.htm, (29/03)

[45]Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d´Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, p. 9

[46] Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d´Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, p. 8

policies. High Representative has then special responsibility for coherent external action on the part of the EU. A new European External Action Service (EEAS) is created to support the actions[47].

Cooperation of the EU and the UN has been seen numerous times in practice as the EU has cooperated with the UN in numerous peacekeeping and peace building missions, such as Afghanistan (UNAMA, UNDP), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (UNMiK), Democratic Republic of Congo. The high level of EU engagement in security issues within the UN proves the capacity of significant contribution to the international security and its capacity to play an important role in international security[48]. It is necessary the process of consensus building between the EU members and the UN structure would be coherent. The decisions concerning EU civilian crisis management operations are taken by the Commission; fast decision making process has been strengthened by The Rapid Reaction Mechanism[49]. Regular meetings at the level between the UN and the European Union were introduced between the General Secretary-General and the UN Deputy Secretary General as well as between the Council and the Commission. Concerning conflict crisis management as well as post-crisis situations, the European Union and the United Nations bound themselves to cooperate with regional organisations. The Commission encourages to concentration on specific geographical areas and direct cooperation between the crisis regions in the UN, such as the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Commission. It is the UN which takes care of the

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[47] European Integration Working Group : The European External Action Service: accessed at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/06326.pdf (20/04)

[48] Tardy T. (2008): ´United Nations – European Relations in Crisis Management´, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

[49] Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d´Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, p. 6

training of the personnel from both organisations for crisis management operations and both organisations strive to achieve the most possible coherence within the structure[50].

To conclude, attitude of multilateralism is the principle of the EU foreign policy as well as a commitment to strengthen closer relations with the UN. The EU strives persuade the states to follow the principles of multilateralism, to follow the rules of international organisations in order to improve the situation of the global governance. The EU's commitment to multilateralism as well as to the United Nations will show if the structure set after World War II will successfully fulfil its objectives in development of international peace and security which means to help countries follow the set of rules, promote multilateralism in all spectra against national interests. Both the European Union and the United Nations share the same values, i.e. the protection of human rights, the respect for international law, democracy. Nevertheless, there are some restriction in the EU-UN cooperation within the multilateral system, such as supranational tendencies of particular member states which causing difficulties to the whole system[51].

2.2 The question of equal partnership

The United Nations and the European Union have invested much effort in order to improve their relationship and bring it to a very official level. It is important to focus on important steps that have taken place in the recent years at both the political and institutional levels which have had significant influence on the EU-UN relations development[52]. These

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[50] Farrell, M.(2006): EU Representation and Coordination within the United Nations, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, p. 6

[51] The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors: Partners in Peace?, IPA, 11-12 October 2002, p. 1. in relation to that opinion, at the end of the 1990s, NATO's Summit in Washington decided that NATO would have no geographical limits (New Strategic Concept, April 1999)

[52] Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, p. 1

steps have also been important from the point of view of an increasing role the EU has played within the UN structures as they have made the EU-UN crisis management more efficient and that have generally developed capabilities of the collaboration in crisis management. Recently, the EU has been developing its capacity in terms of crisis management and has put the issue on the top of the agenda in the relations with the United Nations. The relations were specified in a Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management from September 2003.

At the same time, despite the fact the progress is limited by the Security Council, the EU managed to gain more political influence within the UN structure. It can be said the relations between the UN and the EU are settled on decision-making basis where there is no , overall right to deal with the issues of the international character, i.e. peace and security[53]. This is the reason why the EU, more specifically the European Security and Defence Policy, extended options for cooperation with other structures. According to Esther Brimmer, ´... *what makes the EU a potentially significant contributor to international security is the ability to combine civilian and military resources to manage violent conflicts. The EU presents itself as able to combine traditional 'hard' military power with non-traditional 'soft' power'.*[54]

Overall, as the largest contributor of UN peacekeeping, the European Union cooperates with the United Nations considerably, supporting the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and implementing recommendations from the Brahimi Report[55]. The structure of EU-UN has gone through significant decision-making development where

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[53] The UN, the EU, NATO and Other Regional Actors: Partners in Peace?, IPA, 11-12 October2002, p. 1. in relation to that opinion, at the end of the 1990s, NATO's Summit in Washington decided that NATO would have no geographical limits (New Strategic Concept, April 1999)

[54] Esther Brimmer, The EU's Search for a Strategic Role – ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C.: SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002, pp. 102-103

[55] UN Peace Operations and the ´Brahimi Report´, by William J. Durch, the Henry L. Stimson Center, October 2001

international peace and security issues are treated on the multilateral level and no state or institution has privileged rights. In fact, the European Security and Defence Policy newly enabled cooperation of the UN with a regional organisation and the EU shall prove if it is a capable contributor to the international security and crisis management. Both organisations had to fulfil certain criteria before they could start to cooperate in the field of crisis management. These criteria had both legal and operational character; nevertheless, the EU had to make more significant effort as it was founded more recently[56]. At first, the relations were rather on a symbolic level, a serious cooperation started at the beginning of 2003 with one of the first tests in the EU-UN cooperation in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) where the EU later overtook responsibility over the mission. Inter-institutional cooperation of the two actors was assured already in the planning phase and after launching of the operation regular exchange of information was provided through liaison officers. The first report said that '*while the EUPM is the first experience of cooperation in the field between the UN and EU', it illustrates that a smooth and efficient transition of responsibility from the UN to EU in a crisis management operation is no longer an aspiration but a concrete component of our cooperation.*'[57], which proves certain success of the cooperation, considering the fact it was just the beginning of collaboration between the two structures. Close cooperation and coordination were necessary for both a strategic part of the operation and for the actions in the field. Nonetheless, there was a tension coming from the EU side as its takeover of the mission that had already existed caused some problems in its reshaping to the necessities of the organisation. The High Representative for CFSP issued reports on the activities of EUPM and kept sending them to the UN Security Council once in

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[56] Esther Brimmer (ed.), The EU's Search for a Strategic Role – ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C.: SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002, pp. 102-103.

[57] Novosselof A (2004): ´EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management´, Developments and Prospects, International Peace Academy, p. 14

six months. At the same time the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and UNHCR (the UN Refugee agency) were founded[58].

Other experience was gained in the Artemis Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 which was the first operation for the EU outside its territory under the mandate of the UN. The operation was important for strengthening coordination and cooperation in communication, planning and training and, afterwards, the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Coordination in Crisis Management was signed in 2003. The crisis management became a real priority in the EU-UN relations[59]. The GAERC statement from the meeting called on *'the Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat and in full association with the Commission, to take forward the necessary preparatory work to develop modalities for practical co-operation with respect to the relevant options listed above, in close consultation with the UN and in view of a possible agreement between the EU and the UN on crisis management within the ESDP'[60]*. The European Commission presented on 10th September, 2003, a new strategy for EU-UN relations calling for *'improving the EU coordinating mechanisms in Brussels, New York and Vienna, establishing direct EC representation in fora that deal with issues of Community competence, and establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU services and those of UN agencies, including hands-on co-operation in the field"[61]*. And even though Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation was treating covering both civilian and military aspects of crisis management was the Declaration, the European Council *"reaffirmed the*

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[58] UNHCR: accessed at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home (25/05)

[59] General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522nd Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003

[60] European Union @ United Nations EU-UN – "Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism", EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/9/2003

[61] European Union @ United Nations EU-UN – "Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism"EC03-247EN, European Commission, 10/9/2003.

European Union's commitment to help achieve United Nations objectives in crisis management [62].

Basically, it can be said there have been certain points that were important for advanced communication and understanding. Two objectives from the period of the Swedish EU Presidency from the first half of 2001 were *'(1) to develop mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and (2) to ensure that the EU's evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management'* [63] . The conclusions from the European Goteborg European Summit launched the strengthened contacts between the two institutions and in June 2001 a platform for intensified cooperation was agreed. It comprised of four levels: Firstly, *'EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Secretary-General'*; secondly, *"Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative and European Commission External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary- General and UN Deputy Secretary-General"*; thirdly, *Security Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretaries-General; and other levels and formats as appropriate'*; fourthly, *'Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels'.* [64]

The procedures had the influence on the official level as well as on the working one when regular information exchange was started between the two secretariats. UNDPKO was identified as UN partner and the EU Policy Unit identified the Office of the Assistant

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[62] General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003

[63] Conclusions – Items approved without debate, 2356th Council meeting, EU General Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001

[64] EU General Affairs Council Conclusions, 2356th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001

Secretary-General for Europe in UNDPA as its partner and regular exchange of information was settled between the EU Police Unit and the UN Police Division mainly in the period of transition from the UN Mission in Bosnia-Hezegovina (UNMIBH) to the EU Police Mission (EUPM).

In January 2003 both secretariats established task forces between the UNDPKO and the EU´s DGE-IX. As a result, EU´s departments connected with UN issues shall agree on all the actions, list them, identify them and strive for cooperation. UN Military Adviser General Patrick Cammaert said about UNDPKO that *'the ad hoc coordination group on UNDPKO-EU relations ... provides a forum for the exchange of information on DPKO-EU relations, and an ideal vehicle for the crafting of UNDPKO's overall strategy vis-à-vis the EU. ... It will greatly facilitate both our external and internal communications, and will assist the process of developing a systematized, comprehensive and integrated strategy to inform our interactions with the EU, and potentially other regional organizations'*[65]. A special organ named Steering Committee was founded in order to meet twice a year and discuss common concerns, as well as assure regular meeting of liaison officers from both sides and to supervise reforming of particular areas of the cooperation that needed to be reformed, i.e. planning, training, communication and best practices[66] Delegation to the UN was established already in 1974 with an observer status. The Steering Committee has supervised keeping of all the points of the contract at all levels of the two secretariats and has participated on a significant

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[65] Address by the Major-General Patrick C. Cammaert, Military Adviser to the DPKO, "The Future Partnership with Regional Institutions: The Role of the United Nations in Conflict Management", 3 July 2003, IPA Vienna Seminar.

[66] The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) assists in the planning, conduct, management and support of peacekeeping operations by learning from experience, problem solving and transferring best practices in United Nations peacekeeping. To this end, the Section undertakes a broad range of activities and work, including: (i) knowledge management; (ii) policy analysis and development; and (iii) lessons learned. The overall goal is to develop and support a culture of best practices in United Nations peacekeeping by helping to establish and develop the mechanisms and working habits to share knowledge. Accessed 30/04 at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/bestpractices.shtml

evolution of the operational cooperation thanks to training of particular standards and modules and personnel training courses. Nevertheless, it has to be said the UN has often tried to have more influence on the EU and wanted it to get engaged in its operations more significantly than the EU was interested which was the reason of particular tension. However, the cooperation has been developing rather positively and it can also be evaluated as the most ideal between the UN and a regional organisation. Its function was strengthened after signing of Amsterdam Treaty because of Article 19 and the post of High Representative.[67]

2.3   Analysis of growing political influence

Kofi Annan stated that *'experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action ... integrated peace building effort is needed'*[68]. It can be said that EU´s role in crisis management has been strengthened recently, there are three factors that express strong involvement of the EU in crisis management, and these are presence, capability and opportunity. The point is that crisis management where the EU operates gained a leading role and became an actor on the world scene. We might understand EU´s today´s role from different points of views. First, according to Treacher, the EU got in the external policies by default[69]It can be also characterised by ´spill-over´ notion[70]. Basically, the EU is a representative of certain nations and subsequently,

[67] European Union @ United Nations, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=458&lg=5

[68] Schnabel, A., Ehrhart, H. G. ed., (2004): ´Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding´. New York: United Nations University Press., p. 3

[69] Treacher, A. (2004): ´From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistible Transformation´, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, pp. 49-66.

[70] Reichard, M. (2006): ´The EU-NATO Relationship A Legal and Political Perspective´, Hampshire: Ashgate, 56

certain form of hard power is necessary (Hill 1993, 7). [71]Naturally, the reason is the Union wanted to spread its influence on the world scene, although, military capabilities were necessary for such development. It can be said crisis management (of civilian type) had developed without strong capability of the EU.

Treaty of the European Union described the EU´s interest in defence and security: *'project stability and lasting peace within and beyond its borders'*[72]. Before, the fields such as defence and security were managed by the USA, NATO and the Western European Union as the military structures in Europe were not in a good shape for peacekeeping operations and the forces did not get out of Europe[73].and subsequently, the dependence on other institutions and organisations made Europe act more actively even incited by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. The difficult situation proved the limited capacities of Europe very soon; the European Community was de-valued in the war in Bosnia.

It is necessary to analyse what political influence cooperation between the EU and the UN has had so far. Basically, European Security and Defence Policy was getting involved within the UN structure. Already at the Helsinki European Summit in 1999 and later at the Goteborg European Summit in 2001 *'the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security"*[74] was determined and stronger cooperation between the two actors was established. The Europe Security Strategy confirmed that the United Nations Charter is *' a fundamental framework for international relation'*, and later recognized *'strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities*

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[71] Hill, C. (1993): 'Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No.3, pp 306-328

[72] Nowak. A., ed., (2006): 'Chaillot Paper Civilian Crisis Management: The EU way', Institute for Security Studies, No. 90, p. 6

[73] Howorth, J. (2007): 'Security Defence in the European Union', New York: Palgrave Macmillian, p. 95

[74] UN Security Council: accessed at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html (30/04)

and to act effectively, is a European priority'[75]. According to these conditions, the UN became both a legal and legitimate actor for the EU while operating outside Europe. Nevertheless, it must be considered what the EU influence in terms of European sates within the UN structure is. It can be claimed EU member states themselves are active in terms of improving the level of influence they have on the UN decision-making. In fact, their influence and steps they take influence the EU entity which is referred to in Article 19 of the Treaty of the European Union[76]. Article 19 revises both the UN and EU member state policy issues in terms of policies coordination but also coordination of EU policies in other organizations of various characters which the EU member states participate in. It can be also concluded that Article 19 strengthened the EU influence and position in international relations. Nonetheless, it can be said the EU did not gain its recognition very fast. EU member states keep taking part in the regional group WEOG (Western European and Other States)[77] but sometimes EU has worked as an entity and deciding about the issues in common. This concerns first of all the decisions taken in the General Assembly as well as in its organs.[78] EU Presidency referred to

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[75] UN Security Council: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html (30/04)

[76] The provisions of Article 19 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union (which includes the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty amendments) are the following: "1./ Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 2./ Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

[77] The WEOG is the most heteroclite UN regional group at the General Assembly, gathering the "rest of the world": the North- American countries (Canada, United States), Oceania (Australia, New-Zealand), and all the Western European countries (Turkey included).

[78] 'EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly', Occasional Papers, n° 49, December 2003, EU Institute for Security Studies

these organs for all EU member states as well as for Central and Easter States not being EU member states and the time, EU candidates[79].

Important issues from crisis management, for instance Afghanistan or Africa, are discussed by the EU Presidency which gets involved in Security Council meetings. Nevertheless, it is difficult to coordinate decision-making process as the procedures are easier in the Security Council than in the General Assembly. Consequently, meetings in order to exchange information were established. Firstly, the same issues treated by the Security Council were treated. Later, new urgent issues were discussed and weekly meetings among Security Council coordinators started to be rather detailed. It has to be pointed out that stronger coherence between EU states might have had positive influence for the countries with permanent seat in the Security Council. There were claims that an EU seat in the Security Council might have been motivation for a common foreign policy at the time since the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not comparable with the special position of the countries, such as France and the UK. Other opinion were expressed that an EU permanent seat would have made sense as the EU should be considered as an entity with the common foreign policy in the Security Council as well. Such decision was supposed to deal with the problem of the extensive representation of Europe in the Security Council where France, the UK and Germany were supposed to have a permanent status and where Europe might have had five non-permanent seats. In fact, France and the UK were against the idea as they said the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not the only policy for Europe[80].

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[79] 'EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly', Occasional Papers, n° 49, December 2003, EU Institute for Security Studies

[80] Sur S. (1995) : Relations internationales, Paris, Monchrestien, p. 497

2.4   Analysis of capacities

The EU General Affairs Council came to the findings that crisis management became an essential issue for the EU-UN relations, which was even an incentive for the Balkans and the DRC [81]. The GAC called on *'the Presidency, assisted by the Council Secretariat and in full association with the Commission, to take forward the necessary preparatory work to develop modalities for practical co-operation with respect to the relevant options listed above, in close consultation with the UN and in view of a possible agreement between the EU and the UN on crisis management within the ESDP'[82]*. New strategy concerning EU-UN relations was launched in September 2003 initiating *'improving the EU coordinating mechanisms in Brussels, New York and Vienna, establishing direct EC representation in fora that deal with issues of Community competence, and establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU services and those of UN agencies, including hands non co-operation in the field"[83]*. The Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation treating crisis management was signed on 24th September 2003 which *'... reaffirmed the European Union's commitment to help achieve United Nations objectives in crisis management"[84]*. After the operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which was generally successful, it was the UK and France that proposed a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction

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[81] General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522nd Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003, accessed at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:8oBc8eKVUvoJ:www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/NewsWord/en/gena/76752.doc+General+Affairs+and+External+Relations+Conclusions,+2522nd+Council+meeting,+Brussels,+21+July+2003&cd=1&hl=cs&ct=clnk&gl=cz (05/04)

[83] General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003, accessed at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st12/st12293.en03.pdf (05/04)

[84] General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2527th Council meeting, Brussels, 19 September 2003, accessed at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st12/st12293.en03.pdf (05/04)

capabilities to enhance its ability to help the UN in short-term crisis management situations'[85] in 2003. As a consequence, the EU Council created the concept of coherent credible battle-groups which were composed of 1,500 men deployed as a rapid force[86].

The UN welcomed the initiative of the EU to strengthen its capabilities in terms of deploying joint civil-military rapid force. These actions were started after establishing the European Security and Defence Policy. The first reason why the United Nations appreciated these initiatives was filling the gap in its peacekeeping and rapid reaction capacities which the UN was very well aware of, especially after the Srebrenica disaster that has had consequences on the UN military personnel provision. The western European states became reluctant in military deployment. Consequently, the UN did not consider the ESDP as a competition but as necessary complement; on the other hand, the UN would have appreciated more support from the EU side, especially in peacekeeping missions on African continent where the European deployment is considered unsatisfactory.[87]

Nevertheless, currently, the EU strives to strengthen its role in terms of peacekeeping capacities and financing, technically supporting the African Union and participating in UN operations establishment. It is not only the use of force that an essential element for crisis management it is also prevention including diplomacy and economic means as well as communication, managing peace, and reconstruction. When it is considered how conflicts should be addressed, there are numerous issues that must be taken in account, such as the character of the conflict, geography, possible spill over, capacity of aggressors, involvement

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[85] Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, p. 1

[86] SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy : What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? University of Brussels, Institute of European Studies, p. 21

[87] SDA Discussion Paper. The EU's Africa Strategy : What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? University of Brussels, Institute of European Studies, p. 21

of third parties in management and organizations involved in intervention. And then, when third parties intervene, there are numerous features where they can differ again: timing, objectives, interests and then coherence in alliance might experience difficulties. Obviously, it depends how much a conflict is important for different actors and then the level of their intervention will differ. Obviously, when a crisis is addressed, common positions from the third parties are expected. There are examples confirming that when third parties have different positions than the international community might not respond in the most appropriate way, for instance the case in the Balkans when the US had a different proposition than NATO neighbours, the US position was promoted and the European were not able to promote its influence.

The EU is very motivated about a strong and effective cooperation with the UN in Africa, proved by the ESDP Action Plan for Africa and its battle group, however, more coordination and coherence in all fields is still highly desirable. It can be said there exist different options treating the involvement of the EU within the UN structure concerning crisis management for both UN-led and UN-mandated operations, more specifically determined by three indicators: firstly, the level of EU assets´ deployment in a given UN operation, secondly, the sense of such deployment and the character of the activity itself at the very beginning, and lastly, the cooperation comprised exchange of information and contacts on a very high level. First meeting was the EU Troika summit when the EU High Representative addressed the UN Security Council in 2000.[88] The EU troika summit was followed by the Goteborg European Council one year later where a set of principles and practical options guiding EU-UN

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[88] SDA Discussion Paper. The EU´s Africa Strategy : What are the lessons of the Congo Mission? University of Brussels, Institute of European Studies, p. 21

cooperation concerning civilian crisis management was adopted. EU-UN dialogue was generally strengthened.[89]

Obviously, there exist differences between the approaches towards the conflict crisis management from the part of the UN and the EU but it is still the Security Council of the UN which is responsible for peace operations being the body possessing legalising and legitimising role for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations[90]. Nonetheless, the UN is still unique in terms of possessing the right to give orders concerning the use of force in international relations. Accordingly, except the United States, the UN is the organisation with the highest level of peace operations. The UN has deployed almost 124,000 personnel on its 16 peace operations under the umbrella of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations all over the world[91].

Current DPKO-led peace missions

1948	MIDDLE EAST	UNTSO — UN Truce Supervision Organization
1949	INDIA/PAKISTAN	UNMOGIP — UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
1964	CYPRUS	UNFICYP — UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
1974	SYRIA	UNDOF — UN Disengagement Observer Force
1978	LEBANON	UNIFIL— UN Interim Force in Lebanon

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[89] Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, p. 3

[90] Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping: accessed at: http://wwwupdate.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2010/factsheet.pdf (10/05)

[91] Jakobsen V. P. (2006): EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management : A Promising Work in Progress, p. 1

1991	WESTERN SAHARA	MINURSO — UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
1999	KOSOVO	UNMIK — UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
1999	DEMOCRATIC REP. OF CONGO	MONUC— UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
2002	AFGHANISTAN	UNAMA— UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
2003	LIBERIA	UNMIL— UN Mission in Liberia
2004	CÔTE D□ IVOIRE	UNOCI — UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
2004	HAITI	MINUSTAH — UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
2005	SUDAN	UNMIS — UN Mission in the Sudan
2006	TIMOR-LESTE	UNMIT — UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
2007	DARFUR (Sudan)	UNAMID —AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
2007	CENTRAL AFRICAN REP./CHAD	MINURCAT— UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

Besides the DPKO, it is the Department of Field Supports which is also involved in the field of personnel, budget, communications, information technology and logistics and provides another 12 missions under the umbrella of the Department of Political Affairs[92]. Generally, concerning the military force the UN depends on the contributions from the member states. To the date February 28, 2010, 115 countries contributed its personnel to UN peacekeeping. More than 84,000 of those serving were troops and military observers and about 13,000 were police personnel. In addition, there were more than 5,800 international

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[92] Fact Sheet: United Nations Peacekeeping: accessed at:
http://wwwupdate.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2010/factsheet.pdf (10/05)

civilian personnel, nearly 14,000 local civilian staff and some 2,400 UN Volunteers from over 160 nations. The strongest personnel contributors are Bangladesh (10,862), Pakistan (10,733), India (8,783), Nigeria (5,837), Egypt (5,258), Nepal (5,186), Ghana (3,911), Jordan (3,769), Rwanda (3,663), Uruguay (2,516), Ethiopia (2,412), Italy (2,265)[93]. It can be said that there is a trend that it is rather developing countries being contributors than the developed ones when Italy is on the 12th of regional organisations and other states should considerably contribute to the complex peacekeeping.

Financially, it is all member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly divides the expenses among the member states according to special financial chart taking into consideration economic wealth of member states. Member states with the permanent seat in the Security Council pay a larger sum as they have special *'special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'.*[94] The 10 countries contributing most considerably for conflict crisis management are: United States (27.17%), Japan (12.53%), the United Kingdom (8.16%), Germany (8.02%), France (7.56%), Italy (5.00%), China (3.94%), Canada (3.21%), Spain (3.18%) and the Republic of Korea (2.26%).[95] There are also countries that donate resources for UN operations in a different way, for instance in the means of transportation, supplies or personnel.

All in all, since the year 1999, the number of UN has increased considerably, they are larger, multi-faceted and complex. The number has increased mainly in African continent with approximately 72 000 peacekeepers, especially in the areas of Southern Sudan, Cote

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[93] United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing for UN Peacekeeping Operations: accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml (20/05)

[94] United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing for UN Peacekeeping Operations: accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml (20/05)

[95] United Nations Peacekeeping, Financing for UN Peacekeeping Operations: accessed at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml (20/05)

d´Ivoire, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur. Consequently, the demand for peacekeepers is even rising and contributions from the countries like Canada or entities like the European Union with long peacekeeping history, expertise and capabilities in military and logistics[96]. The EU bound to provide international force to the peacekeeping to the prevention of conflicts in the third countries. The personnel is composed of police forces especially trained for the given task. EU member states engaged themselves to provide 5000 police officers out of this number 1400 might be available in 30 days[97].

2.5   UN demands and EU conditions

Generally, EU-UN level of cooperation depends on political and institutional structures from last years and there is still a question whether the commitments taken will ensure efficient cooperation between the actors. It has to be pointed out that first, the UN is asking the EU for contributions at operational level, which includes mainly peacekeeping[98]. The EU members might theoretically get reluctant to UN peacekeeping, nonetheless the EU feels responsible for the commitment towards the UN Security Council in the issue of contribution to international crises solution finding, but according to its own principles and conditions. After few years of experience the EU proved to be a reliable partner, appreciated especially in the fields in which the UN does not feel so strong, i.e. rapid deployment. Secondly, the ESDP should not prefer peacekeeping in Europe to peacekeeping in Africa[99], which means not only to criticise

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[96] PeaceBuild, Peace Operations Working group: accessed at:
http://www.peacebuild.ca/documents/CanadaUNPKOE.pdf (30/04)

[97] European Commission: Freedom, Security and Justice: A different type of peacekeeping for the EU: accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/peacekeeping/fsj_police_peacekeeping_en.htm (25/04)

[98] European Commission: Freedom, Security and Justice: A different type of peacekeeping for the EU: accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/peacekeeping/fsj_police_peacekeeping_en.htm (25/04)

[99] European Commission: Freedom, Security and Justice: A different type of peacekeeping for the EU: accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/police/peacekeeping/fsj_police_peacekeeping_en.htm (25/04)

conflicts, violence and belligerents but also actively provide troops, both for short-term and long-term operations. According to Richard Gowan, more than one decade after establishing the European security and defence policy '... *the EU has generally left the United Nations to handle conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, though it has offered some support to UN missions in those areas. But with European forces heavily committed in Afghanistan and the Balkans – and defence budgets being squeezed – there is now a danger that diminishing EU support will undermine the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping'.[100]* Obviously, the EU should become more engaged in UN peacekeeping as the reluctance might have negative impact on fragile states and European forces can make, according to Gowan, much difference in such countries, more than in Afghanistan for instance. The importance of EU engagement also comes from new rising powers like China or India which. On the other hand, the EU should urge on batter management of UN peacekeeping.

There exist principles treating cooperation of the EU with the UN and principles for EU intervention elaborated by the European Union in order to clarify its participation in conflict crisis management and providing civilian and military instruments. They are following:

• *The EU will retain through the PSC the political control and strategic direction of any of its operations;*

• *This cooperation will take place on a case-by-case basis;*

• *There would be no automatic involvement;*

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[100] - CER BULLETIN, ISSUE 66 The EU should do more to support UN peacekeeping in Africa EU should do more to support UN peacekeeping in Africa http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/66_gowan.html June/July

• *The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by arrangements[101].*

The EU also committed to the intervention under the UN mandate and the international law, the UN Security Council being the only organ with legal use of force (Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) and in the statement from the Goteborg summit it was claimed that *"the development of ESDP strengthens the Union's capacity to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognizes the United Nations Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"[102].*

Nevertheless, it has to be said that the principles mentioned have certain limiting influence on EU-UN cooperation in larger peace operations. Also, EU members tend to be reluctant after Srebrenica disaster to the UN-led peacekeeping. Nevertheless, there might be used the ´sub-contracting´ model, *´... by which the UN creates an operation, but subcontracts its implementation to the EU. In such a scenario, there is no formal link between the two institutions and the autonomy of decision of the EU is preserved"[103].*

Also, the UN Secretariat does not dispose sufficient personnel for multinational forces, nor sufficient administration. Solution for such a problem was supposed to be deployment of small teams of military advisers, for instance as in case of Afghanistan within UNAMA.

[101] Presidency report to the Goteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy, 11 June 2001, Brussels

[102] Novosselof A (2004): ´EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management´, Developments and Prospects, International Peace Academy, p. 8-11

[103] Novosselof A (2004): ´EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management´, Developments and Prospects, International Peace Academy, p. 8-11

Basically, it is a UN military team that is source of information concerning security in the area and cooperating with ISAF.

2.6   Scenarios of cooperation

The EU bound to get involved in a peacekeeping operation in Europe without a UN mandate and elsewhere outside Europe only under a UN mandate[104]. In such a case, there might be other countries involved in the leadership, the UN or other regional organizations. Such operation might be of a military or civilian character or composing of both types. The EU shall be autonomous in a decision-making process[105]. As already mentioned, there exists military and civilian crisis management which the EU distinguishes, the civilian being less restrictive. There are several options for civilian crisis management operations: First, *'EU Member States can contribute nationally to an operation led by international organizations, without any EU co-ordination.* 'Second, *'EU Member States can contribute nationally to such an operation, but following EU consultations aimed at e.g. identifying opportunities to pool resources.'* Third, *'A coordinated EU contribution could be provided to an operation led by an international organization.'* Fourth, *'The EU could provide and lead a whole component (e.g. police) in an operation under the overall lead of an international organization. A model could be a Kosovo type situation, with a pillar structure between different organizations and under the leadership of one of them.'* Fifth, *'The EU could lead an operation, but with some components provided by international organizations with particular expertise and experience*

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[104] Tardy T. (2008): 'United Nations – European Relations in Crisis Management', International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

[105] McCallum B. (2009): 'EU Civilian Crisis Management : A Vehicle for EU International Actorness', Dalhousie University, p. 4

in relevant fields'" Sixth, *'The EU could lead an autonomous operation.'*[106]   In   a

consequence, there might be determined several models for cooperation between the EU and

the UN. The scenarios are following:

(1) The scenario does not require significant cooperation between the EU and the UN

in terms of the operational level. An EU operation is mandated by the UN Security Council

and might be conducted with NATO's assets as well as without. Such scenario is denominated

as ´SFOR model´[107]. Predominantly, according to this scenario the UN-EU cooperation is

treated at the political level in order to make decisions coherent, this also involves resolution

of the UN Security Council and the European Council Joint Action that are indispensable.

There are two important issues: First, the UN is supposed to control operations that are UN-

mandated which the UN Secretariat has not issued any regularized structures for such

operations; and second, it essential to agree on common procedures concerning reporting to

the Security Council for both the EU and the UN.

(2) The scenario divides the roles between the EU and the UN in the way an operation

which is led by the EU is in charge of the security presence and the UN in charge of the

civilian presence, so called KFOR model. This type is to some extent different from the

scenario number one as in this case, it is liaison officers that are important for the EU-UN

cooperation considering mainly the action on the ground. They assure information exchange

of both decisions and actions of both actors and they are also supposed to solve

misunderstanding and tensions between the two actors. Weakness of this scenario is seen in

insufficient integration between the two types of command, military and civilian.

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[106] "EU co-operation with international organizations in civilian aspects of crisis management", Presidency
report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defense Policy, June 2001.

[107] Novosselof A. (2004): ´EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management´, Developments and Prospects,
International Peace Academy, p. 8-11

Subsequently, so that the coordination is effective, endeavour must be taken by the heads of operation.

(3) The scenario of the third type is an operation led by the European Union, but it is the UN Security Council that is in charge of authorization and the authorisation is followed by a UN peacekeeping operation, so called Interfet model. The scenario is oriented at the solution of a rapid deployment concern of the United Nations. It should be also helpful to put the UN in order for own mission of a longer period. Normally, collaboration between the two actors is realized in the period when the transition takes place and the EU is constantly present on the ground despite the termination of the mandate. In a consequence the EU might provide some soldiers that are in charge of the operation even after the end of the mandate and provide them to the UN. UN operation would strengthen its position on the ground. It can be said certain prevention would be assured. Overall, this model is the one which is the most advantageous for the United Nations.

(4) Model number four treats considers contribution of EU headquarters of a UN peacekeeping operations. The example might be SHIRBRIG in the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, this is so called UNMEE model. Nevertheless, applying this scenario, EU must face the problem of controlling its components in the operations led by the United Nations. In order to overcome such problem, the EU might send headquarters possible to deploy as one body as well as dividing an operation from the UN mission. It might be concluded that in case of such operation, it would be comparable to use the Interfet model.

(5) The scenario five suggest establishing a clearing house role which would be performed by the EU Political and Security Committee for UN peacekeeping operations. role of a clearing house would assure control over national contributions. This scenario is not very

probable to be realized as it is not very much more advantageous than the system of national contributions valid nowadays.

(6) According to the scenario six, the EU would contribute to the UN provision in terms of logistics and training. Such cooperation would be very practical and would include cooperation on the projects of a longer period of time. This would involve training, logistics supports to contingents as well as equipment provision. Special experts in peacekeeping operations would assist in such operations and financial aid to trust funds would be provided.

(7) Last but not least scenario treats the EU involvement in terms of provision very specific capabilities to the UN in the preparatory phase of an operation which means that cooperation of the EU and the UN is becoming stronger thanks to particular norms, concepts and procedures as well as rules of engagement, lessons learned, training criteria, legal aspects and liaison officers exchange. The European Union would be n charge of determining criteria that would be equivalent for both actors concerning peacekeeping, crisis management and policing. Such development is naturally very slow[108].

Another concern for the EU-UN cooperation is the issue of confidential information since the UN does not dispose a system which would assure transmission of secured information, whereas the EU signed an information security agreement with NATO[109]. Consequently, there are some problems as a consequence of lack of information confidentiality[110]. In a need of transmitting confidential information the EU might use the service of a liaison officer of the Liaison Office of the EU General Secretariat as well as of

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[108] Novosselof, A. (2004): ´EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management´, Developments and Prospects, International Peace Academy, p. 8-11

[109] NATO Publications (2002) : Chapter 4, The European Security and Defence Identity: NATO-EU Relations: accessed at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0403.htm (05/05)

[110] Novosselof, A. (2004): ´EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management´, Developments and Prospects, International Peace Academy, p. 8-11

UNDPKO. As a result, information would be transmitted during planning as well as during on-going operations. Also, a question of reporting on UN-mandated EU operations to the UN Security Council has to be raised. For instance, in the EU's Operation Artemis, EU High Representative Javier Solana went to present the report from the mission to the Security Council in person; furthermore, he held a public debate in the Council which was proved to be more efficient than the methods used by SFOR, KFOR and ISAF where the Council receives very short reports once in three months[111]. Nevertheless, sending the High Representative in order to provide a report is an example of a case-by-case basis in case a crisis erupts and normally, such procedure has not been established yet[112].

3   Operations

3.1   Artemis

Background

Ituri has been a problematic region in the north-east part of the country with numerous ethnic conflicts among ethnic groups fighting for access to land, mineral resources and control of local positions of power. The main conflicts caused death of approximately 50 000 people and escape of other 500 000 to other parts of Congo or to the neighbouring states between the years 1999 and 2003.[113] Rival fractions were supported by sponsors from Kinshasa, Goma, Rwanda and Uganda. In 2002, the Luanda agreement was signed between the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also, the withdrawal of the Ugandan army

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[111] Hendrickson C. Ryan, Strand Jonathan R and Raney Kyle L. (2007): Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for stronger common and security policy, Strategic Thought

[112] Novosselof A. (2004): 'EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management', Developments and Prospects, International Peace Academy, p. 10

[113] Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and more united? The debate about Europe's crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151

was planned after establishing an Ituri Pacification Commission and special strategy was set up for the conflict district of Ituri where the Iturians, the DRC and Ugandan governments as well as MONUC (the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)[114] and the broader international community took part in[115]. A new Iruri interim administration was created; nevertheless, it did not take long when the serious crisis erupted after the withdrawal of the Ugandan Peoples´ Defence Force (IIPDF) in May 2003 and IIA ceased to function normally.[116] After leaving of Ugandan troops, Lendu-based militias and the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots tried to take control over the town which caused escape of thousands of civilians gathering around MONUC headquarters and at the airport at the Urugayan battalion base.

Objectives

The objective of the mission was to assure the stabilisation of the security conditions, improve the humanitarian situation, guard the airport of Bunia and protect displaced population in the refugee camps in Bunia which is the capital of Ituri. Mandate was to provide an interim force for three months only until the transition to the reinforced United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[117] EU troops mission also was to support UN troops in DRC in maintaining peaceful situation in the area and reduce acts of violence to minimum.

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[114] UN Peacekeeping: accessed: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml (25/05)

[115] Hendrickson C. Ryan, Strand Jonathan R and Raney Kyle L. (2007): Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for stronger common and security policy, Strategic Thought, p. 2

[116] Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and more united? The debate about Europe´s crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151

[117] Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and more united? The debate about Europe´s crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151

The operation was of special importance for the EU, because it was for the first time when EU troops operated outside the area of Europe without assistance from the NATO. Success in operation Artemis would therefore ensured higher credibility of the EU in peacekeeping missions[118].

The Council of the European Union adopted a decision about the first fully autonomous crisis management operation outside Europe on 12th June 2003[119]. The French forces were the most involved in the operation. There were 1000 French troops, that means more than one half from total number of approximately 1800 troops. The second main contributor was Germany with around 350 troops. In addition, other European countries that provided troops were Sweden or the United Kingdom, while personnel form other EU states assisted at the Headquarters in Paris. However, the planning was realized by all, at the time 15, EU Member States[120].

Cooperation was eased by several transparent procedures using liaison officers of MONUC, common patrols, the Operation Commander´s visit to New York, a mission of the operational headquarters sent to Bangladesh, logistics support given by Artemis to MONUC[121] and relations both formal and informal worked at all levels. The transition took place between August 15 and September 1 for the handover to the UN´s Ituri Task Force that was part of MONUC and was coordinated with UNDPKO, MONUC and the Bangladeshi

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[118] Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): 'Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo', Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo mission? P. 9

[119] Deheza, E. (2009):'EU crisis management in Africa. The time for a 'real adventure' has come', p.4

[120] Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): 'Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo mission? P. 28

Authorities as Bangladesh was the first deployed component of the Ituri Task Force. A French officer being the MONUC representative in the Itrui sector significantly eased the transition. There were several factors very important for successful transition, these were: progressive hand-over of points of control, military staff in Bunia, a planning program determined for different steps of the transition, logistics support by Artemis to MONUC, an operational mission sent to Bangladesh, visit of the Operation Commander to New York, liaison officers of MONUC that were attending field briefings and common patrols[122].

1st set of criteria

It has to be said that the 'Interim Emergency Multinational Force' (IEMF) was not reluctant to use force when it proved to be necessary, not particularly against one of the ethnic group but against any of them which was about to threat the security of the population. The l'IEMF managed to establish security in Bunia and to weaken the capacities of the rival Lendu and Hema militias. In May 2003 the United Nations approved to deploy IEMF with Security Resolution 1484 on 30 May[123] for the town of Bunia in order to compensate the withdrawal of 6 000 Ugandan troops and to fight against the violence between the rival Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. Nevertheless, during other tensions in Ituri, many civilians died which was internationally considered the UN was not responsible enough as there was a high risk of a new genocide in the Great Lakes region. MONUC was supposed to protect civilians under the mandate. The serious problem was that seven hundred Uruguayan battalion

[122] Hendrickson C. Ryan, Strand Jonathan R and Raney Kyle L. (2007): Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for stronger common and security policy, Strategic Thought, p. 2

[123] Lianos, P. (2007): 'European Strategic Culture in the Aftermath of Concordia, Artemis and Althea', University of Leicester, p.17

abdicated its responsibilities and only a few peacekeepers and humanitarian workers managed to protect 5 000-8 000 civilians which were located near Bunia airport[124].

The IEMF was tasked to coordinate with MONUC and to stabilize the security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation, to assure the protection of the airport, to assist the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia, and to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town."[125]

At the end of the operation, security in Bunia was assured and the militias of Lendu and Hema were weakened. As a result, some 60 000 refugees were able to return to the country. Also, more than 3 000 tonnes of humanitarian aid was delivered to Bunia.[126] Still, the success of the mission was ambiguous as after the transition in September to the Bangladeshi-led MONUC, 65 people were massacred in Katshele, the town in northeast of Bunia, out of which majority were women and children.[127] It can be therefore said that within its mandate, EU troops contributed to reduction of human suffering, nevertheless due to short length of the mandate, the effect that persisted after return of EU troops back to Europe was minimal. In addition, if the whole DRC is considered, reduction of suffering was also minimal. Even in areas closely surrounding Bunia brutal violations of human rights causing deaths of many

[124] Lianos, P. (2007): 'European Strategic Culture in the Aftermath of Concordia, Artemis and Althea', University of Leicester, p.17

[125] EU-UN: Communication around the emerging EU-UN relationship was assured through a brochure produced by the office of the Commission in New York (updated in 2004 under the title 'The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter') as well as through a dedicated website (http://europa-euun. org).

[126] Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in thé Democratic Republic of Congo, European Commission: Faster and more united? Thé debate about Europe´s crisis response capacity, May 2007, p. 151

[127] EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, International Crisis Group, Brussels, 17 January 2005, p. 47

civilians occurred[128]. Again, this was caused by limited mandate that was specified for the area of Bunia.

Unfortunately, only a very limited area was under the operation and so, out of the area, the violent aggression against civilians erupted and atrocities continued. From this point of view, EU troops could not in broader scale influence spreading of the conflict beyond DRC borders as the mandate was limited only to the town of Bunia. The problem was also a very short period of deployment, i.e. three months[129].

In can be said that the operation was successful in fulfilling its mandate, partially at least. EU troops contributed to maintenance of order in Bunia and secured the airport. By this, they provided significant assistance to MONUC and helped in fulfilling its mandate[130]. The Humanitarian assistance was also one of the aims of the mission which was successfully achieved as there was a civil-military liaison officer placed on the ground who provided link with humanitarian assistance in Bunia[131]. The liaison officer managed to create a good dialogue and ensured good cooperation with the humanitarian agencies[132]. However, as mentioned earlier, the effect caused by EU forces was very temporary due to the limitations of

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[128] Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007) : 'Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the leasons of the Congo mission?, p.32

[129] UN DPKO: 'Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force', Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, , New York, October 2004, p. 11

[130] Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): 'Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo mission? P. 29

[131] UN MONUC: accessed: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/index.shtml (21/05)

[132] Council of the European Union : EU military support of the MONUC during the election process in RD Congo, accessed at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/89995.pdf(25/05)

mandate in space and time. Taking into consideration the long-lasting effect, shortly after retraction of EU troops from DRC the situation in the area worsened and MONUC was not capable of maintaining peaceful situation despite high number of troops and generous budget.

2nd set of criteria

The first contact concerning possible EU-UN cooperation began in May 2003 when the situation in Bunia started to be critical. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that the UN demands help from all states capable of providing troops to intervene in DRC. France swiftly reported that it is ready to support UN troops under conditions that it would be provided with UN chapter VII mandate, African countries that were related to the conflict (DRC, Uganda, Rwanda) would agree with French intervention and that duration and range of the mandate would be strictly limited. Shortly after, the EU adopted its common position in which it expressed willingness to help MONUC and criticised violence in DRC. On May 19 2003, Javier Solana was accredited by the EU Council to create a draft report concerning time necessary for EU troops to get ready for the mission. Although first estimations were several months, EU troops arrived in DRC approximately in one month. At the end of May 2003, the resolution 1484 was adopted by the UN Security Council describing EU mandate. It also called for collaboration from Congolese parties and other states in the region. The framework specifying goals of the operation was accepted by the EU Council at the beginning of June 2003. Shortly after, Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the DRC was approved. It set Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation, while the Council in cooperation with Javier Solana covered decision-making process concerning objectives and the end of the operation. France was set as Framework Nation and Operational Headquarters was situated in Paris. The decision-making process was very quick and did not encounter greater obstacles. It

is supposed that possible reason for such behaviour was political will to enhance ESDP in context of war in Iraq.

Operation Artemis proved to be a successful experiment of EU-UN cooperation and both organisations perceived it so. It can be said the EU completed the UN gap. The special UN force was formally created by the Security Council, its implementation subcontracted to the EU with absolutely balanced partnership. Only, the Security Council demanded the leadership of the force *'to report regularly to the Council through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its mandate'.*[133] At the preparatory phase, the UN complained it did not receive sufficient information from the EU, nevertheless communication improved during the operation and cooperation with MONUC was acceptable. One of the main successes of EU-UN cooperation was that MONUC was able to take over the operation in September as the EU mandate finished. It has to be said that effective communications and liaison for planning was assured. First shortcomings were solved and the EU took important measures to manage the issue.

EU-led multinational force managed to provide satisfactory logistical support and participated in the MONUC planning programme during the transition in September to the Bangladeshi-led MONUC forces (so-called the Ituri brigade)[134]
The UN requested to the EU to re-hat was not approved by the Europeans and it did threaten the credibility of MONUC[135]. Also, certain limits within the EU-UN relations appeared. The willingness to support through a separate operation and reluctance to support within the UN operation of EU member states was revealed. Javier Solana stated that MONUC *'should have*

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[133] UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003)

[134] UN DPKO: 'Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force', Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, , New York, October 2004, p. 13

[135] UN DPKO'Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force', Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UN DPKO, New York, October 2004, p. 14

a mandate and rules of engagement similar to those of the European Union force, i.e. a mandate under Chapter VII.'[136] And also said that ´equipment and military resources necessary to accomplish its mission and implement the mandate and rules of engagement. It can be said in the Operation Artemis, the EU complemented the UN rapid capacity; ´battle group´[137] concept was created. Also denominated 'bridging model', which means that the EU deploys a rapid force at the request of the UN and the UN gains time to deploy a new operation or to ameliorate and organize the current one. The EU has to have a possibility to deploy a capable appropriate rapid force.

Nevertheless, it has to be criticised there was not enough collaboration between the headquarters of the two actors as well within the field headquarters. It was known already before launching of the operation that there would be a lack of strategic transport. In the end, an aircraft from Ukraine was provided and rapid response capability was increased[138]. Also, there were shortcoming of better information technology, intelligence sharing.

Evaluation

The operation has a significant importance as it contributed to the EU-UN cooperation development. It was basically the first mission EU led autonomously without NATO contribution and where the EU served as a rapid reaction force for the first time and also the military operation outside Europe and first military operation where the EU and the UN cooperated. KFOR model and Interfet model were included in the cooperation as in the period

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[138] Michel, L., Nato and the EU, Stop the Minuet, It´s Time to Tango!, EuroFuture,p. 90

of transition EU military personnel stayed in the area even after the end of the mandate[139]. Both actors evaluated the operation as positive. At the beginning, the EU action was supposed to be a response to the UN Secretary-General that was endorsed by the Security Council. Before the deployment, the UN did not receive enough information from the EU, especially from the IEMF. This fact might have caused incident in the phase when both the EU and UN peacekeepers force were both deployed. In general, communication worked on different levels, i.e. New York, Brussels and on the ground. After Artemis was deployed, EU-UN cooperation was rather satisfactory as well as cooperation with the Ituri Task Force. The most important was successful cooperation of the EU and the UN Secretariat as well as with Bangladesh that was the main contributor to the Ituri Task Force so that MONUC could take over in September 2003 was successful. Also, the takeover was important from the exit strategy point of view[140].

3.2   EUFOR RD Congo

Background

At the end of the year 2005, UN asked the EU to deploy a support mission for the elections in the DRC which were to take place in summer 2006 in order to provide assistance to the UN operation MONUC. As a consequence, the EU deployed the mission EUFOR which was an autonomous military operation within ESDP, the operation was deployed after the agreement with the government of Congo and according to international law.

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[139] Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): 'Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo mission? P. 25

[140]   Tardy T. (2005): EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping: a promising relationship in a constrained environment, p.56

The region of the African Great Lakes has been in inter-state conflict since the 1990s where approximately 5 million Congolese died and many were displaced[141]. In 1999 the Lusaka Accord and in 2002 the Pretoria and Sun City agreements which were to bring the region in a transition process were signed. In 1999, MONUC mission in order to make implementation of the accord easier was established. Transitional process of political aspects was assisted by Committee to Assist the Transition. The objective was to solve the conflict and lead to a transition towards sustainable peace and development[142]. The elections were important to reach the objective. The budget for the mission was more than one billion dollars and counted 18 380 personnel[143]. As a consequence, MONUC has been one of the most expensive missions. The mandate was comprised of four parts: first, implementation of the ceasefire agreement, second, monitoring and reporting of violations, third, DDRRR process (disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration), fourth transition to the organisation of credible elections[144]. MONUC was at the beginning smaller mission that counted 90 members. As the crisis was becoming more serious, MONUC significantly increased. There were also deployed UN agencies providing humanitarian assistance and different kinds of reforms. It is the EU that strongly supported the process of transition, also in terms of provision of institutional and technical support and approximately 750 million euro has been donated for the fight against poverty, support of economy and institution

[141] Bavier, UN DPKO: 'Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force', Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, , New York, October 2004, p. 11

[142] UN Peacekeeping: MONUC: accessed at:

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/mandate.shtml (25/05)

[143] UN Peacekeeping: MONUC accessed at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml (25/05)

[144] J. (2008): 'Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45.000 a Month', Reuters, 22.01.2008

building. The EU is supposed to be the most significant donor of humanitarian aid.[145]There were other three ESDP missions of civilian character in DRC, these were EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2007) that was to advice for the training of Congolese police forces; EUPOL RD Congo (since 2007) that was to support and assist in reforming of the security sector; and EUSEC RD Congo (since 2005) in order to provide assistance in establishing the standards of human rights, international humanitarian law, democracy, good public management and transparency. EU positive response and following support to the UN were according to its commitment in international community. It can be said, EU deployed EUFOR not only to support the UN´s operation but also to demonstrate its capabilities[146].

Objectives

The planning concerning help to MONUC forces began in March 2006, after acceptance of the resolution S/RES/1671 (2006)[147] by the Council of the EU. Decision by the EU representatives to send troops to DR Congo came at the end of April 2006 and their main objective was set to help MONUC forces during the elections in case they would have problems in maintaining peace. Furthermore, EUFOR's goal consisted of protecting lives of Congo civilians, securing the airport in the capital of DR Congo Kinshasa and preventing violence. Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP adopted only two days after the acceptance of the resolution states deterrence and evacuation as further objectives of EUFOR cooperation with

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[145] Cornelis Wittebrod, ´Protecting the humanitarian space in Africa´, in the EU´s African Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo Mission?, SDA Discussion Paper, 2007, pp. 24-26, p. 24. http://ec.europea.eu/echo/information/decisions/2006_en.htm

[146] Major, C.(2008): ´EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 17

[147] United Nation Security Council : Resolution S/RES/1671 (2006) http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7134335.04104614.html

the UN. The operation began on 12 June 2006[148]. The EU deployed approximately 2 400 soldiers in DR Congo, that were divided into two parts; one part of them secured the area of Kinshasa, while the second part was placed in Libreville/Gabon. Additional 1 600 soldiers were prepared in Europe as a reserve. Troops came from 21 EU member states and Turkey and main contributors were France and Germany[149].

The objectives were:

- To stabilize a situation

- To protect the civilians in case of violence

- To protect the airport in Kinshasa

- To ensure security of the personnel

- To deploy an operation in case of a threat[150]

1st set of criteria

There were several occasions when EUFOR had to prove its capacity to limit acts of violence in DRC, however, none of them was critical and tested fully EUFOR's potential. Firstly, in August 2006, escalation of violence occurred shortly before presentation of provisional election results. Incidents continued even after announcement of the first round of the presidential election results. The most serious conflict occurred when presidential guards assaulted premises of vice president and presidential candidate Jean Pierre Bemba, nevertheless, EUFOR succeeded in separating both fighting parties and calm the situation.

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[148] Council of the European Union, 'EU military operation in support of the MONUC during election process in RD Congo', 10366/06 (Press 180), Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

[149] Ministère de la Défense, 'Opération EUFOR RD Congo – BENGA' : accessed at : www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/layout/set/popup/layout/set/popup/layout/set/popup/content/view/full/24657 (05/05)

[150] Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 17

Especially Spanish troops participated in this intervention. Another act of violence arose in September 2006, when presidential candidate Bemba's TV station. Finally, EUFOR intervened during conflicts related to the second round of presidential elections and announcement of results in November 2006. Also, when presidential candidate Jean Pierre Bemba questioned Joseph Kabila's victory at the Supreme Court of Justice, EUFOR contributed to stabilize the situations after several riots.

Overall, EUFOR was able to provide rapid reaction and reacted as a military deterrent force. Also EUFOR cooperated with MONUC and managed to limit the incidents and spreading of the violence[151].

Nevertheless, there were some international observers, such as the International Crisis Group, that did not agree with this evaluation. They said that *'neither the MONUC nor EU troops in Kinshasa acted quickly enough to prevent the August violence from escalating'*[152] the International Crisis Group also said EUFOR would not have been successful if military challenges have been more serious. However, despite these objections, even International Crisis Group admits that EUFOR accomplished its mandate fully.

Right after departure of EUFOR, the guard of the president of Congo attacked the personnel protecting unsuccessful candidate and opposition leader Bemba, right in the centre of Kinshasa and violence escalated. Bemba managed to escape thanks to MONUC. It proves that EUFOR contributed to reduction of conflicts simply by its presence in the area and therefore to reduction of deaths and human suffering.

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[151] Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 19

[152] Internaitonal Crisis Group, 'Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown', p.4. Espoir pour tous, 'La Braille de Kinshasa: MONUC et EUFOR impuissantes?', 23 August 2006, http://www.societecivile.cd/node/3032.

In addition, EUFOR managed to create a positive image among local population. It published its own magazine called 'La Paillote'[153], which informed the inhabitants of DRC about EUFOR mission and was very well accepted by them. Furthermore, EU troops ameliorated its image by proving impartiality when they protected both successful presidential candidate and the opposition candidate and also by supporting local hospitals.

Despite the criticism, the EU served to Congo in many ways, i.e. political, economic, technical, diplomatic and military which should be still ameliorated. In fact, the task of EUFOR was to complement MONUC mission. The EU still showed the capability of military intervention which had benefits for international security and EUFOR still fulfilled the mandate from the UNSC Resolution. After the departure of EUFOR, the situation in DRC changed dramatically and violence in Kinshasa escalated causing more than 300 deaths[154]. However, the criticism seems inappropriate according to the mandate of EUFOR. The aim of EUFOR mission was not to maintain long-term stability; the task was merely to assist MONUC and help to stabilize the situation during presidential elections. From that point of view, EUFOR fulfilled its mission[155].

It can be said the operation was restricted to the capital city Kinshasa due to its focus on presidential and parliamentary elections; therefore, the spread of conflict beyond state's borders was improbable. There exist some criticisms that EUFOR was an inappropriate

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[153] Kinshasa : la communication de l'EUFOR RD Congo (2006), accessed at:
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/operations_exterieures/autres_operations/congo/breves/31_10_06_kinshasa_la_communication_de_l_eufor_rd_congo (15/05)

[154] United Nations Human Rights Office, 'Serious Human Rights violations committed in aftermath of Kinshasa events of March 2006', 7 January 2008, www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=16401.

[155] Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 19

'cosmetic operation' which is typical for Europe and not for African dimension[156] because of the time-frame and number of troops.

Overall, EUFOR achieved the mandate as it provided significant support for MONUC during the elections in Democratic Republic of Congo, which means that the operation was externally successful. EUFOR also did not have serious casualties. Secretary General High Representative Javier Solana said that the operation was *a success, both in the way it has been conducted and in its contribution to the overall conclusion of the transition in DRC*[157]. EUFOR managed to solve several situations when a conflict arose or it was highly probable it will arise. It gained most recognition for an intervention during August riots when EU forces in cooperation with UN troops managed to protect several diplomats that found themselves in the middle of the conflict. The success was also underpinned by the fact that EUFOR mandate was narrowed to only support MONUC troops in the area for a limited period of time (during presidential elections) in a limited area (the capital city Kinshasa). If the mandate had been to bring democracy and more importantly to maintain peace in DR Congo as a whole, the situation would have been more difficult and EU capacities would have been tested more profoundly.

2nd set of criteria

The political decision-making and planning process involved three interested groups, which are the UN, the EU and EU member states and focuses on setting criteria of the mandate. The UN formally asked for assistance in DR Congo in December 2005[158] and

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[156] Jean-Yves Haine and Bastina Giegerich, 'In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation', International Herald Tribune, 12 June 2006

[157] United Nations Security Council: Presentation by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR (2007), www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/92360.pdf

[158] Ondarza. N (2008) : 'EU Military Deployment – An Executive Prerogative', p.19

brought it to the attention of the EU presidency. A series of meeting between the EU and the UN took place both in institutional headquarters of both parties, which is in Brussels and New York, and in the capital city of DR Congo Kinshasa. The goal was simply to assess the ongoing situation in DRC and elucidate the mandate of EU forces. The military-strategic planning process began in March 2006 after the EU Council expressed its will to help UN forces. A formal agreement was established shortly after at the end of March 2006, stating that the EU will be independent in forming the EU forces and the coordination procedure was confirmed by an agreement between the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Secretary General of the EU Council Javier Solana[159], by which the framework of EUFOR was set and stated high level of EU troops autonomy. The process was further delayed due to hesitations among the EU member states. At first, it was not clear who will provide the capacities as well as who will command the mission. The focus was placed on Germany, especially from French side, both in terms of commanding and providing troops, but Germany was not ready to make such a commitment. In January 2006, France came up with the idea of creating a battle group consisted of German and French troops, but German involvement in the mission would be much bigger then French, which means higher level of responsibility and also bigger financial burden. Eventually, the EU called on other member and candidate states as well as on third countries to participate in the battle group with a successful result. In the end, Germany and France agreed to provide one third of troops each and the rest was collected from other states. Contrary to France, where the decision was accepted by the president without further delays, Germany was divided about the involvement in the mission, but in the end German

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[159] United Nations Security Council: Presentation by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR (2007),
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/92360.pdf

government agreed to deploy the troops[160]. Nevertheless, German parliament placed several conditions. Contrary to others, the activity of German troops was limited only to the territory of the capital Kinshasa and German government made it clear that they will not accept any prolongation of the 4-month mandate. Delays caused by the necessity of national governments' agreements show that the ability of the EU as a whole to act is related to willingness of member states to participate in missions, both in terms of capacities and finances[161].

As for the planning process, it was officially launched in March 2006. Firstly, the details about EUFOR mandate were set by the UNSC, UNDPKO, the EU and states that provided troops and later stated in the UNSC Resolution 1671, which was adopted on 25 April 2006. Two days later, the EU adopted the JA319. However, the EU planning process was ready in advance, that is before the UNSC Resolution was adopted and the UN did not have possibility to amend it.

Basically, political planning and decision-making is how the mandate and forces are defined, that is the UN, the EU and the EU Member States.[162]Nevertheless, the procedures were not fast enough within governments in the EU and consequently, Member States did not agree on capabilities and infrastructure provision fast enough. It can be said if the consultation mechanisms of the EU and UN had been used fast enough, the procedures would have been eased.

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[160] Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 27

[161] Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 27

[162] EU-UN: Peacekeeping Operations, accessed at: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_252_en.htm (25/05)

Different understanding of EUFOR´s mandate had an impact on the cooperation in the field as well as demands of the EU on its autonomy. There appeared problems because the agreed procedures were too complex and there were certain limitations of EUFOR due to the capacities and in the area of intelligence. The EU-UN cooperation in the field can be described as limited. One of the obstacles was the communication between EUFOR and MONUC in terms of sharing information. Another problem could be seen in EUFOR interoperability. As EUFOR consisted of troops from several countries, each country had its inner standards that differentiated from others and that influenced the inner cooperation.

Further differences can be found concerning the chains of command. While the MONUC command consisted of two parts, the command of EUFOR was more complex, with three centers influencing the course of the operation – in Kinshasa, in Potsdam and in Brussels. Even though this approach assured better control, it proofed to be slow and inadequate for this case. Force Commanders of MONUC and EUFOR also had different competences[163]. While both of them worked in close cooperation, MONUC Force Commander had more competences than EUFOR Force Commander because he had to consult decisions with Operational Headquarters in Potsdam.

Although EUFOR clearly expressed that its autonomy has to be preserved during the mission, the UN troops regarded them as a subordinate unit. The impression was created by the mandate of EUFOR being ready to act in case of emergency. In addition, MONUC supposed that EU troops would provide assistance in areas where MONUC was not strong, for example dealing with crowds. Nevertheless, these expectations were not fulfilled

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[163] Nzongola-Ntalaja G. (2007): 'Leasons Learned from the Artemis and EUFOR Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', Security & Defence Agenda Discussion Paper The EU's Africa Strategy: What are the lessons of the Congo mission?

completely. However, EUFOR assistance proved to be valid in areas such as intelligence or rapid reaction capability and contributed to successful fulfilment of UN mandate.

Overall, support and logistics should not be underestimated as it includes essentials such as accommodation both for living and working, IT, medical support, air transport, water and food, equipment for office etc. During the operation MONUC was in charge of providing logistics, but due to different approaches and practices, this point did not work properly. Misunderstandings and insufficient provision of products for EUFOR occurred frequently and therefore logistics is considered disappointment of the operation[164].

Evaluation

Overall, the operation of EUFOR was a success. EU troops helped significantly to maintain stability during the operation and what is equally important, with no loss of life. In addition, it impeaches the capacity of EUFOR to solve conflicts of larger scale. In addition, EUFOR was criticized for having only a minor share of success of the operation. Moreover, according to some opinions EU troops did not contribute to maintenance of peaceful situation in a long-term scale. After the departure of EUFOR, the situation in DRC changed dramatically and violence in Kinshasa escalated causing more than 300 deaths[165]. However, the criticism seems inappropriate according to the mandate of EUFOR. The aim of EUFOR mission was not to maintain long-term stability; the task was merely to assist MONUC and help to stabilize the situation during presidential elections. From that point of view, EUFOR fulfilled its mission successfully. Nevertheless, still, it can be said the result of the operation is not clear from the following reasons as EUFOR was successful with fulfilling the mandate

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[164] Major, C.(2008): 'EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Institute of Security Studies, EU, p. 23

[165] United Nations Human Rights Office, 'Serious Human Rights violations commited in aftermath of Kinshasa events of March 2006', www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=16401

which is a proof of external effectiveness of the operation, nevertheless, EUFOR-MONUC cooperation was at some points limited and sometimes the operations was affected by the problems upcoming from this fact. First of all, there appeared to be shortcomings in the EU-UN cooperation considering not sufficient cooperation mechanisms and problems with coordination. The EUFOR-MONUC cooperation suffered from lack of information exchange, communication, insufficient procedures that committed EUFOR to MONUC support, lacks in logistics as well as EU pressure on its autonomy. Nevertheless, this fact caused useless costs. Internally the EUFOR was influenced by the insisting of the Member States to participate on decision-making, i.e. 21 countries wanted to take part which negatively affected smooth course of the operation. Also, internal tensions in the EU also negatively affected cooperation mechanism with the UN. There also appeared some shortcomings in the issue of command as EUFOR personnel claimed there were too many both European and national advisors and so the cooperation had to deal with the problems of interoperability, i.e. internal EU cooperation and different European entities within EUFOR and also, cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC, the EU and the UN.

The reason why the cooperation between the EU and the UN still worked and the mission was successful despite all the challenges it was also due to close contacts between the personal contacts, liaison officers and a joint working group that was to implement confidence measures between the local parties. Last but not least, favourable conditions for the operation had also a favourable impact on the missions. The Congolese population became very interested in the elections which EUFOR profited from. The operation was still successful.

4   General evaluation

Cooperation between the EU and the UN is based on bilateral basis, but sometimes, the main obstacles seemed to be the cooperation between member states of each institution on one side and between the EU and the UN on the other side which is connected with the fact the two organizations consisted of too many members. This turned the negotiations into multilateralism on EU and UN level; needless to say it made the decision-making and cooperation process even more complex and both entities had difficulties to harmonize the cooperation within its members in order to strengthen the cooperation on the bilateral EU-UN basis. Secondly, both entities were developing in a different manner which significantly influenced their organizational structures and so, major differences had negative impact on military operations themselves.

Thirdly, forces taking part in joint military operations consisted of several national troops and therefore operational capacity was automatically lowered. Consequently, a 'mixed' force had then difficulties to operate in a more efficient way than trained national troops and there were not sufficient measures which would have reduced the impact of this inevitable loss of efficiency. Also, the cooperation between the EU and the UN was not balanced enough which caused concerns mainly at the EU side which strived to be autonomous; nonetheless, its autonomy sometimes affected the smooth process of transition and cooperation. The European Union also did neither take enough initiatives nor provided enough human resources for operations led by the UN which criticised insufficient provision of qualified personnel. Even though the number of people prepared to serve in operations increased, it was not enough for an achievement of desired results without effective crisis management. There was still insufficient harmonization of procedures and both entities had problems to reach a common consensus when a critical situation occurred and there was a risk of an upcoming conflict. Accordingly, such a process might have saved many obstacles, the level of

coordination might have been elevated and all the operation might have turned out to become more efficient.

Generally, cooperation and harmonization between the two institutions, the communication was not developed enough. Should the joint operation have been a success, there would have to be better information exchange and sharing of best practices. Better information basis would have most certainly contributed to the capacity of swift reactions if there had been an uprising conflict. In addition, improvement in this area would have further increased mutual harmonization. Nevertheless, in order to improve the information, there was not a sufficient technical background set up between the two institutions. Communication was limited to the highest posts in both entities, and was not encouraged also between personnel of both institutions so that the most fruitful results possible were achieved. EU-UN headquarters did not consider enough creating a secure communication channel, but of course, a considerable amount of money invested in such technology would have been required which presented considerable obstacle.

As mentioned before, the main obstacle of successful mission operating proved to be the level of cooperation. The lack of coordination negatively contributed to results of joint operation or at least decelerated the whole progress. In context of enhancing partnership between the two organizations, a simple logistic step could be undertaken. The presence of representatives in both institutional headquarters should have been expanded; that means more EU representatives should have been sent to UN headquarters in New York and vice versa. Such seemingly insignificant measure could have liven up relations between both entities and enhance mutual cooperation. As far as the EU is concerned, it also did not promote itself more intensively enough so that its contribution to joint missions would not have been overshadowed by the UN. For example, the EU did not provide enough resources to the General Secretariat of the European Council which would have be used to finance

missions. Furthermore, there was a moment in history of joint EU-UN operations when EU voice became louder than before in EU-UN relations. It was during French presidency in 2000 when former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana actively participated at the UN Security Council meeting. The event could serve as a good example of further cooperation and the EU should aspire to promote its position in similar manners, especially when operations are led by UN in cooperation with the EU. Furthermore, both institutions should seek to adjust their operational procedures to become more inter-compatible in order to prevent possible discrepancies in military operations.

5 Conclusion

The European Union is strongly committed to multilateralism and recognition for the UN system and strives to make cooperation within the global system as efficient as possible which has the influence on its effectiveness as well as legitimacy and decision-making. That is the reason why EU crisis management is closely interconnected with the UN structures. From my research, it has come out that after participation in several operations and commitment to take part in others, the European Union has already proved that it is a key player on the world scene in crisis management as it has shown its high attention to world crises, not only in Europe. It can be said that the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo tested the approach of the European Union to crisis management in the cooperation with the United Nations as the role of the EU in the crisis management significantly strengthened. On the Congolese crisis, the demonstration of the coordination between the EU and the UN in crisis management was provided including two military operations, i.e. Artemis and EUFOR RDC to support the UN Mission MONUC.

It needs to be acknowledged there are three actors; these are the United Nations, the European Union and the EU Member States. It is crucial for the European Union to promote its coherence and internal cooperation which is also valuable for the United Nations.

It can be summarized that already after the operation Artemis, the EU and the UN realized their cooperation was successfully operational, complementary and they could reach common objectives. Since then, the EU has been an important partner in crisis management; even though, sometimes it the autonomy is demanded from the EU side which might cause difficulties for an operation. In general, the partnership brings numerous advantages for both actors. EU brings rapid deployment which it is better at and on the other hand, the EU gains experience in peace stabilization, planning, coordination at all levels, exchange of

information, reporting, joint decision-making as well as summarizing and gaining experience from learnt lessons.

Nevertheless, there are several issues on the agenda that still concern the United Nations and the European Union. Even though, in general, the operations have been successful, there is still some ambiguity about the overall results and a discussion how the UN, the EU were able to cooperate and manage to cohere coordination despite major differences such as in their political agendas, institutional procedures and objectives. It has to be added the officials from both military and civilian operations checking the situation criticized the course of the cooperation and stated not all the important information from the previous peacekeeping operations were accepted and lessons learnt adopted and implemented. They also expressed their worries and doubts concerning motivation to deal with the problems. The issue is important from both political and strategic point of view and is notably challenging for future cooperation of the actors[166]. From the research, it comes out that the success can be achieved only when actions are taken in a coherent way. And, moreover, such coordination shall be recognized by both actors as well as by their member states. Still, the EU needs to deal with complexity and difficulty of crisis management, to make its action, command and mechanism more coherent with the UN crisis management in order to enforce and maintain peace, maintain law and order and to build peace efficiently. At the political level, both entities proved to be complementary. The EU should become stronger within the UN structure; the UN needs EU for its crisis management. More profound cooperation would positively influence results of joint operations and therefore both partners should exert effort to interconnect in areas such as exchange of information and personnel, strategic preparations, assessment of results, special training or crisis management.

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[166] 'la contribution de l'UE a la securite du procesus electoral en république démocratique du congo', Les cahiers de Mars, no. 191, 2007, pp. 89-92

It can be also said that overall share of the EU and crisis management might be higher, mainly with the concentration on the African continent. Both the European Union and Africa bound to cooperate to fight against common problems, both global and regional. They committed to strive to achieve Millennium Development Goals. There are without any doubts several challenges in mutual EU-UN relationship on which both institutions should focus. Both entities must realize that the relationship between them has to stay balanced in order to maintain partnership available of future development. The disparities of the two actors, the EU and the UN are mainly of cultural, organisational and structural character which will, nevertheless, remain the same in the future. It might be estimated that cooperation between the two actors, the EU and the UN will always tend to be on the lower level than a national deployment. This problem might be gradually diminished but probably not resolved completely.

6   Appendice

MONUC Facts and Figures

Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml

Current authorization until 30 June 2010
Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010

Strength

Initial authorization

- 5,537 troops
- 500 military observers
- Appropiate civilian component

Current authorization

Security Council resolution 1856 of 31 July 2007

- 19,815 military personnel
- 760 military observers
- 391 police
- 1,050 personnel of formed police units
- Appropiate civilian component

Current (30 April 2010)

- 20,819 total uniformed personnel
  - 18,884 troops
  - 712 military observers
  - 1,223 police
- 991 international civilian personnel
- 2,749 local civilian staff
- 634 United Nations Volunteers

Note: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 31 March 2010

Country contributors

Military personnel

Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania,

Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yemen and Zambia.

Police personnel

Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Guinea, India, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

Fatalities

- 99 troops
- 6 police
- 10 military observer
- 12 international civilian
- 30 local civilian

- **157 total**

Financial aspects

- **Method of financing:** Assessment in respect of a Special Account
- **Approved budget (1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010):** $1,350.00 million

7 Abstract

The focus of this research is in the area of EU-UN relations crisis management, more specifically, the role which the European Union plays within the UN structure as a contributor to the UN crisis management as well as to numerous peacekeeping missions. This occurs at the time when the UN needs to face the crises and seek support of other world players to carry out the missions so that a chance to succeed in these difficult tasks would be higher. The research approach adopted in the thesis includes qualitative analysis and case study methods. The findings from this research provide evidence that the European Union is a competent partner for the United Nations in the field of crisis management, in spite of different policies and agendas. The main conclusion is that the European Union, after participation in several operations and commitment to take part in others, the organisation has already proved that it is a key player on the world scene in crisis management as it has shown its high attention to world crises, not only in Europe.

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